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I.

INTRODUCTION

Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their symbols with freedom of revision, must ultimately decay eitherfrom anarchy, orfrom the slow atrophy of a life
stifled by useless shadows.'

In the last five years, the Supreme Court has shown intense
interest in the Constitution's requirements for separation of powers between the branches of the Federal Government. In particular, the Court has been occupied with a reappraisal of the relatively new arrangement of governmental powers approved by
predecessor Courts under the banner of "administrative law." 2
Occasionally, the Court has shown its concern by dramatically
striking down acts of Congress on highly controversial grounds.
The Court's decisions against the Bankruptcy Act of 1978,' the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, 4 and the "legislative vetoes" contained in hundreds of federal laws, 5 make clear that the Court has
been troubled by possible departures from the original scheme of
balanced powers.
In a subset of these cases, the Court has interpreted and applied provisions of the Constitution providing for an independent
judiciary. This Article is concerned with those cases and their historical background. Specifically, the subject of this Article is the
development, from 1789 onward, of increasingly broad exceptions
to the Constitution's requirement that federal judicial cases be
tried by an equal and independent federal judicial branch of
government.
The 1982 case, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 6 illustrates the Court's intensified concern with in1. A. WHIrEHEAD, SYMBOLISM 88 (1927), quoted in Frankfurter, Book Review, 77 U. PA.
L. Rzv. 436, 438 (1929) (reviewing B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928)).
2. See, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986);
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 105
S. Ct. 3325 (1985): Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
3. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50.
4. See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181.
5. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
6. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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cursions upon the Constitution's guarantee of an independent judiciary. In Northern Pipeline, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute creating a federal bankruptcy court staffed by
judges serving for a fixed term of years.7 The Court determined
that the creation of such an institution did not comply with article
III, the Constitution's provision governing the judiciary.8
Article III vests "the judicial power of the United States . . .
in one Supreme Court and in such inferior federal Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 9 Additionally, it provides that the judges of those courts, which have come
to be known as "article III courts" or "constitutional courts,"10
shall have tenure for life and salaries that cannot be reduced once
fixed. The aim of these provisions is to establish the judiciary as
an independent branch of government, insulated from grosser
forms of political pressures transmitted through the other
branches.1 2 The judicial power covers all cases arising under the
Constitution and under the laws and treaties of the United
States."' This grant allows article III courts an expandable judicial
jurisdiction to meet the output of the federal lawmaking
processes.
In short, article III commands that the judicial power is to be
vested in article III courts. Most literally, this means that federal
judicial bodies hearing cases under federal law must be politically
insulated article III courts. It is not clear, however, to what extent
the framers intended article III to be applied in a relentlessly lit7. Id. at 60-62.
8. Id. at 76, 87 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in the judgment).
9. U.S. CONsr. art. III, § I. Article 111, section 1 provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.
10. See 458 U.S. at 57-60.
11.. U.S. CONST.art. III,

§

1.

12. "'Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence
of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.. . . In the general course of human
nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will.' " 458 U.S. at 60
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 491 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (emphasis in

original)).
13. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
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eral way to every judicial-style decision of a federal officer applying federal law to specific facts. What is clear is that article III has
been applied in an increasingly flexible way. The Supreme Court
has allowed some adjudication under federal law to be conducted
at the trial level by federal courts that are not protected by article
III. These courts have come to be known as "article I courts" or
"legislative courts. ' 14 Similarly, the Court has allowed some federal adjudication to be conducted at the trial level by administrative agencies outside the aegis of article III.1"
Exceptions permitting non-article III federal judicial bodies
to operate in the territories 6 and to try court martial cases17 came
early, but, because of the rationales advanced to support these exceptions, they can be read quite narrowly."8 More cryptic, and,
hence, more potentially generative, is an exception to article III's
scope recognized in the 1855 case, Murray'sLessee v. Hoboken Land
Co. "'9 There, the Court concluded that what it called "publicrights cases," unlike "private-rights cases," could be determined
by non-article III bodies.2 0
Under one interpretation of Murray's Lessee, public-rights
cases constituted a closed and rather small category defined by
reference to eighteenth century British practice. 2' Another interpretation of Murray's Lessee sees public-rights cases as those involving federally created privileges such as land grants. 2 2 This broader
14. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60-62.
15. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3334 (1985) and
authorities cited therein.
16. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). An exception for
courts, sitting in the District of Columbia and applying acts of Congress solely for the governance of the District, was not established beyond doubt until 1973. Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). Despite this, there were early suggestions of such an exception. Id. at 405.
17. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
18. In the opinion of the Northern Pipeline plurality, these exceptions were justified by
the constitutional grants to Congress of plenary power that enable it to legislate for the
District of Columbia and the territories. 458 U.S. at 70.
19. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272. See infra Section I(B).
20. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
21. This was apparently Louis Jaffe's view. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
In fact, in considering a due process challenge to a statute that authorized tax sales prior to
an adjudication of indebtedness, the Murray's Lessee Court referred to pre-revolutionary
English procedures. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276-82.
22. Cf. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3336-37 (1985)
(noting that the congressionally created cause of action in issue did not displace preexisting
rights).
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interpretation prevailed and, at times, seemed to broaden still further.23 In 1932, in Crowell v. Benson,24 the Court read article III
even more flexibly. It allowed non-article III tribunals substantial
powers, even in the formerly sacrosanct domain of private-rights
cases, which involve contests between two private parties such as
were traditionally determined at common law, in equity or in
admiralty.25
I believe that it was the cumulative effect of the series of exceptions to article III described above that moved most of the Justices participating in Northern Pipeline to go beyond the case
before them and to attempt a clarification of the scope and status
of the Constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary.
These Justices apparently wanted to make clear that the tenure
and salary protections had not been, and would not be, effectively
read out of the Constitution. 6
Going on record in favor of a meaningful article III was most
obviously an aim of the plurality of Justices in Northern Pipeline,
including Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.27 Writing
for the plurality, Justice Brennan attempted to draw a detailed
map of article III that would accommodate and clarify existing
exceptions while carefully limiting them.28 Among the exceptions
acknowledged by the plurality was the one for public-rights cases
that originated in Murray's Lessee.29 The plurality concluded that,
in public-rights cases, the Constitution permits the use of an article I court.30 Still, the plurality was not certain precisely what
sorts of cases were to be included in the public-rights category:
The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present
cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise "between the government and others." In contrast, the liability
of one individual to another under the law as defined .

.

. is a matter of

23. See infra Section II(E)(3).
24. 285 U.S. 22.
25. Id. at 51-52.
26. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71-76, 8086 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion): id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment): id. at 113-16 (White, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 52, 64-86 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
28. Id. at 64-86.
29. Id. at 67-70.
30. Id.
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private rights."1

For other cases involving the assertion of rights created by Congress, but not falling within the public-rights category,32 the plurality allowed non-article III adjudication under somewhat more

stringent safeguards. 3 The plurality left the line between the congressionally-created-rights category of cases and its public-rights
subset unclear at best.34
In 1985, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co.,3 5 and again, in 1986, in Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 8 the Court struggled with the present-day significance of the public-rights and private-rights categories and with
the proper general approach to article III exceptions.3 7 As a result, a majority of the Court, including some defectors from the
Northern Pipeline plurality, 8 chose to deemphasize the public
rights/private rights distinction and to approach article III protections in a different way. This new approach substitutes a caseby-case balancing test for formulaic sub-rules in determining the
validity of instances of non-article III adjudication. 9 Thus, it aims
directly at an accomodation between the demands of modern dispute resolution and the protection against the recurrence of the
dangers that called for an insulated judiciary in 1789.40 This Article will return to Northern Pipeline, Thomas, and Schor for a more
complete description, some criticism, and some praise. 4 1
The history of the public rights/private rights distinction has
never been fully explored in scholarship or in court opinion. The
primary purpose of this Article is to trace the history of the
31. Id. at 69-70 (footnote omitted) (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451
(1929), and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
32. Such rights might be seen to include statutory causes of action that Congress confers in substitution for pre-existing causes of action at common law or in admiralty. See,
e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
33. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76-86
(1982).
34. See id. at 67-70, 76-86.
35. 105 S. Ct. 3325.
36. 106 S.Ct. 3245.
37. Id. at 3255-61: Thomas, 105 S. Ct. at 3333-39.
38. In Schor, Justices Stevens and Blackmun deserted Justices Brennan and Marshall.
106 S. Ct. at 3245.
39. Id. at 3256-61: Thomas, 105 S. Ct. at 3336-37.
40. See Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3256-61.
41. See infra Section III.
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Court's flexible approach to article III's protections and, in particular, to trace the history and influence of the exception for public-rights cases.
What follows deals with the development of a technical exception for such public-rights cases, originating with, among other
sources, Murray's Lessee. It is also concerned with how the Court

came to allow considerable room for non-article III adjudication
in private-rights cases.
One thesis of this Article is that a shift in the way judges perceived the appropriate line between the public and private spheres
of action caused them to see many formerly private cases as public. This, I believe, led to a similar relaxation of the requirement
that an independent article III judge hear cases still nominally
termed private.
At its conclusion, this Article, will turn somewhat critically to
the Court's current approach toward the validity of non-article III
federal adjudication.
II.

THE EVOLUTION AND INFLUENCE OF THE

"PUBLIC RIGHTS" EXCEPTION: FROM MURRAY'S LESSEE
TO CROWELL

The Second Life of Crowell v. Benson

A.

Although it might be thought that attempts to vest adjudicatory powers in
non-judicial hands necessarily violate the separation of powers principle,
courts have not often invalidated statutes on this basis.
At the federal level the validity of such [transfers of powers] has long
been settled by Crowell v. Benson."2

I will begin with Crowell v. Benson,43 the case bridging the old
and new article III jurisprudence and providing the basis for expansion of non-article III adjudication. In Crowell, the Supreme
Court considered administrative agency adjudication of a workers'
compensation case brought against an employer by his alleged employee. 44 A majority of the Court concluded that, because the underlying dispute concerned the liability of one private party to another, it was a private-rights case. The majority formally
42.
LAW

W.

GEI..HORN,

C.

BYsE,

P. S'RAuss, T.

RAKOFF

& R.

SCHOTLAND, ADMINISTRATIVF

105 (8th ed. 1987).

43.
44.

285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Id. at 36-37. For a complete description of Crowell, see infra subsections I and 2 of

this Section.
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recognized that private-rights cases, 45 tried federally, must be disposed of only in a federal court.46 In so concluding, the majority
47
perpetuated the analysis of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co.
Yet, even though formally perpetuating the notion that private-rights cases must be tried in an article III court, the majority
in Crowell hastened the erosion of judicial protection in such
cases. 8 While the majority did require court involvement in private disputes, the required involvement was quite restricted. According to Crowell, in a wide variety of private rights disputes, the
article III courts' only role is to review for errors of law, including
gross inadequacy in the fact-finding process. In other words, Congress can require initial submission to an administrative agency
whose findings of facts must be treated as final by the courts, absent any error of law. Thus, Congress functionally has great freedom to employ agencies instead of article III trial courts. 9 Crowell
reached this conclusion despite the Constitution's clear language
vesting the judicial power in tenured article III judges.5 0 In Crow45. Id. at 51.
46. Id. at 50-51. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855),
does this by distinguishing cases of public rights from cases of common law, equity, or
admiralty, the latter three being cases of private right. Id. at 284-85. The Court also may
intend that all suits between private parties are private-rights suits. See id. As discussed
extensively in Section Ill(B) of this Article, the Court nowhere makes clear precisely how
private-rights suits are to be defined. It simply makes clear that ordinary actions at law, in
equity and in admiralty between purely private parties are included in the category. The
majority in Crowell views suits between private parties, brought to establish the monetary
liability of some of them to others, as squarely within the private-right suit category. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51. Whether such suits were seen as subsuming the private-rights category
is not clear.
47. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). See infra subsection B of this Section.
48. Indeed, in his dissenting opinion in Northern Pipeline,Justice White, joined by the
Chief Justice and justice Powell, stated that the article III public rights/private rights distinction had appeared to receive its "death blow" in Crowell. 458 U.S. at 109. The plurality
of Justices in that case thought otherwise. Id. at 67-70.
49.

That Crowell was a case of private right, by the majority's own standards, is not in

doubt. 285 U.S. at 51. The characterization of Crowell as allowing an agency to function
substantially as a trial court is a fair one. See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND
MATERIAIS

144 (3d ed. 1982); D.

CURRIE, JURISDIcTrION IN A NUTSHELL

37-38 (1976).

That the dispute in Crowell would have been within the judicial power if brought in a
court is not in doubt. Virtually any conceivable federal agency or executive branch adjudication involves matters that, if placed in a court, would come squarely within the judicial
power as defined in article III. Thejudicial power includes, among other things, suits arising under federal law and those in admiralty. US. COnST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The dispute in
Crowell fell, without question, into each of those categories.
50. For the text of article III, section 1, see supra note 9.
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ell, the agency's personnel enjoyed no article III tenure and salary
protection.51 The judicial power clearly includes the power to conduct trials as much as the power to hear appeals. Consequently,
Crowell effectively permitted, though not in formal terms, substitution of federal administrative agencies for regular trial courts.
All eight participating Justices agreed that, even in many private-rights cases, such a substitution of an agency for an article III
trial court could be made. The eight Justices included three dissenters (Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts) who would have gone even
further in allowing agencies to displace the courts. Felix Frankfurter, then professor of public law at Harvard Law School, concluded that Congress' power to make such a substitution should
have been clear to those steeped in federal public law.52 With the
exception of the lower courts in Crowell, none of the lower federal
courts that had applied the Longshoremen's Act, which was at issue in Crowell, found constitutional difficulties. 53 None of the law
review commentary on Crowell takes issue with, or even finds
novel, Crowell's conclusion allowing executive branch trials in
many cases involving private rights.54 Despite this consensus, the
conclusion that article III permitted such adjudication was significantly, if not entirely, unprecedented and required an extremely
flexible reading of the Constitution's judicial power provisions.
To me, the mystery has always been how the view advanced
in Crowell became so clear to such distinguished Justices and scholars by 1932, months before the New Deal and years before Courtpacking pressures. What follows is an effort to solve that puzzle
and to further examine the origins and development of the related category of public-rights cases. The puzzle's solution is to be
found partly in a series of technical doctrinal developments.
51. The Deputy Commissioners were appointed by the Commissioners. Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 69-803, §§ 39, 40, 44 Stat.
1424, 1442-43 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1982)) [hereinafter
Longshoremen's Acti. The Commissioners themselves had but six year terms. Act of Sept.
7, 1916, ch. 458, § 28, 39 Stat. 742, 748 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
52. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
53. See cases cited in Justice Brandeis's Crowell dissent, 285 U.S. at 68 n.3; see also infra
notes 58 & 61 and accompanying text.
54. See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson, JudicialReview of Administrative Determinations of
ConstitutionalFact, 80 U. PA. L. RE:v. 1055 (1932); Note, 46 HARV. L. REV. 478 (1933): Comment, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1312 (1932); Comment, 41 YALE LJ. 1037 (1932); Recent Decision
32 COLUM. L. REv. 738 (1932).
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These developments, however, are fully explainable only in terms
of changes in the relative domains of public and private law and in
terms of changes in the ways judges and scholars viewed the Constitution when it blocked desired modernization.
1. A Brief Look at'the First Life of Crowell v. Benson.
February 29, 1932
Dear Stone:
I am again in mourning. Indeed, the decisions in the Standard Nut case
and in Crowell v. Benson make me wonder whether law is really my beat ....
That the Chief should have ... determined the result in Crowell v. Benson
[makes me say to myself] "Either his mode of legal reasoning or mine is
without warrant." Truly, but for the dissents in both cases, I should feel I
had no business to spend my life in public law, since my own understanding
of those matters is so different from that of the Court. 5

The first life of Crowell v. Benson5" is that of the "jurisdictional facts" and "constitutional facts" doctrines discussed immediately below. Those doctrines are now nearly extinct, and Professor Frankfurter's position has been vindicated.5"
The essentials of the Crowell case are simple. The United
States Employees' Compensation Commission had the authority to
determine, in the first instance, certain employee compensation
claims.5" Crowell, Deputy Commissioner of the agency, had made

55. Letter from Professor Frankfurter to Mr. Justice Stone (Feb. 29, 1932) (available
in The Papers of Felix Frankfurter, General Correspondence File, Harlan F. Stone sub-file,
microfilm reel no. 64 at Manuscript Division of Library of Congress). The Standard Nut
case referred to was presumably Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498
(1932). The Court allowed an injunction against tax collection, although prohibited by the
language of a federal statute. Apparently Professor Frankfurter agreed with his correspondent's dissent which was joined by Justice Brandeis. Presumably all Crowell and Standard
Nut have in common, from the professor's perspective, are an unnecessarily stingy view of
the power of the federal government to conduct public business, and the dissents by his
friends, Stone and Brandeis.
56. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
57. By this, I mean that the constitutional and jurisdictional facts doctrines are largely
moribund. See P. BATOR, P. MIsHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COUR-rS AND THE FEDERAL. SYsTrEM 339-40 & nn.14-17 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
HART & WECHSIERI. For a more extensive discussion of the demise of the jurisdictional

facts doctrine and of the paring down of the constitutional facts doctrine, see infra note 76
and accompanying text.
58. 285 U.S. at 42-44. The Commission was created by Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458,
§ 28, 39 Stat. 742, 748 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), and its
functions and relationship to the federal courts were defined in the Longshoremen's Act,
supra note 51.
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an award against Benson and in favor of Knudsen, his alleged employee. 59 Benson brought suit in federal district court, requesting
that the award be set aside and that its enforcement be enjoined
as contrary to law. In particular, Benson alleged that the requisite
employer-employee relationship did not exist at the time of the
accident.6" Read in the most plausible way, the enabling Act required the federal courts, on judicial review, to defer to the
agency's findings of fact as if those courts were appellate courts
reviewing findings made by a federal district court.61
Under this interpretation of the judicial review provisions,
there was a strong claim that Congress had violated the Constitution's command that the judicial power be vested in article III
courts. This was a forceful argument, because the Constitution defines the judicial power as including cases in admiralty and cases
arising under the laws of the United States. 2 The proceedings in
Crowell fit easily into each of these categories6 3 and, because they
involved the application of law to fact and the entering of an order, they were of a judicial, as opposed to a legislative nature.
There was thus a question as to why any federal body to which
such a matter was consigned did not need to qualify as a fullyprotected article III court.
59. 285 U.S. at 36-37.
60. Id. at 37.
61. The relevant portions of the Longshoremen's Act were not completely clear on
the proper scope of review:
If not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be suspended or set
aside, in whole or in part, through injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by any party in interest against the deputy commissioner making
the order, and instituted in the Federal district court for the judicial district in
which the injury occurred (or in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
if the injury occurred in the District) ....
Longshoremen's Act, supra note 51, § 21(b), at 1436 (dealing with proceedings brought
by a party seeking to overturn a Commission award). "If the court determines that the
order was made and served in accordance with law, and that such employer . . . [hasi
failed to comply therewith, the court shall enforce obedience to the order. . . . Id. § 21(c),
at 1436-37 (dealing with employers' contesting awards in proceedings brought by the Commission or by employees to enforce an award). "Proceedings for suspending, setting aside,
or enforcing a compensation order, whether rejecting a claim or making an award, shall
not be instituted otherwise than as provided in this section or section 18." Id. § 21(d), at
1437. Section 18, referred to in section 2 1(d), deals with collection from employers of payments with respect to which they are in default. Section 18 also provides that the federal
courts are to honor Commission awards if made "in accordance with law."
62. See U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
63. 285 U.S. at 39.
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The district court permitted itself de novo reconsideration of
the facts, as found by the agency, bearing on the existence of the
employment relationship."4 Indeed, as de novo consideration permits, it heard evidence which was not presented to the agency. 5
The court determined, contrary to the agency's findings, that the
requisite employment relationship did not exist.66
Despite the statute's language restricting review to errors of
law, the district court had allowed itself de novo review because of
its concern for the constitutionality of the administrative scheme
if it did not permit all facts found by the agency to be redetermined by an article III court. 67 The Supreme Court affirmed on a
much narrower rationale. It required de novo judicial review only
of the facts bearing on employment. Its theory was that employment was a special sort of fact, a "jurisdictional fact," whose establishment was prerequisite to the agency's having jurisdiction. As
to such special facts, but not as to. ordinary facts such as the existence or the extent of injury, the Court held that the Constitution
required de novo fact-finding by an article III court.6 " Likewise,
the Court acknowledged that certain other special facts underlying constitutional claims were fundamental and must, therefore,
be subject to redetermination in an article III Court. 69 Having
drawn these conclusions, the majority in Crowell interpreted the
statute to allow de novo review of the facts underlying the
agency's conclusion that Knudsen was Benson's employee.7 0 Thus,
by adroit statutory interpretation, the Court avoided having to act
on its constitutional dictum. 7 ' The story of the statements in Crow64. Id. at 37.
65. Crowell v. Benson, 45 F.2d 66, 67 (5th Cir. 1930).
66. 285 U.S. at 37.
67. Benson v. Crowell, 33 F.2d 137, 141-42 (S.D. Ala. 1929), 38 F.2d 306 (supplemental opinion), affld, 45 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1930). The court of appeals, in affirming the decision of the district court, had given some weight to the facts in question in Benson. The
facts were, in its view, those "upon which Ithel official's ... power to act at all is dependent." 45 F.2d at 68-69. In other words, they were jurisdictional in the schema of Hughes'
opinion.
68. 285 U.S. at 54-65.
69. Id. at 60-61.
70. Id. at 62-63. While the district court made clear its view that the Constitution
required the court be free to redetermine all contested facts, the only fact-finding contested before the federal district court was the fact of employment, characterized by the
Supreme Court as fundamental. Again, this is revealed in the opinion of the court of appeals. 45 F.2d at 67.
71. Interpretations of statutes to avoid serious constitutional doubt produce state-

778

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

ell requiring de novo review of constitutional facts and jurisdictional facts is the story of the first life of Crowell v. Benson. It was
the only feature of that case found noteworthy by the law journals
of its day.7 2 Those statements were attacked by friends of the
emerging bureaucracy, including not only Justices Brandeis,
Stone, and Roberts, but also Frankfurter, and, with great intellectual power, John Dickinson. 3
Today, some fifty years after Crowell, all of these dissenters
have largely won. While the Court has never expressly overruled
Crowell, it has limited the jurisdictional and constitutional facts
doctrines almost out of existence. Those fundamental facts that
must be redetermined by a court, though properly determined by
an agency in the first instance, seem limited to a very few civil
contexts.7 5 Examples of this can be found in some immigration
and first amendment cases, where important civil liberties are at
stake. 6
ments about the Constitution which occupy a middle position on what might roughly be
called the dictum-holding continuum. Somewhat closer to pure holding are clear statements of the hypothetical unconstitutionality of the most plausible interpretation of a statute, which are then used to justify a somewhat strained interpretation. The Crowell majority's pronouncements on constitutional requirements for de novo review of jurisdictional
facts are in the latter category of semi-holding.
72. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
73. See Dickinson, supra note 54. For a description of Dickinson's professional accomplishments, see infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text. In my estimation, and based
solely on a comparison of the quantity and quality of his published work with that of
others, Dickinson's thinking on administrative law was by far the best of those who focused
on the subject in the 1920's and 1930's.
74. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
75. By "redetermine" I mean either that a court can make new findings of fact after
hearing new evidence, as did the district court in Crowell, or that a court can make new
findings of fact based upon the record established by the agency. Both involve a complete
substitution of judgment by a court as to the facts found. They differ only as to the body of
material from which conclusions can be freely drawn.
76. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts: an Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. RF~v. 1362, 1375 (1953). Henry Hart concluded in 1953 that, in
the field of civil liability, the doctrine of jurisdictional facts was seriously in question. He
did conclude that, in areas where liberty is at stake, something resembling the doctrine
continued to require careful court review. For example, in suits to expel alleged aliens who
claim citizenship, the basic facts determined originally by the immigration authorities were
subject to de nov) examination in a federal trial court. Id. at 1389 (citing Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)). Hart's legal-literary successors make clear that the doctrine
has withered in the years since Hart wrote. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see
also D. CURRIF, FEDERAL. COURM: CASES AND MATERIALS 144 (3d ed. 1982). The exception
for at least some liberty interests has survived. See, e.g., Agosto v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. 436 U.S. 748, 752-53 (1978). For a description of what may be a limited, but
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What survives of Crowell, in robust form, is its conclusion that
non-article III tribunals can be used extensively by Congress to
finally determine most facts, even in purely private controversies.
This portion of Crowell and its pedigree are described in the next
Section.
2. The Second Life.
Well, the solid or apparently solid thing about Crowell is the holding that
administrative findings of non-constitutional and non-jurisdictional facts may
be made conclusive upon the courts, if not infected with any error of law, as

a basis for
judicial enforcement of a money liability of one private person to
7
another.

It is Henry Hart's "apparently solid thing about Crowell" that
has allowed it a second life, this one successful. Crowell has been
correctly viewed as the first case that broadly approved transfers
of trial jurisdiction from courts to agencies.7 8 Indeed, with the de-

mise of Crowell's holding, its statements about nonjurisdictional
and nonconstitutional facts have taken on new importance. They
have been used in civil disputes to justify final agency determination of virtually any fact, whether fundamental or not.7 9
By the time of Crowell, the general legitimacy of final factfinding by agencies was widely recognized among sophisticated
lawyers. The positions of the Justices in that case, and of Frankfurter, John Dickinson, and other legal scholars, make that clear.
Because article III vests the judicial power, trial and appellate, 0 in the tenured judiciary, the developments described above
require explanation. Do the opinions in Crowell adequately explain
its pedigree?
a. The Opinions. The most striking feature of the opinions in
Crowell-majority and dissent-is the weakness of the reasoning
supporting their one shared conclusion: that ordinary (i.e. non-

important, revival in first amendment case, see Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
COuM. L. REv. 229 (1985).
77. Hart, supra note 76, at 1375. Because Crowell involved only the fact of employment, found by the Court to require special procedures, its statements permitting ordinary
fact-finding by agencies are dictum from the very strictest point of view. Those statements,
however, are most clear and forceful. Hart is not alone in treating them as an important
declaration. See D. CURRIE, supra note 76, at 144.
78. D. CURRIE, supra note 76, at 144.
79. Id.
80 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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constitutional and nonjurisdictional) issues of fact, in at least some
cases of private rights, can be determined finally by an administrative agency. After making a plausible case that such adjudication
suffices in public-rights cases,81 Hughes, for the majority, turns to
private-rights cases:
The present case does not fall within the categories just described but is one
of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another. . . . But
in cases of that sort, there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges. On the common law side of the
Federal courts, the aid of juries is not only deemed appropriate but is required by the Constitution itself. . . [I]t is historic practice to call to the
assistance of the courts, without the consent of the parties, masters and commissioners . . . to pass on certain classes of questions . . . . While [their]
reports. . . are essentially of an advisory nature, it has not been the practice
they are properly based upon evidence, in the
to disturb their findings when
82
absence of errors of law.

These arguments exhaust the majority's efforts at reconciling the
questioned provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act with the requirement of article III that the judicial power
of the United States be vested in article III courts. The arguments
against each justification asserted-the institutional precedents of
(1) fact-finding by juries and (2) the fact-finding by aides to courts
such as magistrates-are so strong and, in the case of juries, so
plain, that Hughes seems to feel the need to acknowledge the
weaknesses in his own arguments.
As the Chief Justice points out, in the case of juries, the Constitution itself embodies a decision to preserve that ancient institution.8 3 This, of course, rules out a conclusion that article III
judges must find all facts in all federal adjudications, but it hardly
compels the inference that other institutions not expressly recognized by the Constitution are to have power resembling that of
juries.
Even if the Constitution is read liberally as allowing fact-finding by any institution similar to a jury, administrative agencies are
81. For the majority's view of what constituted a private-rights suit, see supra text
accompanying note 46. For the seeds of such a definition in Murray's Lessee, see supra note
46 and subsection B of this Section.
82. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
83. Id. ("ITIhe aid of juries is not only deemed appropriate but is required by the
Constitution.").
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unlike juries in crucial ways. Juries, like article III courts, are insulated from congressional and presidential tenure and salary pressures. Administrative agencies, however, do not enjoy such constitutionally guaranteed insulation." Consequently, if the right to a
jury trial has any bearing on the issue of administrative fact-finding, its unique nature affords the basis for an implication that
agencies cannot be granted the same fact-finding powers.
Again, in presenting his second precedent-that of special
masters-Hughes seems compelled to recognize the weakness of
his point. These aides to courts make findings of fact that, unlike
the findings by the agency in Crowell, do not bind the courts.8 5
The statute in Crowell, as interpreted by the Court, made agency
fact-finding final. Courts, however, were free to disregard the
findings of masters.86 That they rarely did so may well have been
a product of the courts' control over masters. The decision to appoint a master, and that of whom to appoint, were judicial decisions.8 7 While such a pattern of judicially self-imposed deference
to masters could conceivably raise issues under article III, they
would be of a different magnitude from the issues raised, as in
Crowell, by a congressionally compelled requirement of deference
to officials not selected by the judiciary.8 8 Thus, the opinion of the
majority rests on two institutions that are allegedly analogous to
federal administrative agencies but that are, in fact, sharply distinguishable. 9 Indeed, the analogies are so inapposite that they
84. Of course, Congress can confer statutory insulation upon members of agencies in
the form of life tenure and undiminishable salaries. Unless Congress has engaged the constitutional trip wire by creating an article III tribunal, article III does not prohibit a repeal.
While the fifth amendment may require compensation for breach of a purely statutory
guarantee of life tenure if property rights have vested, sovereign immunity provides a defense if Congress chooses to invoke it. See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 16668 (1894). Whether sovereign immunity trumps article III salary protection is not so clear.
85. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
86. See J. RosE, JURISDIcTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 570, at 498-99
(1931).
87. Rule 68, Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S.
627, 669 (1912) (effective 1913).
88. Justice Brandeis makes a similar argument in an earlier case permitting judicially
appointed and controlled assessors to find facts. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13
(1920).
89. 1 am not the first to find weakness in the majority opinion in Crowell. See L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE A(TION 88 (1965). Jaffe limits his comments to the
suggestive question, "But is [Hughes'] analogy [to jury and master] convincing? The jury
and master have long been traditional as adjuncts." Id.
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amount to virtually no explanation of the institution they are invoked to justify.
Justice Brandeis wrote a dissent in Crowell, which Justices
Roberts and Stone joined. These Justices did not, however, dissent on the issue I am considering. The dissenters agreed with the
majority that Congress is. free, in a wide variety of cases, to have
facts finally determined by federal bodies other than article III
courts. The dissenters' support for this proposition is also transparently weak:
The "judicial power" of Article III of the Constitution is the power of
the federal government, and not of any inferior tribunal. There is in that
Article nothing which requires any controversy to be determined as of first
instance in the federal district courts. The jurisdiction of those courts is sub-

ject to the control of Congress. Matters which may be placed within their
jurisdiction may instead be committed to the state courts. If there be any

controversy to which the judicial power extends that may not be subjected to
the conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative
courts, it is not because of any prohibition against the diminution of the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts as such, but because, under certain
circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process.90

First, the fact that Congress can consign federal cases to nonarticle III courts-the state courts-is not a convincing argument.
As with the jury trial argument made by the majority, Brandeis
argues from an exception clearly made by the Constitution to one
neither mentioned nor remotely suggested by analogy. The policy
permitting state-court adjudication does not also support agency
adjudication. It was not a drafting mistake by the framers to provide both that federal judicial officers shall have tenure and salary
protection and that Congress may consign cases under federal law
to the state courts. It was, rather, their deliberate compromise between mandating the existence of lower federal courts, on the one
hand, and prohibiting them, on the other, which led to allowing
them at Congress' option.91 Once accepted by the framers, this
compromise 2 entailed the possibility of one form of jurisdiction-that of state courts---exercised by non-article III tribunals
90. 285 U.S. at 86-87 (footnote omitted).
91. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 57, at 11-12.
92. Id.
93. Before the creation of general federal question jurisdiction in 1875 under the

forerunner of current 28 U.S.C. § 1331, state courts were the sole available forums for

1986]

FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER

over federal cases. This does not suggest that another form of
such jurisdiction-that of federal administrative agencies-would
have been equally acceptable. For one thing, the compromise was
produced by conflicting political pressures and seems to have little
bearing on the determination of issues not actually compromised.
Even if I were to speculate about whether those who compromised would have found the question of federal agency adjudication easy, it is clear that agency adjudication is a different thing
entirely from state court jurisdiction. The weakness of the state
court argument resembles that of the jury trial argument rejected
above. State courts, like juries and article III courts, are insulated
from federal legislative and executive pressures in a way that
neither a federal administrative agency, nor any other article I tribunal, can be.94
Beyond the weakness of his state-court jurisdiction analogy,
the scope of Brandeis's assertion is breathtaking. A most distinguished commentator said of a similar argument that it would, despite the clarity of article III to the contrary, make the provisions
protecting tenure and salary apply only to federal appellate courts
and judges. 95 In other words, it would permit Congress to substitute agencies or legislative courts for article III trial courts. Indeed, article III, as Brandeis reads it, does not require that the
inferior federal trial courts be article III courts. For Brandeis, it is
mainly the due process clause of the fifth amendment that requires that federal trial judges be article III judges, and then only
for certain compelling types of cases.
Unlike the majority, however, Brandeis did not rely solely on
weak interpretative arguments that had never been advanced previously. His opinion attempted to justify final agency adjudication
by means of case precedents, in addition to the institutional precedents advanced by the majority. He first cited statutes that had
most private actions under federal law. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 57, at 844-47.
94. Of course, state court judges may be susceptible to local political pressures. Nevertheless, article Ill, in keeping judicial power from the federal legislative and executive
branches, insures that the power to make the laws and the power to apply them are not in
precisely the same hands. The exceptions to article III discussed in this Article do, however, permit concentration. The creation of independent federal agencies with highly specialized and fragmented jurisdiction, while creating centers of power not contemplated by
the framers, functionally helps reduce the risks of this concentration of power.
95. See D. CURRIE, supra note 76, at 144.
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been upheld by courts despite deference to agency fact-finding."
The only roughly analogous set of statutes cited by Brandeis, however, were those dealing with the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") and a few other federal agencies. Furthermore, as
the legislative history shows, the ICC statutes were ambiguous on
the availability of, the procedure for, and the scope of judicial
review.
It is well accepted that the courts developed a doctrine of deference to facts found in certain ICC proceedings. However, as will
be shown, 97 in "reparations cases" where the ICC acted most judicially, passing on the lawfulness of past railroad conduct in an action for damagies, the commission's awards could be enforced only
through court proceedings. In such proceedings, by clear statutory provision, the decisions of the ICC were not conclusive as to
facts, but were merely prima facie evidence of them. Thus, in the
ICC cases most clearly analogous to Crowell, both parties were
free to present their entire legal and factual case to an article III
court. Like the ICC, none of the other agencies cited by Brandeis
had nonreviewable fact-finding powers in private-rights cases. Indeed, none of the other agencies had any jurisdiction over such
disputes.9 8

A year before Crowell was decided by the Supreme Court,
Professor Sharfman, a scholar specializing in the Interstate Commerce Commission, offered a reason why reparations cases deserved the different treatment they received under the laws governing the ICC's jurisdiction and proceedings."9 Such cases, he
96. 285 U.S. at 70-71 n.5. The Supreme Court cases cited by the dissenters are mainly
suits brought by the government to enforce public norms. A few of the cases are privateparty suits, such as those brought under antitrust laws to enforce public norms by injunction. The only Supreme Court case cited that involved a suit brought before an agency by
one private party seeking money from another private party for past wrongs entailed proceedings before a District of Columbia rent board. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
Block is an extremely limited precedent for several reasons. First, even before Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), made it clear, the cases strongly suggested that the
District of Columbia courts, applying federal statutes of local application, need not be article III courts. Second, the Block Court stressed that the administrative scheme was created
to meet an emergency posed by the First World War. 256 U.S. at 154. Finally, the Court
did not expressly consider argument that the administrative scheme conflicted with article
III.
97. See infra subsection E of this Section.
98. See supra note 96.
99. 2 1.SHARFMAN, THE INTERs'rATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 387 n.64 (1931).
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said, involve past wrongs and "are designed to afford private redress to particular parties, rather than to further general public
ends."' 100 Sharfman quoted Ernst Freund, a leading administrative
law scholar, '10 who concluded that such cases were the ordinary
stuff of adjudication, appropriate for adjudication only by the regular courts:
[Plublic benefit attaches, however, only in the remotest sense (in the same
sense in which all administration of civil justice is for the public benefit) to
an order which attempts to deal with controversies as to amounts due or
losses suffered by reason of past transactions, and which gives pecuniary redress to one of the parties to the controversy. This is no longer public administration but remedial [i.e., private] justice.102

In using the ICC cases as precedents, Brandeis refers to sections of Sharfman's book, including those portions containing the
Freund quotation. Surprisingly, however, he ignores the public/
private distinction in his presentation of these cases and sources.
The ICC cases and the commentary upon them do not strongly
support the constitutionality of final agency adjudication of facts
in private-rights cases. The Interstate Commerce Act, unlike the
Longshoremen's Act at issue in Crowell, provided for de novo fact-,
finding by a court in those cases that most clearly involved private
rights. Because the ICC's findings were not to be final in privaterights cases, the ICC case law provides no test of the constitutionality of final agency fact-finding. While not proving him wrong,
neither do the ICC cases prove Brandeis right, contrary to the
claim in the text of his opinion.' 03
In sum, the Crowell majority thought that the private-rights
nature of the case raised special problems requiring special justification for non-article III adjudication. 04 Hughes attempted to
justify such irregular adjudication of private rights cases by means
100. Id. (quoting E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 1213 (1928)).
101. See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
102. 2 I.SHARFMAN,supra note 99, at 387 n.64. (quoting E. FREUND,supra note 100, at
12-13 (1928) (emphasis added)).
103. 285 U.S. 69-70 & n.5. The non-ICC examples cited by Brandeis are also inapposite. Of the Supreme Court cases cited, only one involves a proceeding by one private party
against another in which damages or the equivalent are sought. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S.
135 (1921). Block, an unusual case for the time, is highly distinguishable. See supra,note 96.
104. The majority feels the need to attempt a special justification for agency adjudica-

tion of private-rights cases. 285 U.S. at 51.
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of the two unconvincing analogies criticized above. 10 5 Hughes
makes no further arguments and cites none of the cases invoked
by Brandeis, as he certainly would be expected to do if he thought
that they supported his argument. Beyond this, the excerpts from
Sharfman and Freund suggest that private parties' cases were recognized as sufficiently distinct to require special caution and clear
justification in applying to them reasoning from other sorts of
cases.
Despite this, Brandeis cites the ICC cases, and other enforcement cases in which the government is a party, as supporting similar results in the very different case before him.10 6 Nowhere does
he, or any other Justice, refer to a truly analogous case of unreviewable agency fact-finding determinative of the monetary liability of one private party to another.10 7 Nowhere in the main text of
his opinion does he acknowledge that he either rejects the majority's notion of private-rights cases as mistaken constitutional history, or that he accepts the majority's constitutional history as accurate, but simply proposes a departure. It is only toward the end
of his opinion that Brandeis acknoiwledges, in a footnote, that
some might see the cases he invoked as inapposite."0 8
Perhaps Brandeis could have constructed a strong, but nonetheless disputable, chain of reasoning from the ICC cases 09 and
the earlier cases that influenced them. Instead, he rested content
with an assertion that new ground had not been broken.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 81-89.
106. See supra note 96.
107. The closest case is Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). While that case did
involve the liability of one private party to another, it is an extremely limited precedent.
See supra note 96.
108.
So far as concerns the question here presented, it is immaterial whether the
controversy is wholly between private parties or is between the Government
and a citizen. The fact that litigation under the Longshoremen's Act is, in substance, between private parties . . . does not warrant the inference that the
administrative features of the Act present a question not heretofore decided.
285 U.S. at 87 n.23.
109. Perhaps Brandeis's best argument would have been that, with Phillips v. United
States, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), the Court had allowed non-article III adjudication in subject
matter areas even more important and sensitive than that of private-rights disputes. See
infra notes 332-43 and accompanying text. Perhaps this was true. Still, Brandeis buries in a
footnote his response to the position of the majority, and that of scholars such as Ernst
Freund, that private-rights cases are a core area for article III protection. See 285 U.S. at
87 n.23.
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b. Crowell's Break with the Past. Read at a level of generality
chosen for its congeniality, legal history can often be made to justify a wide range of visions of the future. With carefully selected
arguments, one could see the views expressed by Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts in Crowell, simply as a natural extension
of the ICC cases. From a fairer perspective, Crowell represents a
chosen discontinuity, whose offered pedigree rested on two
sharply distinguishable institutions and on government-instituted
regulatory and enforcement cases that, unlike Crowell, were not
contests between private parties. Crowell was, I believe, the product of a number of convergent forces and events. These forces
and events are the subject of the remainder of this Section. Before
exploring them in detail in the ensuing Sections of this Article, I
will briefly summarize them here.
There were, of course, the practical pressures on the Crowell
Court toward allowing expert determination in cases of specialized complexity and other pressures toward conserving judicial resources in frequently recurring cases. 110 Working with these practical pressures was a series of developments which accustomed
judges to administrative adjudication.The Supreme Court first became accustomed to non-article III adjudication through what
might be called federal executive-action cases or, in a broad sense,
government-benefits cases, that functioned under rubric of "exec110. For some sense of the potential judicial caseload problems that might have resulted from reading article III to require that all facts found by the agency in Crowell be
open to de novo judicial review, see the majority opinion, 285 U.S. at 45 n.10 and Brandeis's dissenting opinion, id. at 94-95 nn.31-32. Justice Brandeis speculates about the potential great increase resulting from the majority's opening up only jurisdictional and constitutional facts to de novo review. 1d. at 94-95 nn.31-32. If all findings of fact had been so
reviewable as well, presumably the increase in the district courts' case load would have
been even greater. A very crude, conservative gauge may be the annual number of compensation hearings conducted by the agency as noted in Crowell. For the fiscal year 1931,
these amounted to 905: cases before the agency not requiring a hearing totaled 29,584. Id.
at 45 n.10. The total number of cases commenced in federal district court in 1931 was
49,332.

AMERIUAN LAW INs-'ITurE,

A

STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS PART

II, at 111 (1934) (detailed table 1). While perhaps some of the cases that were contested in
the agency might not have been contested in the courts, it is also true that some of the
other 29,584 cases before the agency in 1931, but not involving a hearing, might have
taken the courts' time in other ways-for example, in the form of summary judgment-style
"paper hearings" involving affidavits. Thus, on the reasonably conservative assumption of
900 new court cases, making the district court a de novo finder of all facts for just the
single agency involved in Crowell would have effected roughly a two percent increase in the
caseload of the lower federal courts. See also Dickinson, supra note 54, at 1062.
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utive action."1 A second factor acclimating judges to administrative adjudication was the series of Supreme Court decisions involving state administrative boards, and particularly workers
compensation boards, holding that the due process clause of the
federal Constitution does not necessarily require judicial process,
even in private-rights cases.112 There were also some state cases
involving state administrative boards and state separation of powers doctrine.11 3 Some of these latter cases held that largely final
administrative findings of fact did not violate state constitutional
provisions that were similar to article III and the related jury trial
protection of the seventh amendment. 4
The decisions extending rules developed and applied in public-rights cases-those involving government-created benefits-to
other sorts of cases were a third influence favoring agency adjudication. These rules were extended to cases brought by the government that involved the somewhat private rights of railroads. 5
This was a natural progression, because railroads, although "pri-,
vate," were "affected with a public interest."" 6 The next step occurred with the creation of the Federal Trade Commission and its
enabling act, which permitted final agency fact-finding in governmental actions against ordinary business corporations.' 17 At least
to some degree, this was the product of the view that such corporations' activities implicated the public interest, if to a lesser degree than railroads. Shortly before Crowell, the rules of extreme
deference to agency fact-finding were extended to suits brought
by the government to enforce civil liabilities owed to it by its
citizens."1
A fourth influence on deference to administrative adjudication was the somewhat expanded view of legitimate public interest
then in the air. This was true despite the Court's general rejection
of the view held by Holmes, Brandeis, and John Dickinson, that
the category "affected with a public interest" extended virtually
to the horizon of the legislative beholder. I believe this expanded
111. See infra Section II(C).
112. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
113. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
115. See infra Section I(E)(3)(a).
116. See infra notes 262 & 269 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 332-43 and accompanying text.
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view of legitimate public interest moved even the most resistant,
at least slightly, toward extending some procedures formerly restricted to public-rights cases to cases formerly viewed as entirely
private matters.119 Although Crowell was cast as a private-rights
case, another reading suggests that the public interest was seen as
now extending legitimately this far in respect of judicial review.
Surely the most conservative members of the Court might not
have agreed with that characterization. Nevertheless, their concurrence in Crowell's dictum had the effect of making most cases
of real public interest functionally public-rights cases, as that category had been defined in the earlier, seminal judicial-power case,
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co.' 20
Finally, the tradition of ignoring inconvenient separation of
powers problems, where not catastrophic (as exemplified by the
territorial cases, 1

if not the court martial cases122), eased the way

for the Court to ignore the article III problem presented in Crowell.123 That tradition was more easily applicable by judges, some of
whom accepted Pound's, Holmes's, Cardozo's, and Frankfurter's
24
view that law could be made to adjust to perceived needs.

I

shall now look more closely at the events and ideas that made
Crowell possible.
B. The Origins of Non-Article III Adjudication.
1. The Potential Breadth of FederalJudicialPower. Article III
vests the judicial power of the United States in a politically insulated judiciary. As further defined in article III, the federal judicial power encompasses all "cases arising under" federal law, as
119. Note that Justice Van Devanter concurred in Justice Brandeis's opinion for the
Court in Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920). For the views expressed in that opinion as
to adapting the demands of the seventh amendment to changing circumstances, see infra
note 309 and accompanying text.
120. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280 (1855).
121. For a description of the development of an exception to article III's coverage for
territorial courts, see the opinion of the plurality of Justices in Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S.
at 64-65.
122. For a description of the development of an exception to article III's coverage for
courts martial cases, see the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 66-67.
123. The recognition of specialized, nationwide, non-article III tribunals in the 1920's
exemplifies the point. See infra Section II(H).
124. See infra subsections D, F, G & H of this Section.
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well as certain other cases and controversies.125 What is the full
meaning of "case" or "judicial power"? Did the Constitution use
these terms in their broadest senses? The lawfulness of federal adjudication outside of the article III courts depends upon the answers to these questions.
In 1833, sitting as a circuit judge, Chief Justice John Marshall
glimpsed, but then avoided, problems of definition that would, for
a time, confuse the later age of administrative law. Ex parte Randolph involved a party arrested pursuant to a distress warrant issued by a Treasury official who acted after ascertaining the facts
.and applying the law to them:
If this ascertainment of the sum due to the government, and this issuing
of process to levy the sum so ascertained to be due, be the exercise of any
part of the judicial power of the United States, the law which directs it, is
plainly a violation of the first section of the third article of the constitution
126

Twenty-three years later, the Court itself recognized the potential vastness of the judicial power in the well-known Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., a case involving facts similar to those
Marshall faced as circuit judge in Ex parte Randolph:
That Ithis auditing of the accounts] may be, in an enlarged sense, a judi-

cial act, must be admitted. So are all those administrative duties the performance of which involves an inquiry into the existence of facts and the
application to them of rules of law. In this sense the act of the President in
calling out the militia under [a federal statute] or of a commissioner who
makes a certificate for the extradition of a criminal, under a treaty, is
2

judicial.1 7

This enlarged possible meaning of judicial action, recognized
by Justice Curtis for the Court, suggests the need for practical
narrowing. His examples show that separation of powers is an
ideal not realizable in pure form. 2 In connection with the judicial power, his examples dramatize the need of the nonjudicial
branches, even within their undoubtedly appropriate spheres, to
act as dictated by their determination of the law and facts. To
125.
126.

For the relevant text of article III, see supra note 9.
20 F. Gas. 242, 254 (C.C. D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558).

127. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280 (1855) (emphasis added).
128. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"Inferior" FederalCourts - A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010, 1012-23

(1924).

FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER

1986]

Justice Curtis, the problem seems one of line drawing: what shall
be treated as centrally "judicial," requiring adjudication by an article III court and an appropriately insulated judge? His sketchy
solution draws a distinction between cases involving public rights
and others.
2. The Origins of an Article III PubliclPrivate Distinction in
Murray's Lessee. Justice Curtis' opinion is the origin of a private
rights/public rights distinction bearing on the meaning of article
III. Immediately before the Court was the validity of a sale by a
United States marshall under a distress warrant issued by a Treasury official. 12 9 Upon auditing the accounts of Samuel Swartwout,
the federal tax collector for the port of New York, the Treasury
official discovered a discrepancy of over one and one-third million
dollars.1 30 Swartwout "attempted to meet this shortage by sailing
to England." 3 ' The shortfall was a considerable sum in those
times, and the government made an intensive effort to reach what
was left of Swartwout's assets in this country.
In accordance with a federal statute, the Treasury official issued a warrant commanding the marshal to sell the tax collector's
property and to apply the proceeds to the debt due the United
States. 32 The federal sale was challenged on the ground, among
others, that it violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment 33 and article III's requirement of adjudication in article III
courts by article III judges.1 3 ' The Court rejected the argument
that due process required judicial process for assessing and compelling the payment of taxes.13 5 The Court noted that it was accepted practice, both before and after the framing of the fifth
amendment, for the executive to act without making use of the
judiciary. 3 The validity of pure executive action under the due
129.
130.

59 U.S. (18 How.) at 274-75.
Id. at 275.

131.

XVIII

DI(TIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY

239 (D. Malone ed. 1936).

132. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 274-75.
133. Id. at 275.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 275-80. For the view that the Murray'sLessee Court decided the due process
issue incorrectly in light of constitutional history, see Taylor, Due Process of Law: Persistent
and Harmful Influence of Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 24 YALE LJ.353
(1915). For a recent discussion of the due-process holding of Murray's Lessee, see Redish &
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE LJ.
455, 463, 469 (1986).
136. See 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 277-80.
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process clause having been determined first, the article III challenge was completely separate analytically. The argument was
that, because the statute in question provided for recourse to the
regular federal courts after the executive had acted, Congress had
137
thereby brought the whole matter within the judicial power.
Curtis responded directly to this argument:
[The argument] assumes that the entire subject matter is or is not, in every
mode of presentation, a judicial controversy, essentially and in its own nature, aside from the will of congress to permit it to be so; and it leaves out of
view the fact that the United States is a party. 138

The Court then makes it clear that a judicial remedy for unlawful
collection by the executive branch was accorded those claiming
injury as a matter of legislative grace, by means of waiver of sovereign immunity. In allowing itself to be sued, the United States
may do so "to such extent, and with such restrictions, as may be
thought fit." 1 9 To the extent Congress has waived sovereign immunity in a case otherwise fit for judicial determination, it has
brought a dispute within the judicial power. Having thus disposed
of the plaintiff's argument, 40 the Court, in a key passage recognizing a public/private rights distinction, continued:
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to
state that we do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring
under the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for
judicial determination. At the same time there are matters, involving public
137. The argument suggests that the controversy was inherently judicial, but may suggest, alternatively, a conceptual estoppel:
It was strongly urged by the plaintiffs counsel, that though the government might have the rightful power to provide a summary remedy for the recovery of its public dues, aside from any exercise of the judicial power, yet it
had not done so in this instance. That it had enabled the debtor to apply to the
judicial power, and having thus brought the subject-matter under its cognizance, it was not for the government to say that the subject-matter was not
within the judicial power. That if it were not in its nature ajudicial controversy,
congress could not make it such, nor give jurisdiction over it to the district
courts.
Id. at 282.

138. Id. at 283.
139. Id. at 284.
140. The response was one that, if borne in mind by a twentieth-century Supreme
Court, would have avoided much confusion. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553
(1933). For a discussion of Williams, see infra notes 359-64 and accompanying text.
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rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination,
but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the
courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.;"

Stated as narrowly as possible, the ascertainment of sums due
the United States from a customs official is in the latter category
of public right. It is a judicial matter, or not, as Congress pleases.
The broader implications of this passage, however, need
drawing out. Its opening clearly is designed to blunt any difficulties created by possible "misconstruction" of earlier passages of
the opinion. The Justices' concerns are with harmonizing the permissibility of some adjudication outside of article III with a meaningful 'role for that portion of the Constitution. Justice Curtis
wants to dispel any concern that his opinion, in effect allowing
adjudication by a Treasury official, might be read as inviting the
substantial circumvention of article III. His approach is to first define the clearly invalid, then the valid.
The clearly invalid includes non-article III adjudication of
suits at common law, and those in equity and in admiralty-the
basic stuff of Anglo-American adjudication both at that time and
at the framing of the Constitution. The set of valid non-article III
adjudications is less clear. It includes at least those matters that
Congress may dispose of itself or delegate to the executive
branch, but which are capable of being structured as judicial
1

matters.

42

Aside from negatively disposing of law, equity, and admiralty
jurisdiction by requiring article III adjudication, Justice Curtis'
opinion tells us only that some other matters can be disposed of by
Congress, either judicially or by other means. He gives no clear
formula for determining what, besides other customs' inspector
cases, falls into the optionally judicial category. His examples and
explanations are susceptible of several readings.
One such reading is that the areas in which Congress is free
to determine a case itself or to assign it to a non-article III tribunal are established by reference to English law institutions at the
time of the Constitution's framing.1 43 A second reading is that almost any civil decision affecting an individual's relationship to the
141. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
142. See id.
143. This is apparently Jaffe's view. L. JAFFE, supra note 89, at 88, 90.

794

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

government, as opposed to another private party, can be made
either by Congress or a delegate.""' The third major possible interpretation is that Congress is free to so dispose of individual
matters only when such matters involve privileges dispensed by
Congress as opposed to vested rights. Cases building on Murray's
Lessee adopted this third interpretation.4 5 How that interpretation was applied and gradually extended to new categories of cases
is a large part of the story of non-article III adjudication within
the federal system.
It is only by strong implication that Murray's Lessee might be
seen, as it was seen later, to bear on the constitutionality of federal bodies designed by Congress in the image of courts, but
avowedly set up outside of article III and its protections. Murray's
Lessee itself makes clear that Congress, or delegates of the executive branch, can perform certain adjudications. It does not make
clear that Congress has the option to use a court-like body in doing so. Nevertheless, if Congress can itself dispose of a matter involving the application of law to fact or can use an executive
branch delegate, it is difficult to construct a good, prudential argument prohibiting Congress from using a non-article III
court,146 and only slightly less difficult to construct a convincing
14 7
constitutional argument to the same effect.

With Murray's Lessee, the notion of the quasi-judicial was legitimated 148 within the federal system, although not under that label.
The potential effect of Murray'sLessee upon the shape of the judi144. This seems to have been Justice Brandeis's view. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
86-87 (1932). An exception would clearly exist for criminal matters. Id. at 87-88 (Brandeis's reference to "civil matters").
145. See infra subsection C(1) of this Section.
146. The best prudential argument against allowing Congress, by statute, to delegate
to a non-article III court matters that it may decide itself, would be that doing so may give
the false impression of article III-style impartiality and insulation.
147. The constitutional argument might involve strict construction of article IllI's language coupled with a wooden application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, forbidding Congress from ever granting a privilege, while conditioning its grant on claimants'
consent to adjudication in a non-article III court. Of course, sometimes such conditioning
needlessly threatens constitutionally protected interests and should be condemned as an
unconstitutional condition. My point is that not all instances of such a pattern seem worthy
of condemnation. See infra note 500.
148. Perhaps that notion was born unnoticed in cases such as Decatur v. Paulding, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840), discussed infra note 156. Murray's Lessee is the first case to address, although inferentially, the constitutional underpinnings and consequent limits of the
quasi-judicial.
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cial power was not realized for some eighty years.14 9 The Court
still struggles with the meaning of Murray's Lessee, as evidenced by
the three most recent decisions of the Supreme Court involving
article III.
C. Judicial-Style Executive Action from 1789 to the Formation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
This Section deals with the bulk of non-article III adjudication from the framing of the Constitution to the formation of the
first independent administrative agency. Not covered is adjudication by courts martial, and by territorial and District of Columbia
courts. What remains are decisions by executive branch officers
known primarily as "judicial officers." As Justice Marshall noted
in Ex parte Randolph, these federal matters were judicial in an "enlarged sense": in them action affecting individuals is taken after
applying law to the facts of their particular situations. 5 This Section will also deal with some later executive branch cases, those
after the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC") in 1887, but having more in common with the earlier
cases than with the product of the new commissions. The ICC
cases constitute a new phase of non-article III adjudication, one in
which the old rules for executive-branch cases are applied to substantially different sorts of cases. As a result, the ICC cases will be
discussed in a separate section.
1. Judicial Deference to Executive Action: Murray's Lessee as
Rationale. While the majority opinion in Murray'sLessee is the first
Supreme Court opinion' 5 ' explicitly to approve non-article III adjudication based on a hazily defined exception for public-rights
cases, it is closely connected with an earlier line of cases involving
executive action. That line of cases, firmly established by about
1840, came to be seen as forming a category separate from the
truly judicial, a category termed "executive," or "administrative,"
action. 5 2 Whatever their theory, those cases ignored the issue
149. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
151. 1 know of no lower federal court opinion suggesting such an exception.
152. Some of the early cases simply ignore the resemblance of executive action to
adjudication. See, e.g., Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 522, 534
(1866): United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 304 (1854);
Brashear v. Mason, 47 U.S. 92, 100-01 (6 How.) 92, 101-02 (1848); Decatur v. Paulding,
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raised by Justice Marshall seven years earlier in Ex parte Randolph
concerning encroachment on federal judicial power. 3 They simply viewed the actions as executive action and treated them as
valid activity by that branch of government. 54 Perhaps the reason
for this was the one suggested by Justice Marshall's opinion in Ex
parte Randolph: the impracticability of the executive branch acting
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515-16 (1840). Many cases, however, do recognize that executive
action bears some of the attributes of adjudication. See, e.g., United States ex rel Riverside
Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1903): Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U.S. 372,
375 (1895). Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1893): United
States ex rel. Redfield v. Windom, 137 U.S. 636, 644, 646 (1891); United States v. Lynch,
137 U.S. 280, 286 (1890): United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 48 (1888);
Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 58, 67 (1884): Smelting Co. v.
Kemp, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 636, 640 (1881): United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. (12 Otto)
378, 395-96 (1880): The Secretary v. McGarrahan, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 298, 312 (1869); Barnard's Heirs v. Ashley's Heirs, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 43, 44 (1855); Lytle v, Arkansas, 50 U.S.
(9 How.) 314, 333 (1850): Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 129 (1849): Wilcox v.
McConnel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 511 (1839). Paradoxically, perhaps, in the numerous
executive-action cases that involved the writ of mandamus, the judicial features of executive decision making permitted the Court to proceed as if executive action was beyond the
judicial power. Because of its quasi-judicial character, executive action involved the exercise of discretion. Mandamus, therefore, would not lie. See, e.g., Riverside Oil, 190 U.S. at
324-25: Redfield, 137 U.S. at 644, 646; Lynch, 137 U.S. at 286; Schurz, 102 U.S. (12 Otto)
at 395-96: McGarrahan,76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 312. In other cases, however, the Court, in the
course of holding executive decisions unreviewable, flatly asserted that executive action was
not judicial. See, e.g., Union River, 147 U.S. at 175-76; Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 123 U.S. 189,
210-211 (1887).
153. See supra note 152 and authorities cited therein. The Court's reluctance to review executive action is perhaps the best evidence that it did not perceive executive action
as an encroachment upon the federal judicial power. In fact, the cases suggest that judicial
review of executive action was beyond the power of the courts and would, therefore, constitute an encroachment upon the executive power. This is due in part to the limitations of
the writ of mandamus, which would lie only if the challenged action could be termed "ministerial." The Court, however, typically classified executive action as discretionary. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1903): United
States v. Lynch, 137 U.S. 280, 286 (1890); The Secretary v. McGarrahan, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
298, 312 (1869): Commissibner of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 522, 534 (1866):
United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 304 (18541): Wilkes v.
Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 8 (1849): Brashear v. Mason, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 92, 101-02
(1848): Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515-16 (1840). But see, Butterworth v.
United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 68 (1884) (once officer decided to issue patent,
signing and delivery to secretary for countersignature purely ministerial): United States v.
Schurz, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 378, 395-97 (1880) (once title to land vested in patentee, delivery of patent purely ministerial). At least one case emphasized that review of executive
action would undermine the doctrine of separation of powers. See Craig v. Leitensdorfer,
123 U.S. 189, 210-11 (1887).
154. See supra note 153.
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in the first instance without finding facts and applying law.' 55 The
Court's attitude, however, goes beyond toleration of such judicialstyle executive action affecting individual interests to an acceptance of it as largely unreviewable by the courts.
In one of the earliest cases in this line, a case reviewingthe
Secretary of the Navy's denial of certain death benefits to the wife
of Admiral Stephen Decatur, the Court made clear not only that
such decisions could be determined initially outside of the courts,
but, more significantly, that courts should be reluctant to overturn
them: "The interference of the courts with the performance of
the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are
satisfied that such a power was never intended to be given
them."' 58
The development of the line of executive-action cases, and
the relationship of that line to the public-rights category recognized in Murray's Lessee, is a complex, but important, part of the
story of the evolution of article III.
Within the province of the executive-action cases were matters involving privileges created by the federal government. 157
There was little opportuniiy for other sorts of disputes between
the federal government and individuals, because, under the then
prevailing views of the commerce clause and the proper sphere of
federal activity, the general government did not regulate individual conduct on a large scale.158 Where the federal government did
directly touch the interests of individuals was mainly in those few
areas in which it dispensed something in the nature of benefits.
Proceedings against the government for damages required a
granted privilege of suing the government.1 59 Aliens seeking admission to our shores or to extend a stay sought what was then
155. Cf. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 128, at 1012-23.
156. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840).
157. For a similar later view of the nature and unity of such cases, see Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 89 (Brandeis, J., digsenting).
158. The views of the Court as to the commerce clause were complex and shifting,
but Congress passed little commercial legislation. J. NOWAK, R_ ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrUrIONAI. LAW 134-38 (1978).
159. The Court in Murray's Lessee made this quite clear. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 283-84.
For later and more comprehensive discussion, see United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882).
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viewed as a privilege. 160 The same was true of those seeking fed1 3
6 2 and use of the mails.
eral lands, 161 veteran's benefits, patents,

During this period these matters were the stuff of the federal
164
quasi-judicial executive determinations involving individuals.
By employing such a definition of executive-action cases it is
possible to clarify their relationship to Murray's Lessee. Executiveaction cases decided after Murray's Lessee and before about
1884165 do not clearly rely on Murray's Lessee, pointing one iniFong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
J. DICKINSON, ADMINIsTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 277 (1927); McClintock, The Administrative Determination of Public Land Controversies, 9 MINN. L. REv. 638, 650 (1925). McClintock applied this analysis only to suits involving government and individual claimants, noting that in suits between private parties, after
the government has conveyed away its interest, the legality of the government's disposition
can be reviewed in equity. Id. As to such equitable suits, McClintock later makes clear that
the facts found by the land department were treated as unreviewable except in certain
unusual circumstances. See id. at 653. It seems likely that the governmental origin of the
interests made easier the justification of a judicial inquiry much more limited than that in
pure private property contests. In light of the fact that the land cases were part of the
fabric of a set of rules common in cases involving veteran's benefits, immigration, etc., the
plausibility of such a view increases. I am not asserting a general, conscious, and carefully
worked-out view that government land was granted on the condition that executive determinations be generally dispositive as to facts concerning the grant so much as an unconscious sense that government land cases were different.
162. See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843). For an example of a
veteran's benefits case, see Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
163. See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506-08 (1904); E. FREUND,
supra note 100, at 291. Still, by this time there seem to have been some doubts. The Court
was reluctant to take a stand on this issue in American School of Magnetic Healing v.
McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 107 (1902), and two Justices seemed to think otherwise. Id. at
S11(White and McKenna, JJ., dissenting). See Hoover v. McChesney, 81 F. 472 (C.C.D. Ky.
1897); Reich, The New Property, 73 YA. L.J. 733 (1964).
164. I am not asserting that, under such benefit schemes, vested rights were never
created. Certainly at some point, by interpretation of the statutes involved, an official act
would transfer title to formerly goyernment land or rights to a patent. See Butterworth v.
United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884): United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. (12 Otto)
378 (1880). 1 am asserting that courts conceded a great amount of unreviewable discretion
to officials who were finding facts and applying law in order to determine whether to do
the act that would trigger vesting.
Occasionally, a court would speak as if the decision of whether or not to vest a right was
not entirely up to Congress, given its decision to launch a benefit program. In one remarkable case, a federal circuit judge anticipated Charles Reich by some sixty years. Compare
Hoover v. McChesney, 81 F. 472 (C.C.D. Ky. 1897) with Reich, supra note 162. The judge
there concluded that a citizens' interest in the use of the mails, apparently regardless of the
intent of Congress to vest a right, is in the nature of a property right. He based this view
on the government's monopoly position and its use of the taxing power to maintain the
postal service. 81 F. at 480-81.
165. See Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U.S. 97 (1884); see also United States v. Duell, 172 U.S.
160.
161.
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tially toward the belief that its public-rights category was seen as
conceptually separate. A careful look at Murray'sLessee, however,
reveals that there was a connection between it and the executiveaction cases during this period, even though the connection was
vaguely understood and not clearly expressed.
In Murray's Lessee, Justice Curtis suggested that public-rights
cases are those involving a dispute over a government benefit. He
further stated that Congress can provide for the resolution of
such controversies either by means of an article III court or otherwise. In Murray's Lessee, the benefit involved was Congress' consent to be sued. While alternative readings of the private-rights
category were possible, the government benefit interpretation was
supported by the only two cases Curtis cited in his opinion. Both
cases recognized the finality of decisions of a federal executive officer dealing with land grants.16 The relevant passage of Curtis'
opinion reads: "[T]here are matters, involving public rights,
which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is
capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within
the cognizance of the courts." 16 This passage was preceded by
language emphasizing that Congress' consent to suit was a privilege. It was followed by a citation to land grant cases. As a result,
Curtis' notion of disputes that could be determined by Congress
itself almost certainly refers to disputes involving privileges created by the federal government.
While Murray's Lessee was not mentioned in the executiveaction cases for nearly another fifty years,168 this is not surprising,
because there was very little cross reference between the various
576 (1899): Fong Yue Ting v. United States 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). The earliest clear indication that Murray's Lessee
formed the underpinning of the executive-action cases came in Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 338-39 (1909) (citing both Decatur, and its line of cases,
and Murray's Lessee for the validity of final executive-action of a judicial sort).
166. Burgess v. Gray, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 48, 64-65 (1853); Foley v. Harrison, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 433, 450-51 (1853). In each, the issue had arisen, not in a suit against the federal authorities, but in a later suit to settle conflicting private claims. These cases are complex. For the conclusion of a commentator on the land department cases that, in equitable
suits, ordinary findings of most facts made earlier by the land department were to be
treated as final, see McClintock, supra note 161, at 650.
167. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
168. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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sorts of executive-action cases themselves."6 9 This compartmentalization of the case law may be taken as a hallmark of an era before
the recognition of an even somewhat unified administrative law.'7
Nevertheless, it is apparent that, at least in a semiconscious way,
the Court came to observe such a category. Whatever the explanation, the categorization was most often conscious but unrecorded; the Justices preferred to cite, in an opinion dealing with
one executive-branch officer or structure, cases dealing with that
particular federal authority. The typical case dealing with any federal authority identifies the action as "executive," "administrative," or " special," and then proceeds to make clear the great
finality of such action. Specifically, the courts would stress how little such actions were open to redetermination, either by extraordinary writs or in later related common law actions, as in the
land department cases.'
Beyond this, although played down by later scholars who
1 72
sought to unify an administrative law they saw as lacking order,
there was some explicit cross fertilization within the executive-action cases. Bartlettv. Kane,'73 an 1853 case approving great finality

for the decision of federal customs appraisers, concludes:
It is a general principle, that when power or jurisdiction is delegated to any
public officer or tribunal over a subject matter, and its exercise is confided to
his or their [sic] discretion, the acts so done are in general binding and valid
as to the subject-matter. The only questions which can arise between an individual claiming a right under the acts done and the public, or any person,
denying their validity, are power in the officer and fraud in the party; all
other questions are settled by . . . the act done by the tribunal or officer,

whether executive, legislative, judicial, or special, unless an appeal is provided for ... by some appellate or supervisory tribunal prescribed by law.""

Referred to after this passage is a land department case and then
169. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
170. J. DICKINSON supra note 161, at 56. As exceptions, Dickinson refers to United
States v.Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905), and American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). There was more cross-fertilization at a much earlier stage than
Dickinson records. See infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
172. I believe this is a fair characterization of the aim of both of the great administrative law treatise writers of the late 1920's, Ernst Freund and John Dickinson. See infra
subsection F of this Section. It must, however, be understood that each was too thoughtful
to believe that reduction of the entire field to a few simple principles was a possibility.
173. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263 (1853).
174. Id. at 272. See Belcher v. Linn, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 508, 522 (1860).
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Decaturv. Paulding,17 5 a veteran's benefits case. The Court in Bartlett quoted Decatur's admonition against interference with executive action. In 1869, Decatur was referred to in Justice Miller's
opinion for the Court ascribing great finality to decisions of federal land officers. 17 Two years later, Justice Miller decided a seminal case dealing with the finality of land department cases.17 He
cited no cases from other departments, but did write a passage
that seems to borrow from Bartlett,1 7 8 and refers without citation
to general principles of deference to executive action.179 Thus,
there was to some degree a federal common law of judicial review
of administrative action.
2. Limited Judicial Scrutiny of Executive Action: From the Requirements of Writs to a Federal Common Law ofJudicial Review. The
discussion above makes clear not only the Court's general deference to some judicial-style action by the executive, but also that
some degree of judicial review was available. The courts viewed
themselves as responsible for assuring that the executive had acted within its statutory mandate-the question of "power in the
officer" referred to in Bartlett v. Kane discussed immediately
above. Occasionally, courts claimed the power to strike down arbitrary, and not merely erroneous, fact-finding, but such fact-finding seems to have been viewed as per se beyond the executive's
power. 180 Within the framework created by the enabling acts, the
courts conceded to executive officers great freedom to find facts
finally and to make policy. The courts also allowed executivebranch officials some degree of control over the interpretation of
the laws they administered.
Review in the executive-action cases was generally obtained
by means of common law writs.1 8 1 Indeed, the exacting requirements of the writ of mandamus played some role in shaping the
175. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840).
176. Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, 350 (1868).
177. Johnson v. "'owsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 83 (1871).
178. Compare id. with Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263, 272 (1853).
179. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 87.
180. "A finding without evidence is beyond the power of the Commission." ICC v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 92 (1913) (emphasis added).
c'181. J. DICKINSON, supra note 161, at 39. Of course, I am speaking of review in the
context of an action brought directly to challenge executive action. Review in some sense
was also available by means of civil or criminal proceedings against such officers in their
private capacities, or by means of defense in suits brought by the government to enforce
executive decisions. See id.
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ultra vires-oriented theory ofjudicial review, as the courts came to
see gross departures from statutory mandates as beyond discretion, and virtually all else as within it. It may be telling that until
1913, in none of the cases described above, was review sought by
means of certiorari, the common law writ used by an appellate
court to call before it the proceedings of an inferior tribunal.1 82
When at last this writ was sought for review of executive action,
the Supreme Court found it inapplicable.1 83 Had certiorari been
attempted by those challenging executive action, it might have at
least somewhat undercut the federal courts' position that executive action, applying law to fact in ways affecting individual interests, was not centrally judicial. 8 While the statements from an
early Marshall opinion and from Murray's Lessee reflect an understanding that such cases were, in many respects, like adjudication,1 85 the language of the later cases and the failure of litigants
to seek review by means of certiorari, reflect a perspective from
which executive adjudication in benefits cases had come to be seen
as legitimate executive action and truly a thing apart from the judicial in its constitutional sense.1 86
The use of certiorari, by the writ's own requirements, would
182. Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162 (1913). The Court acknowledged that this was
"the first instance" in which a federal court had been asked to review an executive decision
on a writ of certiorari. Id. at 169-70.
183. Id. at 171-72.
184. State practice offers no clear test of this proposition. The uses to which the writ
was put under the laws of the several states varied greatly, at least before the end of the
nineteenth century. L. JAFFe, supra note 89, at 165-76. In some states the writ was unavailable for review of administrative decision making, as it was under federal practice. Id.
Some states, however, apparently reached a different conclusion. Id. at 170-71.
185. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
186. Most of the early cases simply ignore the resemblance of executive action to adjudication. See, e.g., Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 522 (1866).
There are exceptions, of which Wilcox v.Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 511 (1839) (analogizing the decision of an executive branch officer to the judgment of a court), is the most
explicit. My point is not that the cases form a neat pattern. It is that, with few exceptions,
starting around 1840, the courts deemphasized the judicial nature of the executive-action
cases. The Court saw the issue raised in Murray's Lessee not because of the judicial style of
executive decision making, but because Congress, by providing for judicial review, had arguably brought the matter within the judicial power. Despite this difference, I believe the
3
government benefits justification for the executive action in Murray's Lessee provided, sul
silentio, the justification for the executive-action cases. Generally, it was more convenient
for the courts to ignore the issue, as they did, where possible. See United States ex rel.
Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 304 (1854); Brashear v. Mason, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 92, 101-02 (1848). Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515-16 (1840).
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have limited the reviewing court to the record made before the
administrative body and entailed great deference to factual conclusions drawn by that body, and even deference to some conclusions of law."' 7 Instead of certiorari, mandamus and injunction
provided the usual means of review. 88 Mandamus was the writ
first, and most often, used in federal executive-action cases.1 89 In
theory, it lay to correct violations of law committed by officials
outside the scope of matters committed to their discretion. 90
As a practical matter, the writ of mandamus was used to distinguish between clear departures from statutory mandates and
possible, but not so clear, departures. 19' Even in the early mandamus cases, the Court made clear that, aside from the requirements
of the writ, the need for noninterference with executive enforce187. Although common law certiorari was not generally available in the federal
courts, a local District of Columbia case provides us with a statement by the Supreme
Court on how limited review was under that writ. The case concluded that certiorari tests
only the jurisdiction of the tribunal below. Harris v. Barber, 129 U.S. 366, 372 (1889).
According to this view, of course, ordinary questions of fact were not before the reviewing
court. See People ex re. Folk v. Board of Police & Excise, 69 N.Y. 408, 411 (1877) (only
errors of law materially affecting rights of parties reviewable); California & Or. Land Co. v.
Gowen, 48 F. 771, 775 (C.C.D. Or. 1892) (court will not consider facts below on writ of
review, statutory equivalent to certiorari). The complete absence of evidence in the record
to support a finding was correctable, at least in some circumstances. 11 C.J. Certiorari§ 365
(1917). For a general description of the theory and scope of review on certiorari, see id. § §
341-75 (1917): see also L. JAFFE. supra note 89, at 174-76.
188. E. FREUND, supra note 100, at 245-47. The use of the writ of mandamus was, by
interpretation of the Judicial Code, restricted to federal cases brought in the District of
Columbia where the common law of Maryland had some force. See United States v. Schurz,
102 U.S. 378, 393 (1880): Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 615-27 (1838).
While this was a serious restriction, a great many of the potential executive branch defendants were sub*ect to process within the district. For an example of the successful use of
mandamus, see United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 405 (1880); Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614 (1838). For examples of cases in which an injunction was
sought, see Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 109 (1904); United States ex rel.
Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316, 324 (1903); Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 347, 352-53 (1868).
189. Compare the Court's discussion of the mandamus precedents with its discussion of
the single injunction precedent. Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, 348-53 (1868).
The injunction precedent, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), involved a
challenge to the administration of Reconstruction and is not part of the body of case law
under consideration.
190. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 289 (1850).
191. "IMandamusi would seem to be peculiarly appropriate to the present case. The
right claimed isjust and established by positive law; and the duty required to be performed
is clear and specific." Kendall v. United States 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614 (1838). For later
cases reaching a similar conclusion, see United States ex rel. Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v.
Lane, 250 U.S. 549, 555 (1919) and cases cited therein.
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ment of the law justified a standard of deference in areas where
Congress intended much discretion.192
It was not, however, until 1868, in Gaines v. Thompson, that
the Court cut the requirements for deference completely away
from those limited to mandamus by requiring a like deference in a
case seeking an injunction against the federal land department.193
In my view, Gaines constitutes a major advancement toward explicit unification of the American law of judicial review of administrative action. 9 At this point, there was an incipient federal
common law of judicial review: the major focus was no longer on
the technical requirements of common law writs, but on the nature and effects of the action reviewed.
Unlike certiorari, the writs of mandamus and injunction allow
a federal court de novo determination of relevant facts.1 95 Despite
this, the deferential standard of review was worked out by a determination that Congress had intended great agency discretion, and
great judicial tolerance for error. As a result, where an agency
had acted within its general "jurisdiction" and not arbitrarily, the
actually correct state of facts was not legally relevant to the legitimacy of the executive action.1 96
3. The Policy Underlying the Law Governing Review: Essentially
Modern Problems Described in Yesterday's Vocabulary. Despite the
vocabulary and doctrines used to decide executive-action cases,
earlier courts struggled with the same fundamental conflict between private interest and public administration that confronts
contemporary courts. Translated into today's terms, the courts
dealt with two intricately related problems. First, they were concerned with the problem of action committed to agency discretion
by law, i.e., action that is unreviewable, despite possible administrative error, because the potential harm of judicial intervention

192. See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840).
193. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, 352-53 (1868).
194. Id.
195. They were, after all, original judicial proceedings and in this respect unlike
certiorari.
196. See Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162, 171 (1913); United States ex rel Riverside
Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1903) (citing Decatur and Gaines); Shepley v.
Cowan, 91 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1875). For the views of a later commentator who saw these
cases as quasi-judicial, see P. LOUGHRAN, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVE ACTIoN §
54 (1930).
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outweighs the value of error correction.19 Decaturand subsequent
cases make clear that noninterference with matters committed to
the executive branch is a major policy that the courts sought to
advance.'98
Second, the courts were concerned with problems of standing, or with what constituted a sufficient personal interest to justify considering a claimant's request for judicial interference with
executive decision making. Although the term standing is not
used, the decisions make clear that only a party with a significant
personal interest may challenge administrative action:
If the Secretary is charged by law with the performance of such a duty, he is
bound to fulfil it. It is imperative, not discretionary. .

.

. [W]henever a pri-

vate person acquires by law a personal interest in the performance by the
Commissioner of any act, he thereby also acquires an individual interest in
the direction and supervision of the Secretary, to correct any error, or supply any omission or defect in its performance, tending to his injury. It is a
maxim of the law, admitting of few if any exceptions, that every duty laid
upon a public officer, for the benefit of a private person, is enforceable by
judicial process. 199

In the early cases, the courts sought to determine whether
the interest under consideration was a vested property right or
something close to it.200 This, in turn, facilitated non-interference
with executive action, because, by statute, rights to such typical
benefits as government land and patents were not deemed to pass
or to vest until a formal official decision had been made in the
claimant's favor. As a result, an official's decision against formally
granting a benefit was often unreviewable.
The language of the Butterworth excerpt quoted immediately
above is somewhat distinct from the earlier cases. The essence of
the quotation is that "whenever a private person acquires by law a
personal interest" in the performance of an official duty, he may
197. See generally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REv. 367 (1968) (need for system of judicial scrutiny attentive to relief for claimant without unduly burdening agency discretion).
198. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 522, 534 (1866).
199. Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 57 (1884) (emphasis
added). See American School of Magnetic Healing v.McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109-10

(1902).
200. See United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 394-95 (1880); Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610-14 (1838): cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 157-66 (1803).
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enforce that duty by judicial process. That statement takes on a
different cast in light of the language immediately preceding it:
"Each case must be governed by its own text, upon a full view of
all statutory provisions intended to express the meaning of the
legislature."20 1 Read together, the two passages seem precursors
of the modern view that whether one has acquired a personal interest turns upon a reasonable construction of the statute. Put another way, a presumption of reviewability should exist in favor of
narrowly defined classes of intended beneficiaries. 0 2
By about 1900, the Court confronted cases involving rights to
the use of the mails. In these cases, nothing was involved which
203
resembled the traditional vesting of a discrete right to a thing.
Sometimes the Court resorted to the language of property, but in
a new way. The essence of this approach was to find a property
right based on a conclusion that Congress would have intended
relief for persons in plaintiffs' class who had been injured by gross
errors of certain statutory provisions. 20
To summarize, by the technical use of the vocabulary of
writs, property rights, and, occasionally, language resembling the
vocabulary of standing or intended beneficiaries, the nineteenth
century Court mediated the conflict of personal interest and public administration. 0 5 The terms it developed reflected a deference
to executive action not clearly exceeding the statutory mandate
and, particularly, deference to facts found in the administration of
law.
The material of these early cases provided the foundation for
the development of legislative and judicial standards of review of
decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. With passage
of the Hepburn amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act in
201.

Butterworth, 112 U.S. at 56-57.

202. Jaffee places this development slightly later than Butterworth, relying instead on
Magnetic Healing. L. JAFFEE, supra note 89, at 339-53.
203. 1 use the word thing to mean both tangibles and intangibles, such as patent rights
that had come to be recognized as capable of ownership in some form.
204. See American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109-10
(1902). The Court did not determine that Congress had to grant plaintiff access to the
mails-it dodged the issue. Id. at 107. As a result, the best explanation is that Congress
intended, in the broadest legal process sense of that word, a personal interest that included
a right to judicial review. By the time of Crowell, at least Justice Brandeis was clear on the
shift from a property-like requirement to one more resembling the demands of the statutory standing or intended beneficiary doctrines. 285 U.S. at 91 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
205. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
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1906,10 the administrative exercise of quasi-judicial power moved
into new and somewhat more private realms.
In understanding the influence of the public-rights category
on the ICC cases and, ultimately, on Crowell, it is important to see
how legal scholars and judges viewed the more general boundary
between the sphere of appropriate public action and that of private enclaves safe from such action.
D. The Public and the Private: Juristic Thought, The Industrial
Revolution, and Social Dissatisfaction
The police power has some pretense for its invocation. Regarding alone the
words of its definition, it embraces power over everything under the sun,
and the line that separates its legal from its illegal operation can not be easily drawn. But it must be drawn. To borrow the illustration of another, the
line that separates day from night cannot easily be discerned or traced,
yet
207
the light of day and the darkness of night are very distinct things.

1. Origins of the Affected with a Public Interest Doctrine in the
1870s. A number of state legislatures passed regulatory measures during the 1870's in an attempt to curb concerns about big
business. In a series of cases decided in 1876, the Supreme Court
justified governmental interference with certain business property
on the grounds that such business was affected with a public interest.2 08 The best known of these cases was Munn v. Illinois, which
approved, under the due process clause, maximum rate legislation
as it applied to charges for storage at major grain warehouses. 9
The phrase "affected with a public interest" was apparently
used by Chief Justice Waite in Munn at the suggestion of Justice
Bradley, 210 and dates back to Lord Hale's De Portibus.1 Waite
writes: "when private property is 'affected with a public interest it
206. Hepburn Act, ch.3591, §5, 34 Stat. 584 (1910). See infra subsection E of this
Section.
207. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 167 (1921) (McKenna, J., dissenting).
208. These regulatory measures eventually gave rise to the Granger Movement and,
later, to the original Interstate Commerce Act. See Fairman, The So-called Granger Cases,
Lord Hale andJustice Bradley, 5 S'rAN. L. REv. 587, 592-630 (1953).
209. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
210. Fairman, supra note 208, at 587-88, 652.
211. M. IHAi., D- PoRr[BUs MARTS, in HARGRAVE LAW TRACTS (1787). For a description of DiE Powrmus, its origins, its posthumous publication, and the use to which it was put

in English and American jurisprudence up to 1930, see McAllister, Lord Hale and Business
Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930).
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ceases to be juris privati only.' "212 It becomes so affected when

"used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect
the community at large."2 13 When private property is devoted to a
public use, the owner "in effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must
submit to be controlled by the public for the
2 14
common good.

Waite applies the same reasoning to common carriers, asserting that the power to regulate the charges of such carriers comes
from "the same source," and stating that such businesses "exercise a sort of public office." 2 5 But could common carriers be compared to grain elevators? In a passage sounding decades ahead of
its time, Waite says:
It is conceded that the business is of recent origin.... And it must also be
conceded that it is a business in which the whole public has a direct and
positive interest. It presents, therefore, a case for the application of a longknown and well-established principle in social science, and this statute simply
extends the law so as to meet this new development of commercial
216
progress.

At the time Waite wrote, the Court had not yet taken the
fateful turn, exemplified by Lochner v. New York, 2 7 of protecting
much business activity from burdensome social legislation. In
Munn, the Court may have intended to abjure responsibility for
determining the validity of legislation enacted by state legislatures
and reasonably calculated to enhance the common good. This was
most likely the view of concurring Justice Bradley, whose memorandum to Waite seems to be the inspiration for the latter's opinion.218 It was, of course, a view later pressed strongly by Holmes
and Brandeis, in dissent. 21 9 Still, Waite departed from Bradley's
proposed language in potentially significant ways. 2 20 As a result,

the opinion reads more like an invitation to classify businesses in
212. 94 U.S. at 126.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 129-30.
216. Id. at 133.
217. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
218. Fairman, supra note 208, at 587-88, 652.
219. Id. at 657.
220. Id. at 657-58. Waite's language indicates a categorizing of business according to
whether it is "clothed" in or "devoted" to public use, while Bradley speaks of regulating
any business "affecting" the general public. Id.
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two categories-those affected with a public interest and those
not so affected-rather than a statement that to the extent any
business is so affected it can be closely regulated.
As the composition of the Court and the views of some Justices changed, the doctrine of Munn was read rigidly, requiring
that any particular business be characterized one way or the
other.2 2 1 Additionally, the public interest category was interpreted
sparingly, encompassing very few businesses.2 22 As a result, it was
used negatively, and the due process clause came to insulate all
but the clearest instances of business affected with a public interest from rate regulation.2 2
Although the affected with a public interest doctrine, and the
public-rights doctrine of Murray's Lessee are analytically distinct,
they are related at a greater level of generality. As more activity
becomes a legitimate object of regulation, it is tempting to assume
such matters are public in the Murray'sLessee sense. This might be
defended on a view that within its regulatory province much of
what the federal government chose to do for those regulated was
analogous to a benefit, the price for which was the surrendering
of any rights to traditional adjudication. As we shall see when we
turn to judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission decisions, some of the proponents of the Interstate Commerce Act
seem to have held a similar view.
2. Roscoe Pound and the Turn of the Century. By the turn of
the century, the Interstate Commerce Commission began to exercise its weak regulatory powers.2 24 While the states continued to
attempt to regulate the maximum rates of a variety of business,
the Court viewed the affected with a public interest doctrine as
prohibiting most such regulation.2 2 5 Though that doctrine was not
used to test other social legislation, such as that specifying minimum hours and wages, the Court did use the doctrine of state
police power in a similar way. Property, including ordinary prop-

221. Id. at 588, 657-58.
222. See id. at 657-58.
223. See id.
224. 1 I. SHARFMAN, supra note 99, at 11-23.
225. Fairman, supra note 208, at 657. This negative use of the doctrine began in
1923. Comment, The Use of the "Public Interest" Concept in Price-Fixing Cases, 39 YALE LJ.
256, 259 (1929). There is a suggestion that the appointment of Justices Taft, Sutherland,
Butler, and Sanford, within a brief period, tipped the balance. Id. at 258 n.12, 259-60.
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erty not affected with a public interest, was said to be subject to
regulation under state police power only to protect the public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 2
Regulation not within the police power was seen as forbidden
' 7
22
by due process. In a series of cases of which Lochner v. New York
has come to be the emblem, 228 the Court struck down industrial
regulation of wages and hours on due process grounds.220
Holmes's dissent in Lochner is congruent with Bradley's view in
Munn that, short of the wildly irrational, state legislators are free
under the due process clause to pursue their view of the common
good. Holmes' statement that the fourteenth amendment did not
enact any particular view of the government's relationship to private property was the first clear judicial response to the Court's
shift toward constitutionally-imposed laissez faire.
Roscoe Pound, founder of the school of sociological jurisprudence, saw Holmes's dissent as the best example of that jurisprudence in action.230 Pound, who was influenced by Maine, the continental legal and moral philosophers, sociologists, and the
emerging American pragmatists, 231 articulated and justified premises that, through Holmes, had just begun to re-exert some force
in American law.23 2 Pound's view of law was quite different from
the mid-nineteenth century view summed up by Rufus Choate,
who said of law: "The judge does not make it. Like the structure
of the State itself, we found it around us at the earliest dawn of
233
reason."
226.
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment .... There
are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each state in the
Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly
stated and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate
to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (emphasis added).
227. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
228.

229.
230.
231.
timeless

G. GUNTHER, CONsTruTrIONAt. LAW 454 (10th ed. 1985).

Id. at 453-54.
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YAtF L.J. 454, 480-81 (1909).
For a discussion of Maine's influence on Pound's generation, which rejected
law in favor of relativism, see Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV.

L. REv. 529, 538 (1951).

232.
233.

See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
Howe, supra note 231 (quoting I WORKS OF RuFus CHOATE 436 (1862)) (represen-
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Pound, in the same year as the Lochner decision, made one of
the clearest statements in American legal literature of the tension
between the late nineteenth century common law system of exalting defined property rights and the demands of an integrated
industrial American economy:
To-day ... the common law finds itself arrayed against the people ... they
know it chiefly as something that continually stands between them and what
they desire. . . . Commissions... with summary administrative and inquisitorial powers are called for, and courts are distrusted .... [Iun large part
this dissatisfaction . . . is well founded. No amount of admiration for our
traditional system should blind us to the obvious fact that it exhibits too
great a respect for the individual . . .and too little . . . for the needs of
society, when they . . . conflict with the individual, to be in touch with the
needs of our present age .... "'

Pound saw in the Anglo-American legal system a residuary
power to do justice similar to the powers exercised by the Crown
in the creation of equity and, indeed, of the common law itself.2 35
Pound felt American law likewise adaptable by means of deft constitutional interpretation informed by current needs. In some
rough sense it is a metaconstitutional legal principle that permits
and requires dealing with the Constitution's text in flexible ways.
Pound continued:
To-day, when the sovereign people stands in the shoes of the sovereign king
as parens patriae, this residuary authority has given us the police power. Not
yet one hundred years old, and scarcely mentioned in the books until the last
twenty-five years, this doctrine has been worked out slowly at the same time
that the common law has been gaining its firm footing in our constitutional
law. It is furnishing the antidote for the intense regard for the individual
which our legal system exhibits.238

Pound recognized that the residuary power, the police power,
was ill defined and stated that the common law was "jealous of all
indefinite power.1 237 In his opinion, a compromise was necessary
tative of attitudes before the Civil War and for a while afterwards).
234. Pound, Do We Need A Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 344 (1905).
235.
The residuary power of the crown to do justice among his subjects has served
to meet two crises in our legal history. When the old polity of local courts became impossible, it gave us the king's courts and the common law. When the
common law was in danger of fossilizing, it gave us equity.
Id. at 350.
236. Id. at 350-51 (fbotnote omitted).
237. Id. at 351.
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and it had to come from reason as applied to the circumstances of
society at particular times." 8 Pound was a nonradical reformer.
Property, in its constitutional sense and as protected by the judiciary, was to be preserved because of its relative stabilizing effect on
society. Its meaning must, however, shift under pressure. The
chief mechanism for such change was the elastic concept of the
police power, which shapes the notion of property for due process
purposes. Through judicial control, sensitive to the needs of both
individuals and society, Pound felt that the definition of the police
power must be flexible enough to reflect changing private and
public needs.
Writing three years later, and obviously influenced by contemporary American philosophy, Pound made clear his view that
law should be scientific and that only in a pseudoscientific jurisprudence do the premises never change:
We no longer hold anything scientific merely because it exhibits a rigid
scheme of deductions from a priori conceptions. In the philosophy of to-day,
theories are "instruments, not answers to enigmas..
The sociological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law; for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to
the human conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed first principles . .. 239

As a result of such views, championed by Louis Brandeis,
counsel in Muller v. Oregon,24° the Court softened somewhat the
position it had taken in Lochner on state regulation of business.
While the immediate effect of the views of Pound and those in his
camp were somewhat limited and short lived, the long-term effect
238. See id. at 351-53.
239. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 608-10 (1908) (quoting
W. JAMES, PRAGMxIsM 53 (1907)). Pound also revealed a preoccupation with law matching
the progress of science and its philosophy:
The substitution of efficient for final causes as explanations of natural phenomena has been paralleled by a revolution in political thought. We do not base
institutions upon deduction from assumed principles of human nature; we require them to exhibit practical utility, and we rest them upon a foundation of
policy and established adaptation to human needs .... We have, then, the same
task in jurisprudence that has been achieved in philosophy, in the natural sciences and in politics. We have to rid ourselves of this sort of legality and to
attain a pragmatic, a sociological legal science.
Id. at 609.
240. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Brandeis was certainly part of the sociological jurisprudence movement. See P. S'rRum, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 335 (1984).
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was to legitimate a more flexible view of the use of legal texts
under social pressure.
The impact of the new jurisprudence on the legitimation of
nonjudicial adjudication of private rights can be seen at an early
stage. In a 1911 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a
workman's compensation scheme. 41 The charge was that the
scheme conferred judicial power on a body that was not a court.
In his opinion for the court, the Chief Justice said:
Where there is no express command or prohibition, but only general language or policy to be considered, the conditions prevailing at the time of [a
constitution'sI adoption must have their due weight; but the changed social,
economic, and governmental conditions and ideals of the time, as well as the
problems which the changes have produced, must also logically enter into
the consideration, and become influential 24 factors
in the settlement of
2
problems of construction and interpretation.

Change was at work within the federal system as well. The
ICC cases under the Hepburn Act provided an intermediate stage
of evolution from principles formerly applicable only in the public
rights/benefits cases discussed above.
E. The 1906 Hepburn Amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act
1. Background. For approximately the first two decades of its
existence, orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission were
not binding when issued.243 This was true for both major types of
Commission proceedings: those brought by the Commission declaring future rates unreasonable, and those brought before the
Commission by private parties seeking damages from carriers for
wrongs committed in the past, so-called reparations proceedings. 2 4 In both types of cases the Commission's order could be

ignored with few ill consequences until enforcement was ordered
by a federal court.2

45

By statute, in any judicial proceeding to en-

241. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
242. Id. at 349-50, 133 N.W. at 216. The opinion goes on to state, however, that such
principles of constitutionalism are not new. Of course, part of Pound's point was that such
principles were old but lately forgotten. For a description of the fate of state workers'
compensation statutes when challenged as non-judicial adjudication, see 71 C.J. § 35, at
290-92. Most survived. Id.
243. 2 I. SHARFMAN, supra note 99, at 385-87.
244. Id. at 387 n.64.
245. Id at 386.
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force an order of the Commission, that agency's report of its findings of fact was to be considered "prima facie evidence of the mat"246
ters therein stated ..
Because the statute said no more than this as to judicial review, the courts read it as permitting a de novo rehearing of all
legal and factual issues determined by the Commission. 4 This
meant, of course, that a losing party was free to submit his version
of the facts and supporting evidence to the courts just as if the
Commission had never acted. The loser, however, would need to
make a convincing case to overcome the presumption in favor of
the agency's findings.248
In 1906, the Hepburn Act enlarged the substantive powers of
the Commission and altered the statutory formula for judicial review of its decisions. 249 The prima facie evidence standard was
eliminated for all proceedings except reparation proceedings,
which were those brought by a private party against a carrier
seeking monetary compensation for past wrongs.2 ° Instead, for
most proceedings, the Hepburn Act provided that the courts
would enforce orders of the Commission "if regularly made and
duly served. ' 251 A leading scholar of the ICC has said, "It was
open to the courts, under the obscure language of this direction,
252
to assert either very broad or very narrow powers of review.
An alternative to judicial review in an enforcement proceeding was a preemptive equitable action seeking to restrain enforcement of the Commission's order.253 Although the legislative debates on the Hepburn Act reflect a knowledge of the possibility of
such a challenge, the Act itself recognized it "only incidentally"
246. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 16, 24 Stat. 379, 384-85.
247. See Cincinnati, N. 0. & Texas Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184, 196 (1896).
248. See id. at 154.
249. Ch. 3591, §5, 34 stat. 584 (1910): see 2 I. SHARFMAN, supra note 99, at 387
(describing regulatory problems under old standard of review); MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL. OF THE FEDERAl. TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMISSION 19201930, at 107 (1933) (discussing ICC's view of its relationship with courts under new
standard).

250. 2 I. SHARFMAN, supra note 99, at 387.
251. Hepburn Act, §5 (amending section 16 of the 1887 Act as previously amended).
See paragraph 2 of section 5's substitute language for treatment of reparations cases, and
paragraph 10 for the new treatment of all other cases.

252.

2 I. SHARFMAN, supra note 99, at 388.

253.

Id. at 388-89.
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and left the scope of review "entirely undefined."" 4
The Hepburn Act left untouched, however, provisions for judicial review of private party reparations actions seeking money
damages for past wrongs committed by carriers.2 5 5 Parties to these
proceedings could still obtain de novo review of the Commission's
findings of fact, which were considered prima facie evidence of
the facts so found.
To understand the development of federal adjudication
outside of the article III courts, it is important to comprehend
how the federal courts responded to the Hepburn Act's ambiguities concerning judicial review of non-reparations cases. It is even
more essential to keep firmly in mind that the Act provided for de
novo judicial review of reparations cases, which closely resemble
the private-rights cases.
2. Non-Reparations Cases: The JudicialDevelopment of Deferential Standards for Review. Before passage of the Hepburn Act,
courts had little room to contribute to the basic structure of judicial review. Their principle task was to determine precisely what
weight was to be given various Interstate Commerce Commission
determinations in light of the statute's command that they be
treated as prima facie evidence. The Supreme Court, in attempting to determine a standard of review, seemed to recognize, if
somewhat elliptically, its debt to a broader body of law dealing
with administrative review: "[T]he findings of the Commission are
made by law primafacie true. This Court has ascribed to them the
strength due to the judgments of a tribunal appointed by law and
informed by experience." 2 56 In support of this proposition, the
Court cited earlier ICC cases, none of which referred to execu2 5 7 or the federal land
tive-action cases such as Decatur v. Paulding
cases. Despite this lack of explicit mention, the Court was most
probably referring to Decatur and other executive-action cases as
providing precedents for the proper scope of review in ICC cases.
The indebtedness of the law governing review of most ICC
decisions to executive-action precedents became greater and
clearer under the 1906 Hepburn Act. The ambiguity of that law
as to the standard of review for non-reparations cases invited
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 389.
Id. at 387-88.
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 441, 454 (1907).
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1839).
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greater judicial contribution, which in turn led to rummaging the
past for analogies. Under the Hepburn Act, no longer were ICC
determinations to be simply prima facie evidence of the matters
determined, rather they were to be conclusive if "regularly
made." The Court gave meaning to this vague standard in its first
major opinion under the Hepburn Act, the second Illinois Central
case:
Beyond controversy, in determining whether an order of the commission shall be suspended or set aside, we must consider, a, all relevant questions of constitutional power... ; b . .. whether the administrative order is
within the scope of the delegated authority . . ; and, c, . . . whether, even

although the order be in form within the delegated power [it was made so
unreasonably as to be in substance outside of it]. .

.

. Plain as it is that the

powers just stated are the essence of judicial authority ... it is equally plain
that such perennial powers lend no support whatever to the proposition that
we may, under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions ....
Power to make the order and not the mere expediency or wisdom of
having made it, is the question."'

While this Court, like virtually all that commented on the
scope of review in ICC cases, makes no explicit reference to the
earlier executive-action cases, there are indications that those
cases were influential. 25 9' First, the broad references to perennial
powers and administrative functions suggests a sense of the existence of a larger body of analogous cases: the executive-action
cases. Second, the Court's theory of review is one of power or
ultra vires in the broadest sense, precisely the theory employed in
26 0
the executive-action or benefits cases.
258. ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452, 470 (1910) (citation omitted).
259. A later ICC case, quite uncharacteristically, does refer to federal executive-action
and state administrative cases in condemning arbitrary fact-finding:
A finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless. And if the Government's
contention is correct, it would mean that the Commission had a power possessed by no other officer, administrative body, or tribunal under our government ...
In the comparatively few cases in which such questions have arisen it has
been distinctly recognized that administrative orders, quasi-judicial in character, are void if ... the finding was contrary to the "indisputable character of
the evidence.
ICC v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1912).

260. A close look at the quotation reveals its ultra vires focus. As for point "a," what
Congress cannot authorize is, of course, ultra vires. Point "b" directly addresses ultra vires.
Point "c" deals with arbitrary decision making, but the Court emphasizes that its concern
is with decisions that, in form but not in substance, are within the delegated powers. For
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Third, the Illinois Central Court had before it a brief that
urged it to apply the federal common law rule of judicial review
developed in the executive-action cases. Citing cases from a variety of executive departments, the brief stated that
the rule appears to be settled that where the decision of a question of fact is
accorded by Congress to the judgment and discretion of the head of a department his decision thereon is conclusive ....
We believe the foregoing to be the true rule to be observed by all courts
in determining questions as to the lawfulness of the Commission's orders in
suits brought to enjoin such orders in accordance with section 16 of the act
to regulate commerce."'

Fourth, in some of the debate on the Hepburn bill, it was asserted that the ICC's power to dispose of cases in a final and
largely unreviewable way found precedents in what I have described as the executive-action or benefits cases, the immediate
offspring of the reasoning of Murray's Lessee. While none of the
benefits cases involved purely private rights, but rather were suits
concerning government benefits, the ICC cases often involved
nominally private railroads pitted against other private parties.
The debate on the Hepburn Act indicates, however, that the railroads were seen as sufficiently public to support the application of
example, if the ICC were to find as fact that the corner grocer was a railroad, the Commission would formally have jurisdiction based upon its completely baseless fact-finding. The
arbitrariness doctrine was theoretically designed to deal with this and less virulent forms of
jurisdictional overreaching: Union Pacific, the first ICC case to clarify the connection between arbitrariness and evidentiary matters, was also the origin of the arbitrariness test for
ICC cases in the 1910 Illinois Central case. ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547
(1912). Compare this approach with the standards of review developed in the executiveaction cases in subsection C of this Section supra. For example, in Gaines v. Thompson, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, the Court made clear that, in suits to overturn executive action, the
issues are whether the official acted within the scope of this authority as defined by the
legislature and whether he refused to perform a ministerial duty. Ministerial duty seems to
have been understood as meaning a duty that was "exceedingly clear to the reviewing
court." Id. at 353.
261. Reply Brief for Appellant at 13-14, ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452
(1910) (No. 233). For the entire argument that the standard of review used in the executive-action cases should apply to ICC cases other than reparations cases, see id. at 9-14. An
examination of briefs in earlier significant cases dealing with judicial review found no such
argument, but rather an emphasis upon according decisions of the ICC prima facie validity.
See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 166-69, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 441 (1907). This
should not be surprising, since, as discussed above, the 1887 Act permitted a de novo trial
at which the Commission's decision would be treated as prima facie correct. See supra notes
188-92 and accompanying text. After 1906, the decisions were to be enforced if "in accordance with law." See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text. The Court needed to
determine what that meant. The executive-action cases were the closest analogue.
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standards of review drawn from the executive-action cases:
The first serious objection that is made to this bill is that [it] does not itself
provide for a trial somewhere in a court of justice.

[W]e have created

tribunals. We have clothed those tribunals with power to determine those
acts necessary to be determined in administering the affairs of the Government [citing authority given to the Postmaster General, and immigration officersi .... Those laws operate as a finality, so far as the Government goes,
but beyond that those upon whom those laws operate have the same right to
appeal to a court of equity which any citizen of this country has.
In order to understand the full scope of a review of the act of the Commission we should look back to the source of this subject and see what it is
proposed to review. The relation of the common carrierto the public is a peculiar
relation. It differs from an ordinary vocation.262

Thus, the hybrid public/private nature of the railroads invited the application, in ICC cases, of rules permitting agency adjudication subject to limited judicial review. Such rules had previously been applied, in the federal system, only in the executive
action-government benefits cases discussed above. Later, the ICC
cases were to be the medium of further mutation. As we shall see
in the next subsections, the rules applied in the ICC cases were
extended to actions brought by the government against ordinary
business corporations. The Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC")
enforcement powers, created in 1914, are the first clear instance
of this extension. 6 3 In 1918, in a case involving similar enforcement powers of the Department of Agriculture, the Supreme
Court upheld the limitations on the courts' powers to overturn4
20
departmental fact-finding, and cited the executive-action cases.
The ICC, FTC, and Agriculture Department cases extend the
principles of the executive-action cases to new areas. Unlike those
earlier cases, which were limited to disputes over government-created privileges, the new cases accorded finality to government reg262. 40 CON;. REc:. 3446 (1906) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (remarks of Senator Clapp).
263. See infra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
264. Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479, 484 (1918).
Strictly speaking, the action challenged in Houston was legislative, or the sort we would type
as rule making. Id. at 479-8 1. Still, without qualification, the Court cited Decatur and other
judicial-style executive-action cases in support of the departmental action. This case, like
the ICC cases, went beyond regulation of privileges created by the federal government to
recognize the finality of agency determinations regulating private enterprise. Unlike the
opinions in the ICC cases, Houston expressly acknowledges its use of the principles enunciated in the executive-action cases. Id. at 484.
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ulatory action constricting private activities. Despite this extension, even these cases do not address the issue later decided by
Crowell, the propriety of final agency determination of what is in
essence a damage suit between two private parties. Thus, the federal enforcement cases had to be extended to support the review
scheme in Crowell,2 65 though the dissenters cited those cases as
supporting agency adjudication in purely private party litigation.
3. The Mutation: From Benefits to Enforcement of Public Law
Schemes, Stopping Short of Private Damage Suits.
a. From Benefits to Enforcement. It is important to make clear
to what extent the Hepburn Act arguably did and clearly did not
depart from existing practices. Up to the time of the Hepburn
Act, all of the precedents for judicial deference to the decisions of
administrative agencies come from the Murray's Lessee/executiveaction line of cases. All such public-rights cases involved litigation
over interests that had been created by the federal government as
matters of privilege. The cases, however, formed two subsets.
The first subset included actions attempting to overturn the
decisions of executive officers. In this group, a person claiming an
interest brought a proceeding against the federal government
seeking its recognition. The scope of review of action by executive
officers denying benefits in these cases was extremely limited.2"'
The second subset concerned actions between two private
persons for what had originated as a grant from the federal government.8 7 In such cases, issues previously determined by an executive branch officer were, to a certain degree, determinative of
the outcome. While the conclusions of the executive branch officer could be reexamined for fraud or mistake sufficient at equity,
the decision of the executive branch was, in many respects, as final
as in the suits brought directly against the government.2 6 8
From the foregoing, some conclusions can be drawn as to the
similarities and differences between the ICC cases and the executive-action cases taken as a whole. The main similarity between
the old executive-action cases and the ICC cases is that both occa265. This is precisely what Justice Brandeis sought to do in Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 69-70 & n.5 (1932).
266. E.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515-16 (1839).
267. See supra note 166.
268. Many of these cases involved land grants. See, e.g., Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 330
(1875); see supra text accompanying note 173 (excerpt from Bartlett v. Kane).
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sionally involved disputes between private parties. Some of what I
term executive-action cases were private disputes in which finality
was accorded an earlier determination of an executive department, such as the land department. Likewise some of the ICC
cases and the later FTC cases were brought by private parties invoking a regulatory scheme against other private parties.
The main difference between the old executive-action cases,
on the one hand, and the ICC cases, on the other, is unrelated to
whether the actions involved the government as a party. In all the
executive-action cases, the finality of non-article III decision making can be justified as the price one pays for enjoyment of a privilege ultimately emanating from the government. In the ICC cases
no privilege is at issue, but rather the enforcement of regulatory
schemes restricting private activity. Therefore, the explanation of
the executive-action cases found in Murray's Lessee is not easily extended to the newer cases.
It is possible, of course, that the language of Murray's Lessee
can be conceptually expanded to control ICC cases by equating
cases involving a business affected with a public interest with the
public-rights category. However, the logic of Murray's Lessee and
the executive-action, or benefits, cases is another matter. Their
logic can control non-reparations cases only if stretched considerably. If Congress's power over federal common carriers is seen as
so broad that their very existence is a federal privilege, one might
argue that the price of the privilege is surrender of any right to
an article III trial court.26 9
269. For the Supreme Court's mid-twenties view of common carriers, see Charles
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). Of particular interest
are those passages distinguishing ordinary businesses from businesses affected with a public
interest, id. at 537-41, and passages indicating that, even among businesses affected with a
public interest, common carriers were objects of more sweeping legitimate regulation. Id.
at 540-44. As to the latter, the court said:
The theory is that of revocable grant ....
IThe most sweeping regulatory
powerj can arise only when investment by the owner and entering the employment by the worker create a conventional relation to the public somewhat
equivalent to the appointment of officers and the enlistment of soldiers. ...
A common carrier which accepts a railroad franchise is not free to withdraw the use of that which it has granted to the public ..
Id. at 541-43. This view may help explain why the Court was comfortable reviewing ICC
cases under standards formerly applicable only to government benefits cases and that permitted minimal judicial review of agency decisions involving privileges. Despite the fact
that the privilege came from the chartering state, the federal government had ultimate
regulatory authority where a railroad operated among two or more states. S. BALDWIN,
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However it might have been rationalized under article III,
the railroads were seen, I believe, as sufficiently public to permit
non-reparations actions to be tried before an agency, the fact-findings of which would be final.
Congressional approval of agency fact-finding expanded along
with its view of the public interest. In 1914, statutory authority to
bring ICC-type actions against ordinary business corporations acting in interstate commerce was extended to the FTC; facts found
by the FTC in such cases were conclusive.
In the legislative debates on the FTC's enabling act, that body's quasi-judicial powers
were attacked on the grounds that (1) they encroached upon article III,2 1 and (2) the FTC heard cases against "ordinary trading
corporations," not common carriers like those within the ICC's
jurisdiction. 272 Despite these arguments, the FTC received final
fact-finding power and the ICC non-reparations cases were seen as
27 3
a precedent.
The FTC's powers were an extension of ICC principles to
permit not just regulation of common carriers, but regulation of
ordinary business corporations, at least in an area of pervasive and
intense public interest: fair competition. The Court's response to
these new FTC powers was curious; it did not strike them down,
despite its view that ordinary business corporations were not sufficiently affected with a public interest to warrant serious forms of
interference such as price regulations. 2 7 The Court did, however,
largely ignore the statute's requirement that the FTC's factual
findings were to be conclusive. While the FTC's powers, at least
theoretically, represented a further extension of the standard of
review granted to most ICC cases and originating in the executive-action cases, it is important to stress that the scope of the
FTC's authority did not include the determination of controversies in which one private party sought money damages from
18 (1904).
270. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, §5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
271. 5 TH LEImsLATIv- HISTORY OF THE FEDERAl. ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATurrs 4311-12, 4477 (E. Kintner ed. 1982).
272. Id. at 4336, 4478.
273. Id. at 4452, 4463.
274. See supra note 269.
275. See C. MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND
THE INTERSTATrE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1920-1930, at 25-38 (1933).
AMERICAN RAILROAD LAW
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b. Stopping Short: Reparations Cases-The Rationalefor Special
Treatment. Unlike the ICC non-reparations cases and similar cases
before the FTC, ICC cases in which a private party sought to establish another such party's monetary liability for past wrongs
were not granted the deferential review established by the executive-action/benefits cases. The ICC's legal and factual conclusions
in the latter sort of case, termed "reparations cases," were subject
to full relitigation in the courts. Although a mid-twentieth century
lawyer would have had no difficulty in finding strong public interest in the disposition of such cases, Congress viewed the reparations cases as private law matters.
As we have seen, in a comprehensive study published in 1931,
ICC scholar Professor Sharfman explained clearly why reparations cases had been treated differently from others.2 In his
view, the reparations cases involved past wrongs and "afford private redress to particular parties, rather than to further general
public ends ... ,"217 He quoted Ernst Freund, perhaps the foremost administrative lawyer of the day, who seemed to conclude
that such cases were the ordinary stuff of private adjudication
properly consigned to the regular courts:
IPjublic benefit attaches, however, only in the remotest sense (in the same
sense in which all administration of civil justice is for the public benefit) to
an order which attempts to deal with controversies as to amounts due or
losses suffered by reason of past transactions, and which gives pecuniary redress to one of the parties to the controversy. This is no longer public ad79
ministration, but remedial justice.

We cannot know what the courts would have done, at the
time of the Hepburn Act, had Congress attempted to treat reparations cases as appropriate subjects for administrative justice, sub276.
Under the Clayton Act and Trade Commission Act, all that the Commission's order can do is to direct the respondent to "cease and desist" the unfair

method or other practice in question .. . .Of course, no damages can be
awarded, or mandatory order entered. Where, therefore, the unfair act has already accomplished its purpose, and there is no occasion for repeating it, the
Commission cannot give relief . ...
G.

71 (1924).
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
278. 2 I. SHARFMAN, supra note 99, at 387 n.64.
279. E. FREUND, supra note 100, at 12-14; see supra text accompanying note 102.

HENDERSON, TH. FEDERAI. TRADE COMMISSION

277.
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ject only to the limited review of the benefits cases. Perhaps the
reason the reparations cases were excepted by Congress is that
they too closely resembled suits at common law, the untouchable
core of article III according to Murray's Lessee. On any other view,
the Court would have had to subscribe to the proposition that
Congress, by fiat and mere labeling, could metamorphose a suit at
common law into a public law proceeding, thereby eliminating a
right to an article III hearing on the facts. If the courts had been
willing to endorse that proposition, they would still have had to
decide how much public interest warranted such a metamorphosis. Had they agreed with the excerpt from Freund, agency adjudication of reparations cases might still have been found to violate
due process.
During the second decade of the twentieth century, questions
about the distinction between the public and the private, and
questions regarding the reach of judicial power, were pressed
upon the Court in various forms. Kindred questions concerning
the relationship of bureaucracy to private rights were a major
concern of the new public lawyers.
F. Administrative Law Scholarship and the PubliclPrivateDistinction
in the Late 1920s
During the 1920s, concerns mounted about the increasing
power of the new bureaucracy over individual lives and interests,
particularly in realms widely regarded as private enclaves. Hardly
coincidental was the appearance in 1927 and 1928 of two books
by distinguished authors, having similar titles and overlapping
concerns, but reflecting somewhat disparate viewpoints.
One of these, Ernst Freund's Administrative Powers over Persons and Property, was a comparative study of the emerging regime
of administrative justice and policy making in several large American states, the federal government, and Germany."'0 Freund was
arguably the dean of American administrative lawyers. 8 1 Freund's
viewpoint certainly was not that of the school of mechanical jurisprudence. Like Pound, he believed that legal institutions must ul280. E. FREUND, supra note 100.
281. Indeed, the dedication page of Felix Frankfurter's first administrative casebook
read: "to Ernst Freund, Pioneer in Scholarship." F. FRANKFURTER & J. DAVISON, CASES AND
OTHER MAIERIAI-S ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1932).
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timately respond to social fact. Writing in 1912 about the validity
of state workers' compensation laws under the due process clause,
Freund said:
[R]ules may well be laid down for the application of the guaranty of due
process . . . . In establishing new canons of justice, the legislature is neither
bound by every historical limitation of the common law, nor is it free to
advance so far beyond prevailing ideas as to make law utopian or even socialistic or communistic; in other words, the law may be in its reasonableness,
progressive; and it must be in its progressiveness, reasonable. 22

Despite this, Freund seems, in many respects, rather conventional. For instance, his 1928 view of the public/private distinction, as it related to defining the province reserved solely for judicial action, is rather black and white. In a section entitled
"Directory Powers of a Purely Judicial Type," Freund finds
"anomalous" and of questionable constitutionality agency adjudication of private controversies, such as reparations proceedings
seeking damages before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and workers compensation proceedings before various state and
federal commissions. 8 It is in this context that Freund made the
statement, quoted in full above, that in such cases "public benefit
cases involve
attaches only in the remotest sense," and that such
21 8 4
justice.
remedial
but
administration
not "public
The end of the 1920s also saw publication of John Dickinson's brilliant Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the
United States. 2 5 A student and one time protege of Professor
Frankfurter, later a New Dealer, and later still Professor of Politics at Princeton, and of law at the University of Pennsylvania,
Dickinson had unusual powers of analysis and foresight. Although
generally influenced by Pound, Freund, Frankfurter, and
others,286 his is, I believe, the first widely published, clear statement of the fully modern consciousness concerning the public and
the private. This consciousness, as well as Dickinson's distinctive
attitude toward the judicial/administrative dichotomy, are revealed in a 1927 passage challenging Freund's conventional dis282. Freund, The Constitutional Status of Workmen's Compensation, 6 ILL L. REV. 432,
436-37 (1912).
283. E. FREUND, supra note 100, at 12-14.
284. Id.
285. J. DICKINSON, supra note 161.
286.

Id. at ix.
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tinction between powers of the government concerning "maintenance of right and justice" versus those concerning "public
welfare."
Procedurally . . . a line can be drawn, coinciding.

. .

with the distinction

taken above between regulation by law alone and regulation by government.
This seems to be the distinction Professor Freund has in mind when he says
that "no community confines its care of the public welfare solely to the enforcement of the principles of the common law." But functions which are
the same in substance will in the course of time pass from one side to the
other of the procedural line. .

.

. Every matter of private law may, and gen-

erally does, involve some issue of public policy. There is merely a difference
of remoteness. .

.

. [In many fields of regulation public welfare or policy

first makes its appearance in common-law adjudications of differences between individuals. This policy in the course of time may come to be enforced directly by an administrative agency or in criminal proceedings. But it
would seem that the function of government performed in both instances is
the same, namely that "of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
28 7
regulating the use of liberty and property."

Freund and Dickinson, then, believed in legal change driven
by social evolution, both as historical fact and as something normatively desirable. As contrasted with what might be termed the
Lochner mentality, the two positions may not seem very different.
There were differences, however, and of such a great degree that
they approached differences in kind. Recognizing the presence of
public interest in all matters to come before the courts, Freund
believed that the degree of remoteness in some cases justified
treating them as private law matters in some fundamental
sense. 2 8 Dickinson recognized the varying degrees of public interest in such matters, but believed it a matter of legislative judgment precisely where to preempt formerly private matters with a
public law scheme. For Freund, the velocity of legitimate change
was more geological; for Dickinson, change could be swifter and
287. Id. at 28 n.49 (citations omitted). Dickinson is here responding to Freund's classification of the functions of government made in a book written before Freund's ADMINISTRAI'w POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY. See supra text accompanying notes 280-84.
In that earlier work, Freund classified the functions of government as comprising three
types: (I) those pertaining to the maintenance of national existence, (2) those having to do
with the maintenance of justice and right, and (3) those concerning public welfare. E.
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3-17 (1904) (particularly §4, at 3). By 1940, recognition of the arbitrariness of the public/private distinction had become a "sign of sophistication" among lawyers. Horwitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1426-27 (1982).
288. See supra text accompanying note 280.
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less deferential to established categories.
Administrative adjudication provides the best example of the
differences between these two positions. Freund, as revealed in
the quotation above, sees disputes between private parties as a
firmly established and exclusively judicial province. Perhaps years
of social erosion might change that fact, but such province was,
from his viewpoint, a relatively fixed feature of the legal system. 28 9 Dickinson, in other sections of his 1927 work, makes clear
that the decision to use an agency instead of a court is a policy
choice to be made within wide bounds by the legislature. 9 '
Dickinson's solution to the central problem of his
book-reconciling individual rights with the new bureaucracy-was judicial review. In his view, however, appellate-style
review of agency action was all that was required by the AngloAmerican doctrine of the supremacy of law and the related requirements of due process.29 a Such review did not permit redetermination of facts found by an agency, but only correction of errors of law and of gross distortions of the factual record. For
Dickinson, like Brandeis, who certainly knew of Dickinson's scholarship, 292 due process in many civil contexts permitted a trial
before an agency as long as appeal could be lodged in the courts.
G.

Due Process: 1920s

In the early days of the Republic there was some tradition of
far-reaching state governmental powers over people and their
property, 2 3 and, of course, there was no due process clause to be
289. See Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L, REV.
261, 295 (1935): see also The PoliticalFunction of the Supreme Court, THE NEw REI'unLc, Jan.
25, 1922, at 237 (Professor Frankfurter's characterization of Freund as conservative). The
editorial is unsigned but attributed to Frankfurter by Professor Kurland. P. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THF SUPREME COURT 49 (1970).
290. For Dickinson's views as to agency adjudication of workers' compensation cases,
see J. DICKINSON, supra note 161, at 6, 21-22, 258-60.
291. Id. at 150-56, 331-32. For Dickinson's possible influence on Justice Brandeis's
views, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 89 n.24 (1932) (Brandeis J., dissenting). For
Brandeis's similar view of the requirements of the doctrine of supremacy of law, expressed
in 1936, see infra note 337.
292. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 93 n.30 (1932) (Brandeis, Stone and Roberts,
JJ., dissenting).
293. F. MCDONALD, NovUs ORDO SECLORUM 12-24 (1985); 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN,
COMMONWFI:I'H-A STORY OF THE RoI.E OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MAS-

SACHUS E-,'rS, 1774-1861, at x-xi (rev. ed. 1969); McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected
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interpreted as a general limitation on such regulation. From the
time of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 to the early days of
the New Deal, the Court hardly steered a straight course in cases
dealing with the line or lines between governmental power and
private enclaves.
The first half of this roughly sixty-year period was one of ambiguity. Munn v. Illinois, 294 the decision reworking Lord Hale's
doctrine into American constitutional law, exemplifies this ambiguity. The need to provide constitutional justification for state
regulation of prices by demonstrating that the business in question was affected with a public interest shows recognition of the
enclaves where the test would not be satisfied. The potential pliability of the test itself left in doubt just how restricted state government was under federal law protecting private property and
transactions.
It was not until 1923, in Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Industrial Relations,2 95 that the Court first invoked the "affected
with a public interest" doctrine in an opinion condemning state
regulation. However, eighteen years earlier, at roughly the turn
of the century, the Court began to show hostility to state regulation of property under a due process-based doctrine of freedom of
contract, limited only by police power permitting protection of
public health and safety.2 96 While, as suggested above, the Court
did not follow a straight anti-regulation course, it had established
a general level of hostility toward state interference with business'
freedom to contract as to such matters as the length of the work
week.29 7
with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. RF:v. 759, 766-67 & n.36 (1930).
294. 94 U.S. 113 (1976); see supra subsection D(l) of this Section.
295. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
296. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
297. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921): Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); Adams v.
ITanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917): Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); cf. Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1907) (Congress without power to make discharge of employee on
ground of union membership criminal offense). Both the Court's changing personnel and
the fact that the issues were seen as complex, and not simply as pro or anti-regulation,
account for the irregularity of the course followed by the Court as seen from a simplified
binary perspective. For example, both Holmes and Brandeis, the most consistently proregulation members of the Court, sometimes found a state measure violative of due process
as an unwarranted interference with private property. Nevertheless, it is not only a standard, but a fair, generalization to characterize the Court as anti-regulation during this pe-
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Consequently, by 1923, when the Court first struck down a
regulation after considering whether the business in question was
affected with a public interest, it had already determined, in a series of due process cases, that the states' constitutionally legitimate
interests did not extend so far as to generally permit regulation of
the terms on which businesses contracted with employees or customers. In effect, but not in terms, the Lochner line of cases decided that, to a significant degree, the activities of businesses
could not be regarded by the states as involving matters of public
right.
Throughout this period, Justice Holmes seemed willing to allow the states any regulatory measures reasonably calculated to
advance their legislatures' view of the public good:
We fear to grant power and are unwilling to recognize it when it exists.
. . . [A]nd when legislatures are held to be authorized to do anything considerably affecting public welfare it is covered by apologetic phrases like the
police power, or the statement that the business concerned has been dedicated to a public use ...
I do not believe in such apologies. I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United
298
States or of the State ...

In the 1920s, Justice Stone agreed with the majority that fixing
prices was generally beyond the legitimate police power permitted
by the due process clause. He seems, however, more willing than
the majority to find a business affected with a public interest on
the ground that it enjoys a monopoly or severe competitive
edge. 9 9 Justice Brandeis, at this time, presents a confusing picture. Having concurred with Holmes in the opinion from which
the quotation immediately above was taken, hie seems to have
moved to the Stone position by 1929.300
riod. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 228, at 453-54.
298. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
299. Id. at 451-52 (Stone, J., dissenting).
300. See Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 245 (1929). A careful reading of
the majority opinion shows that the issue of whether a state could regulate gasoline prices
was inevitably presented. It seems inconceivable that Brandeis's and Stone's concurrence in
the result did not reflect agreement that the state could not constitutionally regulate the
price of gasoline under the prevailing circumstances. From Brandeis's perspective, this is
puzzling, because of his concurrences in Holmes's opinions offering virtual carte blanche to
state legislatures. At this stage it is clear that, on issues of pricing, as opposed, for example,
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By early 1932, within a month or so of the decision in Crowell,
there had been some shift in the thinking of the Justices. In New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,30 1 Justices Brandeis and Stone had clearly
moved to the Holmes's position. They found, in the frightening
economic emergency of that time, reason to abandon their apparent view that the absence of competition itself was the only justification for state-regulated prices. First, there is a repudiation of
the affected with a public interest doctrine:
The notion of a distinct category of business "affected with a public interest," employing property "devoted to public use," rests upon historical error.... In my opinion, the true principle is that the State's power extends to

every regulation of any business reasonably required and appropriate for the
public protection. I find in the due process clause no other limitation upon
the character or the scope of regulation permissible.3 2

Phrased differently, there is virtually no constitutionally mandated
public/private meridian, but rather the legislature determines the
mix of private autonomy and public control in each setting.
Second, that the Great Depression caused the dissenters shift
is not seriously in doubt:
The economic emergencies of the past were incidents of scarcity..
[Wel are now confronted with an emergency more serious than war.
Misery is wide-spread, in a time, not of scarcity, but of over-abundance....
Some people believe that the existing conditions threaten even the stability
of the capitalist system. . . . j Rjightly or wrongly, many persons think that
one of the major contributing causes has been unbridled competition.
Many insist there must be some form of economic control ....
Whether that view is sound nobody knows ....
Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limitations
set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science..... There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet
changing social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or the States which ratified it, intended to deprive
to those of working conditions, Brandeis placed great faith in truly competitive markets.
Perhaps Brandeis had become convinced that where competition prevailed its answer
ought to govern. Still, his apparent elevation of this bit of prudential reasoning to due
process status is generally puzzling, and particularly so in light of the earlier concurrences
in Holmes's opinions.
301. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
302. Id. at 302-03 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citation omitted).
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In Nebbia v. New York, barely two years after Crowell, a majority of Justices clearly embraced the view that regulation was a matter of a continuum of degrees of public interests and correlative
degrees of permissible regulation. 0 ' In approving New York legislation regulating the prices charged by milk producers, Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, including Chief Justice Hughes,
and Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, seemed to echo
Dickinson:
No exercise of the private right can be imagined which will not in some
respect, however slight, affect the public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the citizen which will not to some extent
abridge his liberty or affect his property. But subject only to constitutional
restraint the private right must yield to the public need. 05

While the majority agreed that any regulation reasonably promoting public welfare met due process requirements, at least for a
while even the Nebbia majority could disagree about the content
and stringency of that requirement.3 0
In fact, the Nebbia view may well have been that of a majority
at the time of Crowell. According to his biographer, Hughes, in
voting to strike down the state regulation in New State Ice, a case
decided the same term as Crowell, found that regulation very close
to the public interest side of the continuum. s 7 It seems likely that
Hughes did not at that time reject the continuum view of matters
affected with a public interest, but rather disagreed about where
on the continuum Nebbia was situated. 0
303. Id. at 305-11 (footnotes omitted).
304. 291 U.S. 502, 525, 531-39 (1934).
305. Id. at 524-25.
306. CompareNebbia with Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
Justice Roberts, who had voted with the Nebbia majority, again voted with the majority in
Morehead to strike down state wage legislation as violative of due process. justice Roberts
seems to have later joined his former Nebbia colleagues in a broad view of the restrictions
of substantive due process. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). His
was, of course, the vote said to be the famous "switch in time that saved nine" from
Roosevelt's Court-packing proposals.
307. 2 M. PusFY, CHARLF S EVANS HUGHFS 698 (1951).
308. Hughes, father of New York's public utility regulatory agency, held fairly modern views as early as 1903:

Will anyone suggest to an intelligent audience that American citizens are in
revolt against their own prosperity? ... What they are in rebellion against is
favoritism which gives a chance to one man to move his goods and not to an-
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H. The FederalJudicialPower and the Related Issue of the Right to a
Jury Trial in the 1920s and Early 1930s
In Suits at common law, where the value in Controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the
right to trial by jury shall be preserved ....
United States Constitution, Amendment VII
The command of the Seventh Amendment . . . does not require that old
forms of procedure be retained. . . . New devices may be used to adapt the

ancient institution to present needs ...
Ex parte Peterson...

1. The Courts' and Scholars' Views. While the issues of due process, the right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment, and
the right to a full-fledged federal court under article III, are analytically distinct, they are, nevertheless, related in a number of
ways. The first goes to the heart of the matter of fairness; the
other two are designed primarily to assure fairness for private interests, by means of prophylactic procedures. 10 It was early established that due process itself did not, in many contexts, require
judicial process.3 11 I believe that, having determined that adminis-

trative trials meet due process standards of fairness, the Court felt
other: which gives to one man one set of terms and another set to his rival
..

.

. It is a revolt against all the influences which have grown out of an unli-

censed freedom, and of a failure to recognize that these great privileges, so
necessary for public welfare, have been created by the public for the public
benefit and not primarily for private advantage.
1 M. PusKY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 206 (1951) (quoting address by Charles Evans Hughes
delivered in Elmira, New York, on May 3, 1903).
309. 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1919) (citations and footnote omitted) (Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the conservative Mr. Justice Van Devanter and four other Justices, to
approve use of court-appointed auditor to assist in fact-finding in case at law).
310. 1 do not mean to rule out other secondary policies served by these provisions,
including the public interest in the appearance of fair treatment of private interests and in
accuracy. The latter two policies seem to have less force in purely private cases not commenced, maintained, or significantly supported by the federal government.
311. See Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 506-510 (1903) and cases cited therein.
Reetz fairly attributes such a holding to Murray's Lessee. Id. at 507. As discussed earlier, to
what category of cases the Murray's Lessee opinion is addressed is a difficult question. Reetz
seems to go quite far in allowing states to use nonjudicial tribunals, as long as due process is
otherwise satisfied. These developments seem unsurprising, since article III clearly applies
only to federal courts, and the federal Constitution nowhere else defines what state bodies
constitute "courts" for federal purposes. To require states to use the label would have
accomplished nothing. Whatever tribunal is employed is of course subject to federal due
process-based fairness standards.
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freer to approach article III and the seventh amendment as somewhat technical provisions, easily adjusted around their outer edges
to meet practical problems. Support for this view follows.
Starting in about 1918, there was significant scholarly pressure on the Court to reform civil procedure, and, in particular, to
pare down the scope of the right to a jury trial.312 Professor
Scott's particular proposals seem tame enough. For example, he
heavily criticized the Supreme Court's decision finding violative of
the seventh amendment the procedure of entering judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict. 13 His more generalized statements
suggest the need for a flexible interpretation:
If the ancient institution of trial by jury is to survive, as our ancestors intended that it should, it must be capable of adaptation to the needs of the
present and of the future. This means that it must be something more than
a bulwark against tyranny and corruption: it must be an efficient instrument
in the administration of justice.-" 4

The impact of Scott's statements can be seen in the 1919, seventh
amendment case quoted at the beginning of this Section. There,
Justice Brandeis cited Scott to justify the Court's flexible reading
of that amendment.
In 1921, the Supreme Court decided Block v. Hirsch,31 upholding a District of Columbia war emergency rent control
scheme, despite numerous challenges, including a Lochner-style
due process argument, and a seventh amendment due process
complaint. The dissent was one of the most eloquent statements
of the view embracing substantive due process. 3 6 For the majority, no doubt held together by the need for such power in an
emergency,311 the war caused private property temporarily to be
affected with a public interest, thereby justifying rate regulation
under the Munn doctrine. 8 As for the jury trial issue, Holmes,
writing for the majority, allows the District of Columbia rent commission to find finally facts determinative of the rent a private
312.

Scott, Trial byJury and the Reform of Civil Procedure,31 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1918).

313. Id. at 688-89: see also Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
314. Scott, supra note 312, at 691.
315. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
316. Id. at 158-70.
317. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 551-52 (1934) (McReynolds & Van Devanter, JJ., dissenting) (explaining Block).
318. Block, 256 U.S. at 155-58.
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landlord could charge.3 1 9

The next year, 1922, we find an indication of how the judiciary, at the highest level, viewed the constraints of article III, particularly in connection with agency adjudication. Eulogizing former Chief Justice Edward D. White, William Howard Taft, his
conservative3

20

successor, said:

The Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to exercise powers the conferring of which by Congress would have been, perhaps, thought
in the earlier years of the Republic to violate the rule that no legislative
power can be delegated. But the inevitable progress and exigencies of government and the utter inability of Congress to give the time and attention
Ito these matters] forced the modification of the rule. Similar necessity
caused Congress to create other bodies with analogous relations to the existing legislative, executive, and judicial machinery of the Federal Government, and these in due course came under the examination of this court.321

In 1924, two years after Taft's eulogy for White, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis published an article supporting Congress'
authority to restrict the power of federal judges to punish certain
contempts 22 The article was subtitled, "A Study in Separation of
Powers. 3 23 The first portion of the article seems designed to establish the ancient pedigree and correctness of a flexible approach
to the doctrine of separated powers:
As a principle of statesmanship the practical demands of government preclude Ithel doctrinaire application lof principles of separation of powers].
The latitude with which the doctrine must be observed in a workaday world
was steadily insisted upon by those shrewd men of the world who framed the
Constitution and by the statesman who became the great 24Chief Justice..
"JAI political doctrine" . . . not a technical rule of law.

This view is brought to bear particularly on the judicial power:
The term "judicial power" is not self-defining; it is not, like jury .

. .

. [It]

319. Id. at 158. As to the rent charged during the emergency, the Commission's judgment on the facts was final. See Brief for the Defendant in Error at 4, 19-21, Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).

320.

W. SWIND.ER, COuir AND CONSTrUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. THE OLD

1889-1932, at 224-26 (1969).
321. Proceedings on the Death of Chief Justice Edward D. White, 257 U.S. xxv-xxvi
(1921) (emphasis added).
322. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010 (1924).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1012-14 (footnotes omitted). The material in quotation marks is from Sir
Henry Maine, in Frankfurter's and Landis' words, "following Madison."
LEGAI.rT
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sums up the whole history of the administration of justice in English and
American courts through the centuries. Therefore, we are not applying a
static concept but are dealing with a process, the activities of which must be
left unhampered by particularization, in order to be able to accommodate
themselves to the changing demands of the administration of justice .3

Toward the end of the decade, as Professor Scott had advocated, the Supreme Court effectively abandoned its objection to
judgments notwithstanding jury verdicts in federal civil suits. 326
Two years later, in Ex parte Bakelite Corp., the Court sustained a
congressional grant of nonjudicial power to the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals on the theory that it was a legislative, as opposed to an article III, court, and hence could act both judicially
and legislatively. 2 7 The next year, the Harvard Law Review published a study of non-article III federal courts by Professor Wilber
Katz, who was then one of Professor Frankfurter's graduate students.3 2 Reacting to Bakelite, Katz identified the most serious
problem caused by the Court's recognition of such legislative
courts:
One must recognize ...

that to argue broadly that the "judicial power" is

not vested in the constitutional courts exclusively and may be vested by Congress in legislative courts would completely nullify the tenure and salary requirements of Article III. Obviously, these provisions were intended as limitations on the power of Congress. In order to give them such an effect one
must assume that the Constitution forbids the vesting
in legislative courts of
2
some of the jurisdiction of constitutional courts. '

Katz's problem, of course, is a particularly difficult one after
Crowell, which allowed agency adjudication of a private law suit
under an act of Congress that supplanted a common law action
with a statutory one. Katz, however, writing three years before
Crowell, did not have to consider what possibly could be within the
irreducible core of article III protection if such private suits were
not. Citing Murray's Lessee, as did Freund, Dickinson, and the
Court in Bakelite, Katz sees the appropriate province of legislative
courts as coextensive with that of executive branch decision making: "The only matters which the Bakelite doctrine permits to be
325. Id. at 1017.
326. See Northern Ry. v. Page, 274 U.S. 65, 67 (1927); 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
MOORE's FEDERAL. PRAar1CF 1 50.07[1] (2d ed. 1986).
327. 279 U.S. 438, 454, 458-59 (1929).
328. Katz, FederalLegislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. RFV. 894 (1930).
329.

Id. at 917 (emphasis in original).
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taken from the constitutional courts and vested in legislative
courts are those which Congress could, apart from that decision,
commit to the final determination of executive officers." 3 30 The
distinction Katz seems to be making corresponds roughly to that
between judicial-style jurisdiction over disputes involving constitutionally protected property and liberty rights, and such jurisdiction over areas of privilege: "The criterion suggested [by the language of Bakelite] presupposes the existence of a body of law
distinguishing cases in which the Constitution permits final determination by executive officers or an administrative tribunal from
those in which a litigant has a constitutional right to a hearing
before a court."3 31
2. Phillipsv. Commissioner. The year following Professor Katz's
article and one year before Crowell, the Supreme Court laid some
important groundwork toward expanding permissible non-article
III jurisdiction. Justice Brandeis's opinion for the Court in Phillips
v. Commissioner3 32 dealt with a statute that made findings by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue final in subsequent court proceedings, if supported by any evidence. 3 3 In a portion of the
opinion, Justice Brandeis seems to argue that tax cases are special,
citing Murray's Lessee.3 3 4 He rejects the view that Murray's Lessee's
rationale, permitting a summary proceeding against a tax collector, was limited to such suits brought by the government against
its agents. Under such a view, Murray's Lessee would be seen as
holding that an agent consents to summary process on becoming a
tax collector. Instead, Brandeis concludes that the government
can proceed in summary fashion outside the courts to collect all
taxes from citizens, including income taxes.33
Brandeis may have been correct on this point, but there remains the issue of what sort of judicial review can later be had of
summary executive action. On this question, he finds constitutionally adequate judicial review limited to questions of law and to assuring that some evidence supports the Commissioner's findings
330. Id. at 916-17.
331. Id. at 913.
332. 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
333. Id. at 599.
334. Id. at 596.
335. "The underlying principle in IMurray's Lessee] was not [the relationship of government and agenti, but the need of the government promptly to secure its revenues." Id.
at 596. In other words, Brandeis generalizes Murray's Lessee to all collection of revenue.
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of fact: "It has long been settled that determinations of fact for
ordinary administrative purposes are not subject to review." 336 In
support of this proposition are cited three cases involving, respectively, federal land, use of the mails, and immigration. 3 These
are akin to the executive action/privilege cases described earlier
in this Article. Additionally, he cites United States Supreme Court
cases upholding state laws providing for final fact-finding by agencies. 3 38 In some of these, the state regulation was challenged on

due process grounds. 3 9 Finally, Justice Brandeis cites one case involving administrative finality in the regulation of private
industry. 4 °
The cases involving state regulation say nothing about the
scope of article III. The land grant, immigration, and mails cases
are classic executive-action cases, reflecting an exception to article
III established early in the nineteenth century. The case involving
final fact-finding by a federal agency regulating private business
reflects extensions of the executive-action cases already accomplished by the time of Phillips. First was the extension permitting
agency adjudication for the regulation of quasi-public railroads.
Then, as used by the FTC in 1914, the doctrine was stretched to
cover regulation of business in general, arguably on the theory
that all of it was to some degree affected with a public interest.
Phillips moves one more step. It permits the federal government to use agencies to determine, at the trial level, monetary obligations, imposed under otherwise constitutional statutes, owed it
by private citizens. Neither Phillips, nor, with the exception of
Block v. Hirsch,341 any of the other cases cited by Brandeis in Crow336. Id. at 600.
337. Id., citing Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 93, 99 (1898): United States v.Ju Toy, 198
U.S. 253, 263 (1905): Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904).
338. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923): Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n,
236 U.S. 230 (1914): Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U.S. 380 (1912);
New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905); Reetz v. Michigan, 188
U.S. 505 (1903).
339. See Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923): Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505

(1903).
340. Tagg Bros v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930). Also cited is one earlier tax
case, which justice Brandeis sees as presaging Phillips. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1928).
341. 256 U.S. 135 (1921). For a discussion of the factors making Block a limited precedent, see supra note 96.
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ell,3 2 involves final federal agency determination of the liability of
one private party to another. In this sense the Court broke new
ground in Crowell by crossing into the private rights realm, which
was seen as centrally judicial by Ernst Freund. Still, after Phillips,
so little seems left of the original article III that private party
cases seem relatively unimportant. Are not the executive and legislative branches more likely to attempt to influence judges in
cases like Phillips where the federal government is a party?
Seen in this light, Hughes' opinion in Crowell is deft symbolism. With so much no longer covered by article III, it seems to say
that there is at least something covered by article III: private controversies; article III will be taken seriously. At the same time, in
light of the fact that more sensitive categories of cases had been
opened up to non-article III adjudication, Hughes allows it sub
rosa in private-rights cases as well. He does this by allowing an
agency to find facts finally. Justice Brandeis is more direct. Without acknowledging that the Court was covering somewhat new
territory, his opinion is correct in its implication that major steps
previously had been taken toward allowing final fact-finding by an
article I body in virtually any civil controversy. Still, with the exception of the sharply distinguishable Block v. Hirsch,"s those major steps stopped short of agency inroads in controversies between
private parties over monetary liability.
3. Summary: The 1920s and Early 1930s. To summarize, the
1920's, particularly the later years, were busy years in the development of judicial power and of administrative law. While the way
was being paved for greater governmental powers in dissents,
both on and off the Court, the scope of substantive due process
limits on regulation was expanded as the Court read the judicial
power and jury trial protections of the Constitution in a flexible
way. Indeed, it was established that findings of facts determinative
of citizens' obligations to the government made by an administrative agency could be made conclusive on the courts. Freund, Dickinson and other scholars were particularly preoccupied with what
was to occur where individual rights were subjected to administrative adjudication. The questions pressed by Professor Katz were to
take a most difficult form in Crowell, which dealt with "private
342.
343.

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 70 n.5 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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rights." When that case was decided all of the Justices refused,
perhaps wisely, to face those questions squarely, concluding that
clear precedents were in place. What was in place was a series of
developments of various sorts, making the result in Crowell seem
practically desirable and relatively non-threatening.
I.

Conclusion, Section 11.

By 1932, when Crowell was decided, the world had changed in
a number of ways that facilitated its decision. At the simplest and
most linear level, the Court had accepted agency adjudication in a
number of contexts, state and federal. These cases determined
that final agency fact-finding violated neither the fifth nor the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Charles Evans
Hughes, the new Chief Justice and author of the opinion in Crowell, had been the driving force behind the New York utility regulation commission, 4 and had gone on record, between his two
terms on the Court, that final agency fact-finding was compatible
at least with due process.

45

A number of states had approved such

adjudication despite separation of power challenges.
In related developments, the Supreme Court took a less than
relentlessly severe view of the scope of the seventh amendment's
jury trial guarantee. Additionally, the Court implicitly had found
agency and executive branch adjudication compatible with article
III in a series of cases which were essentially public-rights cases in
the sense those words were used in Murray's Lessee. The Court
also stretched the category to cover cases decided initially by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court had walked up to,
but never crossed, under article III, the line drawn by Sharfman
and by Congress in creating the Interstate Commerce Commission: it had never allowed final agency or executive adjudication
in a controversy as purely private as imaginable. Beyond the fairly
technical progression described above, there was a change in the
ethos of constitutional interpretation and, in turn, in the relationship between the public and the private. This facilitated Crowell
from the perspective of some Justices, and ensured it a good reception in scholarly circles. Beginning with glimmerings in the
works of Holmes and Pound, and more fully articulated by Car344.

1 M. PusEy, supra note 307, at 200-09.

345. C. HUGH-S,

THE SUPREME CouRr OF THE UNITED STATEs

223-24 (1928).
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dozo and Frankfurter, the notion of careful remaking of fundamental law had found impressive spokesmen. Benjamin Cardozo
had joined the Court, although he did not participate in Crowell.
Acknowledging some debt to Dickinson, while still Chief Judge of
the New York Court of Appeals, Cardozo, in a 1928 book, dealt
with problems of constitutional interpretation.' 8" In passages concerned with the proper judicial role in reconciling legal doctrine
with changing circumstances, Cardozo endorsed the view that the
appropriate response is not logical synthesis, but compromise."'
Frankfurter, in characterizing those portions of Cardozo's book
dealing with constitutional interpretation, borrows a passage from
Whitehead. 4" That passage, recognizing a need both for preserving and adjusting public symbols to new demands, 49 captured the
view of some of the Supreme Court justices at the time of Crowell.
It states well the later prevailing view that made possible broad
grants of legislative and judicial power to the executive branch
and independent agencies.
At least some of Cardozo's brethren had come to appreciate
the need for deft constitutional revision, or at least gymnastic interpretation, preserving, to borrow from Whitehead, constitutional "symbols" while allowing greatly needed change. As can be
seen from Chief Justice Taft's eulogy to his predecessor, nowhere
was such revision as acceptable as in the area of inconvenient prophylactic procedural guarantees, those going above and beyond
procedural due process.
Beyond this, while the Court had generally continued to adhere to a view of substantive due process most hostile toward regulation, voices on the Court, and Dickinson off the Court, had
made a convincing case that there was no natural border between
the public and the private. Like many forceful insights, this one
may have moved, if only slightly, even the most resistant. I believe
that, although Crowell is couched in terms of what procedures
must be accorded in a private rights case, it is partially a product
of a shift in perception of the public and the private. For many of
the Justices, Crowell was facilitated by a perspective in which for346.

B. CARIozo, THE PARADOXES oF LEGAL SCIENCE 61-63 (1928).

347. Id. at 5.
348. Frankfurter, Book Review, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 436, 438 (1929) (quoting A. WHITEHFAD, SYMBOmsM 88 (1927)).
349.

The passage is quoted in full at the beginning of this Article.
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merly private rights had come to be seen as sufficiently public,
whatever their official description, to permit procedures formerly
used only in areas of great federal control. Certainly the Munn
and Lochner line of cases deal with problems technically distinct
from those involving the judicial power. Still, the new world-view
of allowing greater governmental control, shared to some degree
by four or more justices, created a climate for procedural reform.
It was a climate that allowed forms of dispute resolution more attuned to public ends than traditional court proceedings.
Only two years after Crowell, and well before Roosevelt's
Court-packing campaign, a majority of the Court had clearly
abandoned its view that only a few businesses were affected with a
public interest for purposes of regulation. It is entirely possible
that this view was shared at the time of the Crowell decision. Finally, and closely connected with the latter, the notion of a fluid
public/private distinction, which had also been reflected in the
earlier work of Holmes and Pound, found clear and forceful expression in the writings of John Dickinson.
Indeed, by 1932, a British legal scholar stated: "[P]ublic law
.. .is gradually eating up private law .. . [T]he public lawyer is
ousting the private lawyer, and the rights and duties of institutions
are superseding the ordinary rights and duties of private citizens." 3 50 While the American federal government was to remain
somewhat distant from this description for a few more months, it
was apt for some American state institutions, and for a new American ethos already in existence and amply represented, although
to different degrees, by many distinguished members of the profession, including many of the Justices of the Supreme Court.
III.

FROM CROWELL THROUGH NORTHERN PIPELINE TO UNION
CARBIDE AND SCHOR.

My focus above has been on the evolution of thought, up to
the time of Crowell v. Benson, 51 regarding federal adjudication
outside of the article III courts. Particular emphasis has been
placed upon the development of an exception to article III's tenure and salary provisions for cases within a "public rights" category and upon the spreading influence of that category beyond its
350. Jennings, The Institutional Theory, in MODERN THEORIES
351.

285 U.S. 22 (1932).

OF

LAw 68, 72 (1933).
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original boundaries. The opinion of the plurality of Justices in
Northern Pipeline 52 perpetuated the Murray'sLessee-Crowell publicrights exception. Subsequent opinions, in Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co.,3 53 and in Commodities Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor,354 deemphasize the importance of the publicrights category without clearly discarding it.355 In addition, the
two later cases mark a broader shift from the general approach of
the plurality in Northern Pipeline toward non-article III
adjudication. 5 6
A. From Crowell to Northern Pipeline: A Brief Look at a Period of
Passivity
A jump of exactly one-half century from Crowell to Northern
Pipeline is, on the surface, difficult to justify. Surely, one would
suppose, there must have been significant developments in the interim. A closer, but brief, look at Supreme Court cases dealing
with article III reveals that 1982 was more than Crowell's fiftieth
anniversary: it marked an important change in the tone and emphasis of article III jurisprudence.
Crowell posed a serious potential threat to the continued existence of a meaningful article III. At the most general level of
analysis, it raised the question whether article III can be bent to
permit all but the most blatant attempts at congressional circumvention. More specifically, it suggests that Congress has great
power to use agencies and article I courts to adjudicate congressionally created rights, even when such rights are substituted for
57
old rights of action at common law and in admiralty.
From Crowell to NorthernPipeline, the Supreme Court allowed
Congress increasing flexibility in circumventing article III's tenure requirements. With only a few minor exceptions, the Court
decided cases and wrote its opinions in a way that did little to indicate a willingness to resist the more alarming possibilities raised by
Crowell's broad statements.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

458 U.S. 50 (1982).
105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985).
106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
See infra notes 447-51, 472-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 449-52, 465-78 and accompanying text.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See also Hart, supra note 76, at 1375.
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First is Williams v. United States,35 decided one year after
Crowell and termed an "intellectual disaster" by distinguished
commentators. 59 While Williams is not a serious erosion of article
III protections, 60 it does demonstrate the Court's compliant attitude toward Congress' decision to avoid use of article III courts.
In Williams, the salaries of judges of the Court of Claims were to
be reduced under an act of Congress." 1 Sixty years earlier the
Supreme Court had almost certainly declared the Court of Claims
an article III court.362 Implausibly rejecting the authority of the
earlier case, the Supreme Court proceeded to assert that the
Court of Claims could not be an article III court, because it heard
cases outside the judicial power. 63 The judicial power, however,
expressly includes controversies to which the United States is a
party, and suits arising under federal law.36 The Williams Court's
unconvincing attempt to conclude that suits against the United
States under federal law are not within the judicial power is a sad
chapter in article III jurisprudence.
289 U.S. 553 (1933).
HART & WE(:HSLER, supra note 57, at 399.
360. Williams itself affected only a narrow band of cases seeking damages against the
United States. Indeed, after Murray's Lessee, it is difficult to argue that, if the federal government consents to suit, it must consent to suit in an article III court. As a result, a finding that the Court of Claims need not be an article III court breaks no new ground and has
narrow implications. The difficulties with Williams are twofold. First, although Congress
need not have done so, the evidence indicated that an earlier Congress had made the
Court of Claims an article III Court. The Court shamefully ignored this evidence and allowed a later Congress to reduce the judges salaries. Second, the Court concluded that
proceedings against the United States for damages were either within the judicial power or
they were not. On this view, if Congress could itself determine claims against the United
States, as it had done in the past, it could not, at its option, consent to suit in an article III
court. The lesson of Murrays' Lessee is precisely the opposite; it is that there are some matters that may or may not be styled as a judicial case at Congress' option. This portion of
Williams was so weakly reasoned that it has been the subject of ridicule. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 57, at 399. It is interesting, however, that such reasoning, if sustainable,
might have doomed most agency adjudication, for it was clear that most such agency litigation arose under the laws of the United States. See D. CURRIE, supra note 76, at 146, (asking
rhetorically, "How many federal administrative agencies would be destroyed if article IIl
were held to be exclusive? Or don't you think Williams should be taken to have overruled
Crowell v. Benson?"). The main point is, of course, that the Williams Court intended no such
thing. The difficulties with its rationale, not carefully thought through, seem to demonstrate its eagerness to find a way to accommodate Congress.
361. 289 U.S. at 559-60.
362. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144-45 (1871).
363. 289 U.S. at 577-81.
364. For the relevant text of article III, see supra note 9.
358.

359. See
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Among the 1932-1982 cases, Glidden Co. v. Zdanok36 5 has
been cited as an indication of judicial resolve to preserve a meaningful article III.366 The Glidden opinion dealt with the appeal of
two cases. 6 7 In each, the vote of an arguably non-article III judge
was determinative of the result. In Glidden itself, a Court of
Claims judge, sitting by designation on the United States Court of
Appeals, wrote the opinion and cast a decisive vote in reversing
the decision of a Federal District Court against employees in a diversity jurisdiction-contract dispute.' 8 In its companion, Lurk v.
United States,3 69 a Court of Customs and Patent Appeals judge, sitting by designation in a District Court, presided over a criminal
trial resulting in conviction.37 0 Like the Court of Claims, the Customs and Patent Court had been declared an article I court years
earlier.37 1 A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that both
of the judges in question were article III judges. 2
In reviewing Glidden itself, the civil appeal, the plurality of
Justices left no doubt as to its view that the Constitution required
an article III court.37 3 It is a fair reading that the concurring Justices doubted the propriety of an article I adjudication.7 4 The
370 U.S. 530 (1962).
D. CURRI F, FEDERAL JURISDIC-TION IN A NUrsHELL 42-44 (2d ed. 1981).
367. 370 U.S. at 532-33.
368. Id. at 532; see Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F.2d 99, 100, 105 (1961). The judge in
question, Judge Madden, was in a majority of two and, thus, cast a deciding vote.
369. 370 U.S. at 532: see Lurk v. United States, 296 F.2d 360 (1961), aff'd sub nom.
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
370. 370 U.S. at 532.
371. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
372. A plurality of three Justices, Harlan, Brennan and Stewart, reached this result by
overruling the earlier cases that declared the Claims and Patent courts non-article III
courts. 370 U.S. at 541-85. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark concurred on the
grounds that curative legislation enacted years after the earlier decisions had changed the
courts into article III courts. Id. at 585-89. The plurality was clearly unwilling to rest its
opinion upon the attempted curative legislation. Id. at 541-43.
373. 370 U.S. at 537-38. From a strict point of view, the statements that an article III
court was required are dictum. Given the Court's conclusion that the Court of Claims is an
article Ill court, the Supreme Court did not have to decide what an opposite conclusion
would have required. If the Court's statements be dictum, they are the clearest possible.
Contrast the courts avoiding the ultimate issue in Glidden's companion case, Lurk. See supra
notes 369-72 and accompanying text.
374. They expressed disagreement on the rationale for determining article III status.
See supra note 373. They expressed no disagreement with the plurality's conclusion that an
article Ill court was required. Most conservatively read, their opinion may be one which
avoids the issue of constitutionality of an article I adjudication by finding that such an
adjudication did not occur. This is how the plurality disposed of Lurk, Glidden's companion
365.

366.
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plurality reasoned that federal courts hear diversity cases only by
virtue of article III's grant and that therefore a court and judges
protected under that provision are required. 5
Whether one agrees with the plurality that diversity cases are
special, Glidden seems an easy case. There we have an arguably
non-article III judge casting the deciding vote to reverse an article
III district judge on what was seen as a question of law. Hughes'
opinion in Crowell makes clear that, at least in cases of private
right, article III review of questions of law is required. a 8 Indeed,
such review was required by due process via the doctrine of
supremacy of law as understood by judges and leading scholars in
1932. 8' Had the judge in question not proven to be an article III
judge, not only would the doctrine of supremacy of law have been
violated, but in addition an article I judge would have been elevated above the article III district judge who heard the case
originally.
Glidden, then, makes a stand for a meaningful article III, but
its facts did not require the Court to take a particularly strong
stand.3a7 The plurality's conclusion that article III treatment is recase. See supra notes 369-72 and accompanying text.
375. The plurality in Northern Pipeline likewise saw cases adjudicating state-created
cases as a specially protected category. 458 U.S. at 83-84.
376. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932). The dissenters do not disagree.
377. "The Supremacy of law demands that there shall be an opportunity to have some
court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and whether the proceeding in
which the facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly." St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v,
United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See Dickinson, supra note
161.
378. Lurk v. United States, Glidden's companion, does not reinforce a meaningful article III. 370 U.S. at 532. At best it was no occasion for comment, at worst it shows some
lack of concern. All participating justices carefully examined the article III status of the
judge who conducted the criminal trial in Lurk. 370 U.S. at 538-42, 558-606. The Court of
Appeals in Lurk had concluded that a trial before an article I judge was lawful, because the
trial was conducted under the local law of the District of Columbia within the District.
Lurk v. United States, 296 F.2d 360, 361-62 (1961). The plurality made clear, however,
that it was not necessarily committed to the view that a conclusion of non-article Ill status
required reversal. 370 U.S. at 537-38. Having favorably decided the Patent Court's article
III status, the Court did not have to decide if Lurk could have been tried before an article I
judge. Indeed, one wonders whether the plurality was correct that the issue was easy to
dodge. The justices concluded that, even if Mr. Lurk had been entitled to an article Ill
judge, he had in fact been accorded one. Did Mr. Lurk really receive what article III requires? Can one have the prophylactic protection of a judge insulated from tenure and
salary pressures while, during the trial, there is serious doubt, generated by the most recent Supreme Court opinion on the subject, as to whether the judge was indeed so
insulated?
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quired in diversity cases is a clear limit, and one echoed by a majority of Justices twenty years later in Northern Pipeline. Despite
this, rarely has Congress attempted non-article III treatment in
diversity cases, nor does it seem likely to do so on a significant
scale. The most serious article III problem after Crowell arises
from the use of agencies and article I courts to hear matters arising under quickly proliferating federal law.
During the period 1932-1982, in addition to its recognition in
Glidden of some article III limits, courts imposed other such limits
upon the kinds of parties and cases subject to non-article III
courts martial. In one of them, military court jurisdiction over
military wives was denied in certain cases."' In another, jurisdiction over servicemen was denied military courts for crimes committed off the base and unrelated to military duty."'
Despite these narrow assertions of article III's protections,
the force of cases expanding non-article III adjudication outstripped those cases that imposed limits. Toward the end of the period
1932-1982, the Supreme Court, for the first time, clearly allowed
an article I court sitting in the District of Columbia to dispose of
cases under local laws passed by Congress to regulate conduct in
the District.381
Most significantly, in 1977, in Atlas Roofing v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission,382 the Court settled defini-

tively the question of the application of the seventh amendment's
jury trial provisions to administrative actions. 3 The Court held
that a matter that would have been a suit at common law can be
preempted by an administrative scheme. 4 By substituting an administrative action for its common law antecedent, the right to a
379. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
380. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See also United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (denying court martial jurisdiction over former servicemen for
certain offenses committed during period of service). The Supreme Court, however, has
recently done away with the "service connection" requirement, thereby overruling

O'Callahan. Solorio v. United States, 55 U.S.L.W. 5038 (U.S. June 25, 1987) (No. 851581). The Solorio opinion seems to cast no doubt on Toth's holding that former members
of the armed forces are not subject to military justice for offenses committed during their
previous term of duty.
381. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
382. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
383. See Young, Federal Courts & Federal Rights, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1145 (1979).
384. 430 U.S. at 455.
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jury trial can be eliminated. 5 Just as Crowell lowered any article
III barriers to substitute administrative actions, Atlas lowered the
related seventh amendment barrier and implicitly vouched for
Crowell's continued viability as to the permissibility of agency adjudication under article III.
Finally, in United States v. Raddatz, s" the Court allowed an untenured federal magistrate to determine the facts underlying a coerced confession claim. The magistrate's decision was subject to
mandatory de novo review on the record made by the magistrate,
but with no requirement of a de novo hearing of evidence by the
reviewing article III judge.8
Aside from Williams, the Court's record from 1932-1982 is
not shameful. It may not be fair to fault the Court greatly for
failing to demonstrate a sense of seriousness about article III limits. The Court has only negative control of what it decides: it cannot create test cases. Still, the two cases with the broadest reach,
Atlas and Raddatz, were resolved against article III or similar seventh amendment claims. Perhaps the resolutions of these difficult
cases were correct; what I find objectionable is the fact that, in so
resolving the difficult cases, the Court did not indicate that it was
prepared to draw a definitive line somewhere and to make serious
efforts to police it.
Whether one agrees with the precise resolution of the new,
post-1981 cases, the concerns driving those opinions are laudable.
So is the Justices' willingness to announce publicly that there are
some limits to the flexibility of article III, as exemplified by Crowell. What follows will trace developments from 1982 to date and
will then discuss them critically.
B. Non-Article III Adjudication 1982-1986: The Cases
Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their symbols with free-

dom of revision, must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or from the
slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless shadows .... .8

Again, the passage from Whitehead quoted approvingly by
385. Id.
386. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
387. Id. at 674.
388. A. WHrrEHFAD. SYMBOLISM 88 (1927), quoted in Frankfurter, Book Review, 77 U.
PA. L. REv. 436, 438 (1929) (reviewing B. CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE
(1928)): see supra note I and accompanying text.
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Frankfurter in connection with constitutional change. Those
words capture the Court's difficulties in applying the Constitution
to changing circumstances. The story of article III we have surveyed has been the story of attempts at balancing and adjustment.
In the recent cases discussed below, the Supreme Court has struggled to mediate the conflict between practical pressures, favoring
new forms of adjudication, and the requirement that it preserve a
meaningful role for an independent judiciary as required by the
Constitution. In so doing, the post-1982 Court has attempted to
make clear that there are limits to the flexibility exemplified by
Crowell.
1. Northern Pipeline.
a. The Plurality Opinion. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe.Line Co., 8 9 the Court held unconstitutional certain portions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.90 Those provisions
permitted judges of the Bankruptcy Court, an article I court, to
conduct trials of state contract and tort cases brought by the estates of bankrupt persons against third parties, regardless of diversity of citizenship.391 At least on the surface, Justice Brennan's
opinion for a plurality, including Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, 39 2 placed very stringent limits on Congress' power to use
courts other than those established under article III. The plurality
recognized three, 3 and most likely only three,3 94 exceptions to
the rule that federal adjudication in a court must occur in an article III court. The exceptional categories of cases that, constitutionally, may be heard in an article I court are: (1) cases within the
judicial power of article III but adjudicated in the territories or
the District of Columbia, 9 5 (2) cases of courts martial,3 96 and (3)
public-rights cases. 97 In recognizing these three categories, the
plurality's justification seems partly principled, in the narrow legal
sense of the word, and partly an attempt to accept article III's
389. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
390. Id. at 53-56.
391. Id. at 52-56. (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in the judgment).
392. 458 U.S. at 52.
393. Id. at 63-70 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
394. Id. at 75-76.
395. Id. at 64-65.
396. Id. at 66.
-397. Id. at 67-70.
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case law legacy of exceptions while limiting further serious erosion: "Although the dissent is correct that these three grants are
not explicit in the language of the Constitution, they are nonetheless firmly established in our historical understanding of the constitutional structure. When these grants are properly constrained, they
do not threaten the Framers' vision of an independent Federal
Judiciary."398

The contents of the first two categories are clear enough.
That of the third, the public-rights exception, somewhat mystifies
even the plurality which invokes it:
The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present
cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise "between the government and others." In contrast, the "liability
of one individual to another under the law as defined" . . . "is a matter of
private rights. " "

Whatever the content of the public-rights category, its significance is clear according to the plurality: if an article I court adjudicates matters outside the public-rights category and not involving District of Columbia courts, territorial courts, or courts
martial, its doing so is unconstitutional unless, as seems unlikely,
the Court establishes further exceptions.
Having identified the categories in which adjudication may
proceed in an article I court, the plurality nevertheless recognized
that in other sorts of cases a substantial amount of non-article III
adjudication will be permitted. It did so by drawing a distinction
between article I courts and adjudicatory bodies which are "adjuncts" to article III courts.400 On this view, the agency that decided Crowell, a private-rights case, could do so because it was
merely an adjunct to an article III court." 1 Under the reasoning
of the plurality, the Constitution does not permit private-rights
cases, such as Crowell, to be decided by a legislative court.
Remember that the agency in Crowell, characterized as an adjunct fifty years later in Northern Pipeline,402 was not formally de398. Id. at 70 n.25 (emphasis added).
399. Id. at 69-70 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438,
451 (1929) and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
400. Id. at 76-86.
401. Id. at 78.
402. Id at 80-81.
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nominated an adjunct to the article III courts. What, then, was
the contemplated difference between adjuncts and article III
courts? Apparently the difference was one of degree in terms of
the scope of powers 0 3 and perhaps, symbolically, 40 4 in terms of
the trappings of court-like power.
The plurality's description of article III's limits is as follows:
as the scope of an agency's subject-matter jurisdiction, its powers
within its jurisdiction, and its freedom from review by article III
05
courts increase, the closer the agency moves to court status.
With too potent a combination of these factors, an article I body
reaches court status and can be assigned only District of Columbia, territorial, courts martial, or public-rights cases.40 8
Short of court status, an article I judicial body is an adjunct to
the article III courts. This, however, does not insure constitutionality. If Congress created the right in issue, its power to provide
40 7
for adjudication by an adjunct was said to be "at a maximum."
This is true even if the right created by Congress, like the one
involved in Crowell, was a private right assertable by one private
party against another. This means that such a tribunal can have a
very potent combination of powers, but not quite enough to make
it a court. If, on the other hand, constitutional or state-created
rights are at issue, Congress' powers to use an adjunct can be employed only if it is made relatively impotent as compared with the
supervising article III court.
The Northern Pipeline plurality voted to strike down the Bankruptcy Act because the Bankruptcy Court could determine statecreated contract rights. Thus, while its power should have been
narrowly circumscribed, 0 8 the adjunct possessed too much power
for a body determining such highly protected rights. 40 9 In what
ways was the Bankruptcy Court too powerful?
First, unlike some adjuncts whose decisions were enforceable
only by a subsequent action in an article III court, the Bankruptcy
Court issued orders enforceable by United States marshalls unless
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Id. at 84-86.
See infra notes 479-81 and accompanying text.
458 U.S. at 83-86.
Id.
See id. at 83-84 & n.35.
Id. at 84-87.
Id.
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successfully appealed.4 10 Second, although tethered to bankruptcy,
the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction covered a wide variety of substantive subjects that may be involved in any bankruptcy, such as
state contract and tort claims.411 Third, the Bankruptcy Court
possessed a wide range of.remedial powers. 412 Finally, the article
III courts could reverse the Bankruptcy Court, on review, only for
errors of law and for clearly erroneous fact-findings.41 3 In all of
these respects, the Court seemed to believe that the Bankruptcy
Court's powers were greater even than those approved in Crowell
for an adjunct operating subject to the substantially more relaxed
standards applicable to adjudication of rights created by Congress.
b. A Critique of the Plurality Opinion. The plurality's opinion
in Northern Pipeline leaves us wondering about precisely what subset of litigation involving rights created by Congress constitutes
the public-rights subset. It also leaves us wondering whether the
line between the set and its subset is worth drawing in light of the
fact that an adjunct hearing any case involving a congressionally
created right can have relatively potent powers, approaching
those of a court. What is the difference between an article I court
and a potent adjunct? The Court itself seems to reject the view
that the difference is one of pure labeling or symbolism. 1 4 If the
difference is one of fine degree based on a host of factors, why
distinguish court from adjunct instead of noting that a weighing
of such factors bears on the validity of any particular assignment
of jurisdiction to an article I tribunal?
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in the judgment
in Northern Pipeline on the ground that the state-created rights did
indeed define a sensitive area of jurisdiction and that the Bank41 5
ruptcy Court was too independent of the article III courts.

Their opinion expressed some skepticism, however, of the elaborate system of categories drawn by the plurality.1 6 I believe con410. Id. at 85-86.
411. Id. at 85.
412. Id.
413. Id.

414. 1 draw this conclusion because, despite the Bankruptcy Court's having been
named a "court," the Supreme Court was willing to consider the possibility that its powers
are sufficiently modest to allow it to be an adjunct. If the concern were with symbolism and
public confusion, I would think the label extremely important. Id. at 76-87.
415. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
416. Id.
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cerns similar to those expressed in the criticism of the plurality
just presented influenced the concurring Justices. Similar concerns caused a later defection from the plurality opinion, leading'
to a new majority with a less artificial view of non-article III jurisdiction. The later cases are discussed below.
Beyond the problems with the specificity and shape of the
plurality's map of article III, there are difficulties with some of the
factors it viewed as worth weighing. If symbolism is not important, should it really matter that a tribunal's decision is enforceable even without a court order? Whether (1) the victor before the
adjunct must bring its decision to an article III court for enforcement or (2) the loser must either appeal the decision or obey it,
seems to have limited practical, as opposed to symbolic, effect.4"'
In either case, the loser can have an article III court apply the
appropriate standard of review. What that standard of review is
seems by far the more important issue. On that issue, as we shall
see in later discussion, the plurality in Northern Pipeline and the
majorities in later decisions seem to have misread Crowell as a reference point.
Oddly, perhaps the portion of the plurality opinion with the
most lasting significance was not the rococo map of article III exceptions, but an acknowledgement in a footnote:
Contrary to Ithe dissent'sl suggestion, we do not concede that "Congress
may provide for initial adjudications by Art. I courts or administrative
judges of all rights and duties arising under otherwise valid federal laws."
Rather we simply reaffirm the holding of Crowell-thatCongress may assign
to non-Article III bodies some adjudicatory functions. Crowell itself spoke of
"specialized functions." These cases do not require us to specify further any
limitations that may exist with respect to Congress' power to create adjuncts
to assist in the adjudication of federal statutory rights. 418

This, along with the statements of the dissent discussed immediately below, constitutes the first clear signal from the Court that it
was willing to police Congress' use of adjuncts, as approved in
Crowell, in civil cases arising under acts of Congress.
c. The Northern Pipeline Dissents. Justices White, Burger,
and Powell, dissenting in Northern Pipeline, came closest to meeting the Frankfurter-Whitehead challenge of preserving symbols
417. As to this factor, I agree with Professor Redish. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE LJ. 197, 217.

418. Id. at 80 n.32.
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meaningfully while accommodating change. For them, it was too
late to reverse the creation of exceptions to article III's requirements.419 What was needed was to determine the circumstances
that created a need for non-article III adjudication and those that
created a countervailing need for the protection of an independent judiciary.420 Where the two were at odds, the courts would
balance the needs, although not according them equal weight, in
deciding which would prevail. 421 By this means, article III would

be compromised with decades of recognition of federal administrative adjudication.
2.

Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. 422 In

Thomas, decided in 1985, the Court confronted a constitutional
challenge to provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). 4

23

That Act requires registration of

pesticides by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
before they can be sold. 424 The EPA will not register a pesticide

unless the manufacturer discloses research data concerning the
product's health, safety, and environmental effects. 25 Such data
are of use to competitors and have trade secret status under state
law until made public.426
FIFRA, however, prohibits a second manufacturer from registering a pesticide if it has used data submitted by another manufacturer and if no offer is made to compensate the original registrant.427 If the offer of compensation is not agreeable to the
original provider of data, the second user must pay a sum deter428 If
mined by binding arbitration if he is to register his product.

the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, either may request the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to appoint one. 429
The decision of an arbitrator selected in this manner is final "except for fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct by one of
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

Id. at 93 (White, J. dissenting).
Id. at 113-16.
Id.
105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985).
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Id. at § 136a(a).
105 S. Ct. at 3329: see also 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2) (1982).
See 105 S. Ct. at 3329.
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982).
Id.
Id.
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the parties to the arbitration or the arbitrator....","
In Thomas, an original submitter of data, disappointed both
with the follow-up user's offer and with the outcome of arbitration, challenged the arbitration scheme under article III.4a1 Despite the challenger's arguments that FIFRA's scheme (1) substituted a new federal right for his state-created property rights43 2
and (2) then compelled adjudication of the new right by an untenured arbitrator whose decision was virtually unreviewable,4 3 3
the Supreme Court upheld the Act.43 4
The majority opinion in Thomas was written by Justice
O'Connor, and was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Rehnquist, White, and Powell.43 5 Thus, as contrasted with the voting in Northern Pipeline, the Thomas majority436 is composed of the
three Northern Pipeline dissenters, who had rejected any formulaic
application of rules for exceptions to article III,437 and the two
concurring Justices, who were skeptical of the particular lines
drawn by the plurality opinion. 438 Thomas is important for its suggestion of a new majority view regarding article III that in two
respects is quite different from the view expressed in the plurality
opinion in Northern Pipeline. Specifically, and most clearly, it suggests that a reappraisal of the importance of a private-rights category is at hand and, generally, it suggests that a majority of the
Court now takes a less structured, and more flexible, view of article III than presented in Justice Brennan's 1982 opinion in Northern Pipeline. As we shall see in the next Section, the hints in
Thomas matured, in 1986, into a clear break in the majority opinion in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor.439
430. Id.
431. 105 S. Ct. at 3330-31.
432. Id. at 3325.
433. See id. at 3334.
434. Id. at 3335-39.
435. See id. at 3328.
436. Note that the Thomas decision was unanimous. FourJustices, however, concurred
in the judgment alone. Justice Brennan filed a separate opinion in which Justices Marshall
and Blackmun joined. Id. at 3340 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens concurred on the unique ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
FIFRA. Id. at 3344 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
437. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., & Powell, J.).
438. Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
439. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
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Here is the new direction suggested by Thomas: "The enduring lesson of Crowell is that practical attention to substance rather
than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform the
application of Article III."44" More specifically, beyond the general rejection of formal categories, the Court was forced to address the public rights/private rights distinction, because FIFRA
was challenged on the ground that it gave a non-article III tribunal, the arbitrator, too much unreviewable power in the sensitive
area of private rights.44 1 The challenger asserted Crowell's definition of private-rights cases: those involving the "liability of one
individual to another."44 2 The Northern Pipeline plurality had endorsed such a definition 4 3 and given it new, or at least clearer,
significance: in private-rights cases an article I court could not be
used,"' but use of an appropriately limited adjunct would be permitted.4 4 5 The agency arbitrator in Thomas was, however, not
clearly appropriately circumscribed. The article III courts could
reverse its decision only for fraud or similar misconduct.
As a result, the constitutionality of the scheme in Thomas was
seriously in doubt. First, the fact that the proceeding was, in substance, brought by one private party seeking the monetary liability
of another suggested that it might well be a private-rights case in
the sense intended by the Northern Pipeline plurality. But the extremely limited judicial review of the arbitrator's decision suggested that he might be so potent as to constitute an article I
court. 446 Under the NorthernPipeline plurality's reasoning this was
a fatal combination: an article I court cannot hear a private-rights
case. Even if the arbitrator was not an article I court, the standard
of review might make him too potent an adjunct even for a case
involving private rights that owed their existence to an act of
Congress.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

105 S. Ct. at 3336.
Id. at 3335.
Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
458 U.S. at 67-68 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 67-70.
Noting that the parties had waived whatever due process objections they might

have had to a more stringent standard of review, the Court reserved judgment as to
whether due process required more than review of fact-findings for fraud, misconduct or
misrepresentation. 105 S. Ct. at 3339. The Court nowhere specifically discussed whether
the parties personal rights under article III, also waived, might require more. It certainly
held that that portion of article III designed to protect the courts as institutions did not.
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It was for these reasons, among others, I believe, that the
Thomas majority was quick to distance itself from the Northern
Pipeline plurality's view of the nature and significance of the public-rights category.
ITIhe theory that the public rights/private rights dichotomy of Crowell
and Murray's Lessee . . .provides a bright line test for determining the re-

quirements of Article III did not command a majority of the Court in Northern Pipeline. Insofar as appellees- interpret that case and Crowell as establishing that the right to an Article III forum is absolute
unless the federal
"7
government is a party of record, we cannot agree.

Despite its deemphasizing of the importance of the privaterights category, the Thomas majority sought to justify FIFRA by
clinging to a somewhat reformulated public-rights concept, one
that encompassed some cases involving only private parties:
"[T]he right created by FIFRA is not a purely 'private' right, but
bears many of the characteristics of a 'public'8 right. Use of a regis-

trant's data

. . .

serves a public purpose. 9' 44

"Serves a public purpose" is a broad standard indeed, by itself
doing little to stand in the way of serious circumvention of article
III. Despite this, the Thomas majority does suggest that there is at
least some additional minimal content remaining in a privaterights category, aside from the state-created and constitutional
rights content recognized by the majority in Northern Pipeline.
The Court is at pains to make clear that the appellee's right was
conferred by Congress and was not given in lieu of a preexisting,
vested common-law right. 49 Hence, according to the majority,
Crowell was a private-rights case, not because of the nature of the
parties, as the Crowell Court itself stressed cosmetically, 4 50 but because the employee's statutory right to compensation was substituted for preexisting rights in admiralty. 51
Subject to this exception, where federal statutory rights are in
issue, the Court's reformulated public-rights category seems almost coextensive with Congress' power to legislate. Or, to put it
another way, it seems virtually coextensive with the public interest
as Congress sees it. Roughly sixty years after John Dickinson
447.

105 S. Ct. at 3336.

448. 105 S. Ct. at 3337.
449. Id. at 3335.
450. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932).
451. 105 S. Ct. at 3336-38.
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wrote Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United
States, the Court has finally applied his analysis to the Murray's
Lessee public-rights category.452 The inevitable conclusion is that
the public-rights category is so flexible as to envelop, virtually at
Congress' option, the private-rights category.
3. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.45 3 Schor is a
rather complicated case, for it involves a complaint about non-article III adjudication raised by one found to have waived his personal rights to an article III court.4 " Justice O'Connor's opinion
for all Justices, save Brennan and Marshall, who dissented, 455 is

the only Supreme Court opinion I know of that separates the
Court's institutional interest in article III's tenure and salary requirements from an individual's personal interest in having his
case before an insulated judge. The Court holds that only the personal interest is waivable. 4 " Thus, a party who waived his personal rights to an article III court still has standing to assert article III's institutional requirements in challenging a non-article III
adjudication. This analysis is complicated somewhat by the Court's
conclusion that the institutional interests of the article III courts
are to some degree less threatened by article I adjudication where
it occurs by choice of the parties.457
In Schor, a commodity broker's customer brought a proceeding before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, charging violations of requirements of the Commodities Exchange Act
("CEA").4'" The relief sought was a statutory form of monetary
damages. 59 At the customer's option, the case could have been
commenced in court in the first instance. 460 The broker denied
452. See supra notes 285-92 and accompanying text.
453.

106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).

454. Id. at 3257.
455. Id. at 3262 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices clung steadfastly to
the structured analysis of non-article III adjudication that the Northern Pipeline plurality
had advanced.
456. Id. at 3256-57.
457. Id. at 3260.
458. Id. at 3250.
459. Id. Section 7 of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982), permits persons injured by
violations of the CEA or regulations promulgated thereunder to apply to the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission "for an order awarding actual damages proximately caused
by such violation." Under section 18(l) injured parties may have the order enforced in
federal district court.
460. See 18 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982) ("Any person complaining of any violation. . .may
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liability, but counterclaimed for his fee as permitted by agency
regulation. 61 By choosing to commence his action before the
Commission, the customer waived his right to article III adjudication of whatever violations there may have been to his personal
rights.

4 2

The Court's opinion must be read in light of this waiver. it is
possible, though not likely, that the basic outlines of the Court's
analysis would change if the personal right to an article III tribunal had not been waived. Much more likely is the possibility that
the balancing test articulated by the Court in Schor and discussed
below would still apply, but in a way weighted more strongly
against constitutionality.
In upholding the CEA as not in violation of article III's protection of the judiciary, the Schor majority, now including two defectors from the Northern Pipeline plurality, expanded and clarified
the approach of the majority in Thomas. The detailed distinctions
of the former plurality were even more clearly rejected:
In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal impermissibly threatens the integrity of the Judicial Branch, this Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules. [citing Thomas]....
Although such rules might lend a greater degree of coherence to this area
of law, they might also unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed and
46 3
innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers.

Given the rather limited powers of the CEA,464 the Court
would naturally have characterized that agency as an adjunct, had
it subscribed to the Northern Pipeline distinction between an article
I court and an adjunct. Doing so would have bolstered the Court's
conclusion of constitutionality. Yet, as in Thomas, nowhere in the
opinion is there mention of adjuncts. The words "non-Article III
tribunals" are used throughout to deal generically with untenured
federal judicial decision makers.
What the Court substitutes for the Northern Pipeline plurality's
detailed map of article III is a list of factors to be considered in
...apply .... ): 106 S. Ct. at 3250.
461. 106 S. Ct. at 3251: see 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2) (1983) amended by 17 C.F.R.§
12.19 (1986).
462. 106 S. Ct. at 3257.
463. Id. at 3258.
464. Id. at 3258-59.
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appraising the validity of any particular non-article III adjudication. Here is the list of factors, which the Court makes clear is not
necessarily exhaustive: 65 (1) "the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to the Article III
courts"-in other words, the breadth of the subject matter jurisdiction of a judicial body and the extent of its powers within that
jurisdiction; (2) "the origins and importance of the rights to be
adjudicated"; and (3) "the concerns that drove Congress to depart
from the requirements of Article III.' '466

This list, of course, represents a combination of views present
in the various Northern Pipeline opinions. The first two factors
were stressed by the Northern Pipeline plurality, 6 7 but are now cut
free from the arbitrary distinctions drawn there. The balancing
approach and the presence of the third factor listed above are
most strongly traceable to the Northern Pipeline dissenting opinion. 48 Indeed, most generally, Schor tracks the Northern Pipeline
dissent in its concern with allowing Congress great freedom to
solve practical problems, but not so much as to undermine the
central role of an independent judiciary.
The third factor addresses many of the problems that would
result from extending Crowell too far. Apparently using this factor, the Court concludes that even a sweeping, but entirely voluntary, alternate system of federal judicial tribunals might violate article III:
This is not to say, of course, that if Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of the Article III
courts without any Article II supervision or control and without evidence of
valid and specific legislative necessities, the fact that the parties had the elecchoice would necessarily save the
tion to proceed in the forum of 4their
69
scheme from constitutional attack.

Here, in the context of a hypothetical, the Court makes clear
its view that Crowell's permission to use non-article III tribunals is
limited, however loosely, by the real need to use a specialized tribunal. 470 The excerpt goes beyond making explicit what was im465.
466.
467.

106 S. Ct. at 3258.
Id.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 450 U.S. 50, 77-86

(1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
468.
469.

Id. at 113-16 (White, J., dissenting).
106 S. Ct. at 3260.

470. Indeed, the excerpt suggests that even in cases involving a congressionally cre-
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plicit in Crowell; it declares a willingness to engage, however deferentially, in more than a perfunctory review of Congress' motives
and findings of need.4 '
As for the public rights/private rights distinction, the demotion in Thomas has been clarified. According to the majority, when
Congress creates an interest, short of a full-fledged, vested, oldstyle property right, it has great power to use potent non-article
III tribunals for adjudication." 2 Presumably this is true for "new
property" rights, 473 which must, of course, be accorded due pro-

cess, 47 but not necessarily in an article III tribunal. 17
As for rights originating in the states, the majority has heightened concern, not because of state origination, but because such
rights are more likely to be private, common-law rights. 7T Cor-

rectly citing Murray's Lessee, the Court notes that cases involving
private, common-law rights were historically the core. of the judicial power. 7 While this analysis is historically correct, it may be
that there is a more pressing need for an insulated judiciary, in
other categories of cases not envisioned by the framers, because of
the limited view of the federal commerce power in 1789. Today's
myriad federal civil proceedings, pitting the government as regulator against business and individuals, may be at greater risk of
improper influence than a prototypical private contest over monetary liability.47 8
The Schor majority's elaboration and application of the balancing approach requires further analysis. As did the plurality in
NorthernPipeline, the Schor Court correctly stressed the breadth or
narrowness of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the CEA's province quite limited. 47 9' This is an appropriate factor because a main
ated right not in substitution for an admiralty or common law right, non-article III adjudication must be justified by reasons like those offered in Croweli.
471. Beyond the Court's hypothetical, consideration of Schor's third factor might prohibit, for example, Congress' assigning sensitive civil-rights cases to an agency, if done
clearly in an attempt to avoid Court-declared rights.
472. 106 S. Ct. at 3259.
473. See Reich, supra note 163.
474. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
475. See, e.g., Clevelaild Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
476. 106 S. Ct. at 3259.
477. Id.
478. See Redish, supra note 417, at 210.
479. 106 S. Ct. at 3258-59. Compare id. with 458 U.S. at 85 (Brennan, J., plurality
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practical justification for a non-article III tribunal is expertise.
The broader the jurisdiction the less substantial this claim. Additionally, the broader the spectrum of jurisdiction the greater the
portion of the judicial power spectrum occupied by an agency,
and hence the greater the threat to the tenured judiciary as an
institution.480
Difficulties arise from the consideration of other factors. If a
tribunal is operating within an appropriately narrow judicial spectrum, why should it not have almost all the powers of a court and
why do we care if it employs juries? In other words, why can it not
look substantially like a court within its province? There are several possible answers. If the power is a power to substantially encroach on liberty, perhaps there is a point to this concern. For
example, contempt power and, possibly, wide powers to issue discovery orders, do seem like potentially real problems. The use of
juries in some contexts might suggest that the claimed need for
agency or tribunal expertise is artificial. Such powers are matters
of real importance.
My concern is that the Court's formulation can easily be read
as permitting consideration of the trappings of court-like status.
This obscures the real question of whether a particular bundle of
potent powers poses any real threat, and if so, whether it carries
countervailing benefits. I recognize the Court has adopted a balancing approach, but my concern is that the Court put real interests in the balance and not just trappings. I am particularly concerned about the Court's recurring emphasis on whether the
tribunal's judgment may be enforced only if an article III court
orders enforcement.4 ' As mentioned earlier, the real issue is not
whether it is the winning party or the losing party who must bring
the matter before an article III court, it is, rather, whether the
losing party can have his day in court and, if so, what $tandard of
review will be applied.
As for the standard of review, the Schor Court found the
Commodities Exchange Commission's fact-findings reviewable in
an article III tribunal under what it saw as the more searching
opinion).

480. See 106 S. Ct. at 3260.
481. See, e.g., id. at 3259: Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 105 S. Ct.
3325, 3338-39 (1985): see 458 U.S. at 85-86.
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"weight of the evidence" standard applied in Crowell,482 rather
than what it saw as the more deferential "clearly erroneous" review that helped condemn the Bankruptcy Court in Northern Pipeline."83 Neither in Northern Pipeline nor in Schor did the Court cite
any authority for its conclusion that the Crowell standard provides
more thorough review of fact-finding.""' My research indicates
that, as interpreted by the Court, the statute involved in Crowell
required agency orders to be set aside only for errors of law or for
nearly complete lack of evidence to support factual conclusions.485
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Schor, described the
Crowell standard as a "weight of the evidence" standard, presumably meaning that the Court would set aside the agency's fact-finding if, after independently examining the record, it concluded
that the weight of the evidence significantly supported a different
conclusion. 488 This interpretation sees the reviewing court in

Crowell as possessing much greater power to set aside agency find482.

106 S. Ct. at 3259: see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 64 (1932).

483. 106 S. Ct. at 3259: see Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85. As Professor Redish has
suggested, Justice Brennan exaggerated the degree of court deference to agency findings
under the "clearly erroneous" standard involved in Northern Pipeline. Redish, supra note
417, at 218 & nn. 138 & 140. In fact, the clearly erroneous standard is less deferential than
the substantial evidence standard, which generally governs judicial review of administrative
decision making. K. DAVIS, ADMINIS*RATIVE LAW TEXT 528 (3d ed. 1972). Review under the
clearly erroneous standard is less deferential than review of the findings of fact by juries. 0.
WRIGHT & A. Mn.tI.FR, FEDERAL PRAC'rIc- AND PROCEDURE 730 (1971). Because of their special expertise at fact-finding, however, administrative agencies are often equated with juries. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra, at 528.
The substantial evidence test involves review for reasonableness. Id. On the other hand,
under the clearly erroneous test, a trial court's findings of fact do not bind the appellate
court if the latter has the "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Agency findings, however, "may be clearly erroneous without being unreasonable so as to be upset
under the substantial evidence rule." K. DAVIS, supra, at 528. Similarly, though a finding
unsupported by substantial evidence is clearly erroneous, the converse proposition is not
true: a finding supported by substantial evidence might not withstand clearly erroneous
review if,
for example, the finding is "against the clear weight of the evidence." C. WRIGHT
& A. M.I.LER, supra, at 735.
I believe the standard applied in Crowell was not the modern substantial evidence rule,

but its precursor which called for even less thorough review than its descendant. See supra
notes 6 & 8 and accompanying text. But, even assuming the statute involved in Crowell
called for modern-style substantial evidence review, Justice Brennan was in error in concluding that the weight of the evidence standard was a more thorough standard of judicial
review than the clearly erroneous rule.
484. 106 S. Ct. at 3259: see Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85.
485. See infra notes 487-89 and accompanying text.
486. 106 S. Ct. at 3259.
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ings than would a court reviewing under the clearly erroneous
standard.
Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the standard of review in
Crowell is clearly wrong. The cases involving the agency reviewed
in Crowell applied the most deferential standard conceivable for
judicial review of agency fact-finding.
By giving a large degree of finality to administrative determinations, contests
and delays, which employees could ill afford and which might deprive the
Act of much of its beneficent effect, were discouraged. Thus it is that the
judicial review conferred by §21(b) does not give authority to the courts to
set aside awards because they are deemed to be against the weight of the
errormust be one of law, such as the misconevidence. More is required. 48The
7
struction of a term of the Act.

This passage by Justice Douglas is very close to an accurate
description of the Crowell standard as applied in future cases. The
Court did not, however, consistently see the judicial role quite so
narrowly as the passage indicates: it is part of our tradition that
the notion "errors of law" has come to include at least gross misreading of the factual record by the body below. The Court did
acknowledge that it could reverse if "no evidence" in the record
supported the agency's conclusions.48 n
Occasionally, under special provisions of the statute requiring
"substantial evidence," the Court made clear its view that this adjective added nothing either to the usual requirement that findings must be supported by evidence or to its usual rule that inferences drawn by the agency, if supported by evidence, would not
be disturbed.8 9 In short, it is impossible for me to imagine a more
487. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 569 (1944) (emphasis added). Section 2 1(b)
of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act provided that the conclusions of the Deputy Commissioner would be final "if in accordance with law." 44 Stat.
1424 (1927). The Norton case was not aberrant. At least with regard to findings of nonjurisdictional facts, the Court, from the very beginning, interpreted this as a requirement of
deferential review. Thus, for example, Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
We think that there can be no doubt of the power of the Congress to invest the
deputy commissioner, as it has invested him, with authority to determine these
questions after proper hearing and upon sufficient evidence. And when the deputy commissioner, following the course prescribed by the statute, makes such a
determination, his findings of fact supported by evidence must be deemed to be
conclusive.
Voehl v. Indemnity. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 288 U.S. 162, 166 (1933) (emphasis added).
488. See supra note 487.
489. Shortly after Crowell, in Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280 (1935), the Court
confronted the Longshoremen's Act's provision that "in the absence of substantial evi-
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deferential standard of review of fact-finding than that permitted
in Crowell. Anything more lax is not a standard for, but rather a
prohibition of, judicial review of fact-finding.
The current Court continues to suggest that Crowell was a
special case, not so much because it involved two private parties,
which was the reason given by the Court in Crowell itself,4 " but
because it involved rights substituted for common-law or admiralty rights.4 9 ' I am concerned that the current Court is not aware
of just how narrowly the Hughes' Court and its successors read
the constitutional requirements for review of ordinary fact-finding
in what it saw as the most sensitive of civil cases. 92 It is particularly troubling that the Court incorrectly stressed differences between the standard of review involved in Crowell and the standard
employed in Northern Pipeline in reaching its decision in the latter
case.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the history of the public-rights exception presented above,
up to the time of Crowell, should make clear, the public-rights catdence to the contrary," the employee should "have the benefit of the presumption of accidental death." Id. at 286. Citing Crowell, the Court stated that: "The statement in the act
that the evidence to overcome the effect of the presumption must be substantial adds nothing to the well understood principle that a finding must be supported by evidence." Id.
(footnote omitted). The Court continued:
If the employer alone adduces evidence which tends to support the theory of
suicide, the case must be decided upon that evidence. Where the claimant offers
substantial evidence in opposition . ..the issue must be resolved upon the
whole body of proof pro and con; and if it permits an inference either way
upon the question of suicide, the Deputy Commissioner and he alone is empowered to draw the inference: his decision as to the weight of the evidence may
not be disturbed by the court.
Id. at 286-87 (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, in South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940), Chief
Justice Hughes wrote that the Deputy Commissioner's finding of fact, "if there was evidence to support it, was conclusive ...." Id. at 258. Thus, he continued, "it was the duty
of the District Court to ascertain whether it was so supported and, if so, to give it effect
without attempting a retrial." Id. Even if the evidence permitted conflicting inferences, the
Deputy Commissioner's findings were, nonetheless, conclusive. Id. at 260-61; see Norton v.
Warner Co. 321 U.S. 565, 568 (1944).
490. 285 U.S. at 51.
491. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259.
492. Presumably these were constitutional requirements because the Constitution required judicial review of questions of law, which in turn included review for gross distortions of the evidentiary record. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49-50 (1932).
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egory has not been a stable one. The standard nineteenth century
public-rights case was a contest between a department of government and an individual concerning entitlement to a privilege.
When regulation of private business became acceptable to some
degree, the category of public-rights adjudication was extended,
de facto, beyond cases involving privileges, to cover public lawenforcement suits brought by the government. Starting with actions against the railroads in 1887, extended to some suits against
ordinary business corporations in 1914, and applied to many nominally private-rights actions in 1932, federal non-article III adjudication spread with a new view of the public interest.
In 1927, John Dickinson noted that the choice of recognition
of a private right or a public action, or both, is largely a question
of means for the legislature."9 3 Even early in this century, on occasion, private rights of action against private parties were conferred legislatively, largely for public purposes. 4 Conversely,
some suits by the government were old common-law actions in
public-law garb. 4 5 This has been even more true during recent
years. 96 Indeed, today it is often, though not always, fruitless to
493.
Procedurally . . . a line can be drawn, coinciding ... with the distinction taken
above between regulation by law alone and regulation by government. This
seems to be the distinction Professor Freund has in mind when he says that "no
community confines its care of the public welfare solely to the enforcement of
the principles of the common law." (§8) But functions which are in substance
the same will in the course of time pass from one side to the other of the procedural line . . . . Every matter of private law may, and generally does, involve

some issue of public policy. There is merely a difference of remoteness ...
[I in many fields of regulation public welfare or policy first makes its appearance
in common-law adjudications of differences between individuals. This policy in
the course of time may come to be enforced directly by an administrative
agency or criminal proceedings. But it would seem that the function of government performed in both instances the same, namely, "that of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."
J. DICUKNSON, supra note 161, at 28 n.49 (footnote omitted).
494. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (treble actual damages awardable to
successful private plaintiff). For a later example, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78p (1982) (either issuer or holder of security permitted to sue to recover, for
corporation, the short swing profits regardless of actual harm). These and other measures
largely aimed at deterrence empower private citizens to be public enforcers.
495. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
496. For an indication of the modern uses of private rights, or at least private standing, to police public programs, see Stewart & Sunstein, Pu'blic Programs and Private Rights,
95 HARV. L. REv. 1193 (1982). For a discussion of another sort of action, which occasionally
may have a greater public than private/ flavor-the claim of a third-party beneficiary of a
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attempt to distinguish between federal rights of action created or
recognized primarily for private, individual benefit, and those created as incentives for private policing of public values. 497 As a result, any attempted public/private distinction, particularly a nominal one focusing on the nature of the parties to an adjudication,
seems to provide no useful foundation for an exception to article
III's requirements.
The Court has finally come to some recognition of these facts
in Thomas and in Schor. The focus now is off arbitrary distinctions
between the public and the private and between article I courts
and adjuncts. The focus is now properly on balancing the need for
non-article III adjudication against the threat it poses to a variety
of private interests and rights, and to the tenured judiciary. The
Court currently emphasizes the interplay of (1) the source, importance, and sensitivity of the rights to be adjudicated, (2) the practical need for non-article III adjudication, (3) the portion of the
judicial power spectrum preempted by non-article III institutions,
and (4) the degree of review available in the article III courts.
Given the long history of exceptions to article III, this look
directly at the problem is for the good. Looking backwards nearly
200 years, it is, however, natural to wonder whether the changes
were not so dramatic as to warrant a constitutional amendment.
At some point, it becomes clear that a constitutional "symbol" has
been so changed that it bears no resemblance to its former self.
Perhaps even for so-called loose constructionists, this marks the
limit of acceptable informal constitutional amendment by the
courts. Our vantage point obscures the difficulty in recognizing
when this point approaches: the dramatic change in article III,
with a few exceptions, has been the product of a great many small
adjustments. I understand and respect the sentiments of those
who would wipe out 200 years of exceptions as illegitimate and of
those who would seek the legitimating effect of a constitutional
amendment. Neither approach seems realistic today.
Without abandoning 200 years of case law, the Court's current approach seems the best alternative for preserving a meaningful article III. The current Supreme Court continues to take
government contract-see Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party
Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1176-99 (1985).
497. The doctrine of a competitor's standing to challenge agency violations of law that
aid her competitor is a clear case of mixed motives.
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the position that non-article III adjudication seems easiest to justify where congressionally created rights are at issue. Given the
vast powers of the federal government to tax and to regulate,
such cases may be of greater importance and sensitivity than actions resembling common-law damage suits. Still, the Schor Court's
criteria may allow it to deal deftly with this constitutional-prudential problem by invalidating the more threatening forms of nonarticle III adjudication.
One source of doctrinal opposition to flexibility over cases involving congressionally created rights comes from those who see a
flat prohibition in the modern doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The underpinnings of such flexibility originated in Murray's
Lessee's view that, when Congress creates a right, it is free to condition it as to procedural incidents, including the availability vel
non of an article III forum.4 98 Although there is a strong surface
argument that what the Court has said in recent cases is inconsistent with its procedural due process and other unconstitutionalconditions cases,49 9 I do not believe that is so. The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine has not been, and should not be, an absolute abandonment of the notion that an institution that creates
an interest normally controls the terms on which it is granted. It
is, rather, a flexible doctrine that condemns such conditioning
when it poses an unacceptable threat to recognized constitutional
values. 500 Soundly applied, the current majority's balancing test
498. See Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and the Northern Pipeline Decsion, 1983 DbKE LJ.197. This was the position of the Northern Pipeline plurality, which
said that the legitimacy of non-article IIIadjudication in public-rights cases follows from
Congress' "power to define the right that it has created." 458 U.S. at 83.
499. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Fduc. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, (1985).
500 In a 1983 article, Professor Redish addresses the Northern Pipeline decision as it
bears on the legitimacy of agency adjudication. See Redish, supra note 498. 1 am in agreement with much of what he says. Indeed, I have tried to document, historically, his conclusion that the public-rights category will not bear weight. However, on an important point, I
must register disagreement or concern. Professor Redish concludes that the Murray's Lessee
justification for agency adjudication is so weakly established in the case law as to permit
reexamination, and that upon reexamination that justification is clearly insufficient upon
application of the modern doctrine of unconstitutional conditions:
In the present context the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument simply does
not work. First, the argument that the government may attach conditions to its
consent to be sued disregards the well-established "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine. Congress indeed may have no obligation to allow suit against it or to
provide a statutory benefit. According to the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, however, once Congress allows suit against it or provides a statutory ben-
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can provide assurance that those article III values that do survive
efit, it may not condition the right

. . .

on the waiver of the individual's first

amendment right of free expression. . . . Constitutional logic should not differ
when the relevant constitutional restraint is . . . Article III .
Id. at 212-13.
The quotation, of course, presents the unconstitutional conditions argument. For the
threshold argument that, given the weaker force of precedent on constitutional issues and
given the quantity and quality of the precedents establishing the Murray's Lessee justification, the precedents are not compelling, see id. at 204-08.
I have concern about the conclusion that the Murray's Lessee justification fails the "unconstitutional conditions" test, although perhaps Professor Redish is right. I disagree with
his statements that the outcome is clear or that the logic of the Murray'sLessee justification
is necessarily the same as that in his hypotheticals.
"The greater-includes-the-lesser" is a perfectly good argument for most contexts, including that of constitutional interpretation. Normally, those who grant power, whether in
a charter to a corporation or in a constitution to organs of government, would intend that
a power that can be exercised completely can be exercised partially or conditionally. It is
only in those instances, where other values important to the grantor are seriously, or needlessly, frustrated, that the argument clearly is no longer acceptable. The examples cited by
Professor Redish involved conditioning government benefits on the surrender of personal
rights under circumstances wherein the clear object was the surrender of what would otherwise clearly have been an important right. Murray's Lessee has a different flavor over a
wide range of its application.
Whether the doctrine condemns every instance of the pattern described by Professor
Redish depends upon where one begins the argument. There can be little argument with
one who sees in the Constitution itself a clear prohibition against the government's conditioning a power it possesses upon waiver of a constitutional right: there can be little argument, except to dispute the presence of such a prohibition. I am not attributing this position to Professor Redish. His view may rest either on such a position or on the view that
the doctrine owes its existence to a policy choice by the Court. The first is hard to support.
Assuming his view to be the second, the scope of the doctrine is not as clear as he seems to
believe. I do not see such a prohibition as coming directly from the text. It certainly is
within the bounds of reasonable argument to assert that government's prohibiting an activity, on the one hand, and its offering something conditioned on abstinence, on the other,
are not only literally and analytically two different things, but may often be different in
substance as well. "The basic flaw in the [unconstitutional conditions] doctrine is its assumption that the same evil results from attaching certain conditions to government-connected activity as from imposing such conditions on persons not connected with the government." Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81
HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1448 (1968): see L. TRIBE, AMERKICAN CONSTITTrIONAL LAW 510 n.30
(1977). If this is recognized, then the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is gloss or
constitutional common law, a legitimate enterprise, in my estimation. But it is also a purposive, rather than a mechanical, enterprise, for it requires choice and judgment. Such a
doctrine, in the form that we are discussing it, arose because the relatively new, yet extremely vast, taxing, employment, and other economic powers of the federal government
offered potentially pervasive, and originally unforeseen, ways of seriously undermining the
Bill of Rights.
In that context, there can be little quarrel that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
was a necessary compensatory adjustment made in the process of mapping old guarantees,
not easily abandoned, onto what had become a very different Constitution. Where, how-
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200 years of exceptions will not be unduly threatened.
There is one specific indication that the Court recognizes differences, even among instances of conditioning a congressionally
created right upon its assertability only in a non-article III trial
forum. The Court has continued to make clear its special concern
when a new federal right is conferred in forced substitution for
preexisting rights in admiralty and at common law. While this is
legitimately an area of special caution, I am concerned that the
Court has misread its precedents. The Court has stated that, in
such cases, what it views as Crowell-like, that is, relatively thorough, article III factual review must be available. In Crowell,
which involved a statutory substitute for an action in admiralty,
the article III review was, however, not thorough at all. 501 In
short, to a much greater degree than the current Court realizes,
its own precedents, carefully read, permit unreviewable authority
to agencies in statutory actions substituted for common-law and
admiralty actions.
Aside from concern for preexisting rights, the rest of the
Schor case does suffer from difficulties of vagueness and tranever, the imposition of a condition is not clearly designed to frustrate rights, but does so
apparently as a side effect, the proper scope of the doctrine is legitimately disputable. Considerations warranting extension include the degree to which important, protected interests are frustrated (even if as a side effect), the difficulties of drawing lines, and the need
for prophylaxis to guard against a well disguised intent to frustrate rights. Considerations
warranting limiting the doctrine are the facts that the doctrine is a judicial creation to
protect against a certain sort of harm, and that the conditioned use of a power is a presumptively valid means of achieving the ends for which the power was created.
Where a right, particularly one not given in substitution for another previously existing
right, is given, conditioned upon acceptance of narrowed procedure for its assertion, the
Court has behaved contradictorily on the surface. In Murray's Lessee and Northern Pipeline,
it has accepted conditioning, despite its effect on what otherwise would be a right. But in
due process cases culminating recently in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct.
1487 (1985), the Court has struck down conditioning.
These developments suggest that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine has been one
of balancing, consciously or unconsciously, and is not a simple mechanical rule. To use one
test among many, the Framers might well have approved the outlawing of conditions related to speech without disputing the premise of Murray's Lessee that article III was not
designed to limit Congress' power to consent to using virtually any sort of tribunal it
wished to construct for purposes of dealing with government benefits. The question
whether article III is being evaded, in the sense that evasion of the first amendment often
has been sought, must begin with a sense of the intended scope of its application, That is
simply not clear in the case of article III. This is not to exonerate non-article III adjudication under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, it is io say only that the result of the
intersection of the two is not clear.
501. See supra notes 482-92 and accompanying text.
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siency. When has too much of the article III spectrum been preempted by agencies and article I courts? What is a sufficient showing of need for expertise? What is a politically sensitive case today?
Does the validity of the assignment of a particular matter change
with the political climate? Is the Court then forced to declare the
constitutionality of a non-article III tribunal on a "for now" basis?
These are serious problems, but they are the inevitable result of
200 years of exceptions. In light of these problems, the Court's
new approach has merit. It aims right at the heart of what seems,
intractably, a set of intersecting problems of degree. Perhaps with
more experience, some patterns, governable by more precise
rules, may emerge and at least some rules may crystallize. After
years of practical pressures and, perhaps, some errant precedents
not easily discardable, there is currently no satisfying, bright-line
solution, but only hard choices to be carefully made.

